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ABSTRACT
YEN-TING LIN: Competitive Supply Chain Strategies in the Retail Sector
(Under the direction of Dr. Jayashankar M. Swaminathan and Dr. Ali K.
Parlaktu¨rk)
In response to increasing competition, quick response (QR) and vertical integration are
commonly used strategies in the retail industry to gain competitive edge. While the benefits
of these strategies have been well studied in a monopoly setting, their value under competition
has received less attention. It is therefore essential to understand the competitive value of these
strategies. In the first chapter, we investigate the value of an additional in-season replenishment
opportunity provided by QR in a supply chain with a manufacturer serving two competing
retailers. We find offering QR to only one of the ex-ante symmetric retailers may be the optimal
policy for a manufacturer, rather than offering QR to both of them or refraining from offering
it at all. Moreover, we show QR may prove detrimental to a retailer when retail competition
is taken into account. In the second chapter, we examine the value of vertical integration for
a manufacturer under channel competition. We build a model with two competing supply
chains, each with a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer considers three
strategies: (1) forward integration, (2) backward integration, and (3) no integration. We show
backward integration benefits a manufacturer while forward integration can be harmful to it.
For manufacturers’ competitive choice of integration strategy, we find manufacturers encounter
prisoner’s dilemma: every manufacturer chooses to vertically integrate, making them and the
entire channel worse off than they would be if none of them vertically integrate. Finally,
vertical integration can result in a better quality product sold at a lower price. In the third
chapter, we examine the impact of having strategic customers on firms’ profitability and the
performance of the entire channel. Interestingly, we show that having strategic customers
benefits a supplier from higher sales. It also benefits a retailer when a product is sufficiently, but
not overly, fashionable. The total supply chain profit can be higher with strategic customers.
A decentralized channel with strategic customers can perform better than a centralized one
iii
with strategic customers or a decentralized one with myopic customers. That is, decentralized
decision making and having strategic customers can improve channel performance.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the advice and collab-
oration of various individuals listed here, as well as countless others. I am eternally grateful for
their support, encouragement, and guidance. I am also blessed to enjoy the abundant resource
at the Kenan-Flagler Business School.
My greatest appreciation goes to my co-advisors Dr. Jayashankar M. Swaminathan and Ali
K. Parlaktu¨rk. Jay has been an incredible mentor, adept at developing big picture while being
supportive in technical details. His enthusiasm for research is contagious and motivational for
me. He always makes himself available even during his busy schedule as the Senior Associate
Dean of the Kenan-Flagler Business School. I am deeply touched by his passion and commit-
ment to research, and he sets himself as my best role model for academic success. Ali has shown
the details of deep rigor and strength in analytical skills. He generously has given his time and
challenged me to continuously improve my work on all levels. He pays attention to every de-
tail of my writing, and I tremendously benefit from his infinite patience and encouragement.
Working with Jay and Ali has been my privilege. I am deeply indebted to them.
Also special thanks to Dr. Ann Marucheck for her time and overall support throughout
my Ph.D. study. In particular, she helped me obtain my fifth year funding as a teaching
assistant, showing the generosity and strong support of our area to Ph.D. students. I also thank
Dr. Dimitris Kostamis and Dr. Tarun L. Kushwaha for agreeing to serve on my dissertation
committee. Their invaluable feedback and comments have further improved the quality of this
dissertation. I am also grateful to Sharon Parks, Erin Rimmer and Holly Guthrie for their
various support during my graduate study.
I have gained enormous support from my fellow doctoral colleagues: Vidya Mani, Kaicheng
Zhang and Paul Rowe. They added to my graduate study moments of levity and much-needed
v
extracurricular fun time. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Go¨kc¸e Esenduran, Aaron
Ratcliffe, Karthik Veeraswami Natarajan, Adem Orsdemir and Gang Wang for their friendship.
Above all, I give my special thanks to my parents and my sister. They have shared my
every moment of joy and sorrow. My parents have provided their time, best resource, cheering
and energy raising me up. Although my parents live in Taiwan and we do not have much
time staying together, they have shown their greatest support and care to me. Dad and mom,
thank you for loving me so much, and I want to share my greatest joy of accomplishing this
dissertation with you.
vi
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
xi 
 
 
1 
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
 
1.2 Dissertation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
 
1.2.1 Quick Response under Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 
 
1.2.2 Competitive Vertical Integration Strategies in the Fashion Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
 
1.2.3 Are Strategic Customers Bad for a Supply Chain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
 
 
2 Quick Response under Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
6 
 
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
 
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 
 
2.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
 
2.4 Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
 
2.4.1 SS Scenario (Two Competing Slow Retailers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..17 
 
2.4.2 FS Scenario (A Fast Retailer versus a Slow Retailer) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
 
2.4.3 FF Scenario (Two Competing Fast Retailers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
 
2.5 The Value of QR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
 
2.5.1 Monopolist Retailer Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
 
2.5.2 Impact of QR on the Manufacturer’s Equilibrium Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 
 
2.5.3 Impact of QR on the Retailers’ Equilibrium Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 26 
 
2.5.4 Impact of QR on the Channel’s Equilibrium Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
 
 
 
vii 
  
 
2.6 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 
 
2.6.1 Endogenous Wholesale Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..30 
 
2.6.2 Alternative Sequence of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
 
2.6.3 Limited QR Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
 
2.6.4 Numerical Study: Normally Distributed Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
 
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
 
 
3 Competitive Vertical Integration Strategies in the Fashion Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
 
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
 
3.4 Quality and Price Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 
 
3.4.1 Characterization of Equilibrium Quality, Prices and Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 
 
3.4.2 The Eﬀect of Integration on Product Quality, Sales and Retail Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
 
3.5 Profitability and Equilibrium Integration Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
 
3.5.1 Manufacturer’s Value of Vertical Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
 
3.5.2 Eﬀect of Vertical Integration on Channel Profitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
 
3.6 Forward Integration and Price Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
3.6.1 Forward Integration: Symmetric Reduction to Price Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
 
3.6.2 Forward Integration: Asymmetric Reduction to Price Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
 
 
4 Are Strategic Customers Bad for a Supply Chain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
 
.74 
 
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 
 
4.2 The Model and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..75 
 
4.3 Equilibrium Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
 
4.4 Impact of Customer Type and Channel structure on Profitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..83 
 
4.4.1 Impact of Customer Type on Firm Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 
 
4.4.2 Supply Chain Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84 
 
4.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
 
 
 
viii 
  
 
4.5.1 Capacity Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
 
4.5.2 Exogenous Wholesale Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.
89 
 
4.5.3 Quick Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
 
4.5.4 Price and Quantity Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
 
 
5 Conclusions and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
6 Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
. .96 
 
 
103 
 
6.1 Appendix I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
 
6.1.1 Monopoly Retailer Benchmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
 
6.1.2 Addendum to Lemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
 
6.1.3 Demand Variability v Threshold Values for the Base Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..104 
6.1.4 Demand Variability v Threshold Values for the Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 
 
6.1.5 Value of QR in Models E1 and E2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105 
 
6.1.6 When the Retailers Can Decide Whether to Adopt QR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 
 
6.1.7 Proofs for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108 
 
6.2 Appendix II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 
 
6.2.1 Equilibrium Decisions in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
 
6.2.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 
 
6.3 Appendix III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122 
 
6.3.1 Equilibrium Decisions for Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 
6.3.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 
 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
  
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 The Sequence of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 
 
2.2 The Scenarios that Maximize the Manufacturer’s Profit for m = 1, δ = 0.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 
 
2.3 The Boundaries Given in Proposition 5 for m = 1 and δ = 0.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 
 
3.1 Circular Model of Competition and Arc Distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
 
3.2 A Manufacturer’s Vertical Integration Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
 
3.3 Qualities and Sales in Scenarios NF and FF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 
 
3.4 The Effect on Quality when Changing from NN to FN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 
 
4.1 Sequence of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
 
4.2 Sequence of Events with Quick Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90 
 
6.1 Retailers’ Equilibrium QR Adoption Decisions . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
 
6.2 Regions Characterized in Lemma 10 (m = 1, v = 0.7, cw= 0.5, δ = 0.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
  
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Value of QR for cw= 0.2, 0.3 and δ = 0.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 
 
3.1 Parameters and Decision Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
 
3.2 Examples of Difference in Retail Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
 
4.1 Firms’ Equilibrium Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..82 
 
4.2 Firm Decisions with Quick Response when Customers are Strategic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 
 
6.1 Threshold Values in Section 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 
 
6.2 Threshold Values for cq in the FF scenario of the model E1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113 
 
6.3 Equilibrium Quality, Retail Price and Sales in Section 3.6.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Retailing is highly relevant to our daily life, and it also is a vital sector of most developed
economies. In the U.S. the retail business represents about 40% of the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) and is the largest domestic employer (Fisher and Raman 2001). Many operational
strategies have been developed in the retail industry to gain competitive edge. Among these
strategies, quick response (QR) and vertical integration have drawn much attention from aca-
demic circles for their popularity, and the value of these strategies has been shown within a
monopoly setting.
The retail industry, however, is facing two challenges: growing competition and smarter
customers. Many retailers extend their reach beyond domestic markets after their domestic
success. For instance, the Japanese apparel retailer Uniqlo invaded the U.S. market in 2006
(Alexander 2009). Such globalization draws more players into the arena and intensifies com-
petition faced by retailers. While fierce competition affects the value of operational strategies,
the value of QR and vertical integration has received less attention. Moreover, customers are
trained to be strategic: many shoppers intentionally delay their purchase until discounts are
offered in holiday seasons. This strategic move potentially lowers sales at the full price and
undermines retailers’ margins.
In this dissertation, we focus on retail competition and customers’ strategic behavior. We
examine how retail competition affects the value of quick response and vertical integration, as
well as the impact of customers’ strategic behavior on firm performance. Toward this end, we
draw from literature in operations, strategy, marketing, and economics to develop analytical
models. First, in Chapter 2, we study firms’ QR offerings and adoption decisions in competition.
In Chapter 3, we shift our focus to vertical integration, addressing a manufacturer’s choice
between forward and backward integration. Finally, in Chapter 4 we analyze how having
strategic customers affects the performance of a supply chain.
1.2 Dissertation Overview
1.2.1 Quick Response under Competition
Quick response was initiated by the U.S. apparel industry during the mid-1980s (Hammond and
Kelly 1990). It aims to increase production flexibility and therefore drastically reduces supply
lead times. This directly benefits retailers by enabling additional inventory replenishment as
updated demand information becomes available. The benefits of quick response have gained
much attention, and more and more firms have adopted QR to gain a competitive edge. Never-
theless, the growing popularity of QR also has intensified competition, potentially diminishing
QR’s value. While the benefit of QR in a monopoly setting has been studied extensively, its
value under retail competition has received less attention. Moreover, it is not uncommon to see
a manufacturer serving competing customers. For example, Hot Kiss, a California based man-
ufacturer serves junior fashion retailers Hot Topic and deLia’s as well as upscale department
stores like Dillard’s and Nordstrom (Bhatnagar 2009). Nevertheless, literature has focused
only on single-manufacturer-single-retailer relationships (e.g., Fisher and Raman 1996; Iyer
and Bergen 1997; Caro and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz 2010). The value of QR when a manufacturer
serves multiple competing customers has not been well understood.
In Chapter 2, we develop a stylized model with a manufacturer serving two competing re-
tailers. The retailers place their regular (initial) orders before the selling season starts. In
2
addition to an initial order, quick response allows a retailer an additional replenishment oppor-
tunity after demand uncertainty is resolved. The manufacturer sets the price for replenishment
opportunities while the retailers decide their inventory order quantities. We characterize re-
tailers’ ordering decisions and the manufacturer’s pricing decisions in equilibrium when none,
only one, and both of the retailers have QR capability. We then compare firms’ decisions and
profits across scenarios to reveal the value of QR.
We first confirm the popular belief that QR capability is beneficial to all firms in a monopoly
setting. However, in the presence of retail competition, we find that offering QR to only one
of the ex-ante symmetric retailers may be the optimal policy for a manufacturer, rather than
offering QR to both of them or refraining from offering it at all. Furthermore, we find that QR
may prove detrimental to a retailer when retail competition is taken into account. Interestingly,
a retailer that does not have QR capability may benefit from its competitor’s QR capability. In
addition, we confirm that the above insights continue to hold for the following extensions: (1)
when the manufacturer has full control over the price for all ordering opportunities; (2) alterna-
tive sequences of events; (3) when the manufacturer has a capacity limit for QR replenishment;
and (4) numerical study for other demand distributions.
A key message of this research is that firms need to pay attention to retail competition
before they make their QR offering/adoption decisions. A manufacturer does not necessarily
benefit from offering QR service to all of its customers. On the other hand, adopting QR
actually may hurt a retailer.
1.2.2 Competitive Vertical Integration Strategies in the Fashion Industry
Vertical integration extends a firm’s operational reach in a supply chain. In chapter 3, we exam-
ine manufacturers’ choices among no integration, forward integration and backward integration.
Forward integration extends a manufacturer’s reach over product distribution, tightening its
grip on the demand side, while backward integration allows stronger control over the quality on
the supply side. Both types of integrations are seen commonly in practice, and firms present
inconsistent choice of integration strategies. In the apparel industry, for example, Chinese
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manufacturer Esquel chooses backward integration for control over its cotton supply (Peleg-
Gillai 2007), while the Taiwanese manufacturer Tainan Enterprise chooses forward integration,
launching its own brand and establishing its distribution channel (Ho 2002). It is intriguing to
observe that in practice manufacturers - even in the same industry - demonstrate inconsistency
in the direction of vertical integration. Thus, in the presence of channel competition, we analyze
(1) the impact of vertical integration on firm profit, product quality and retail price; (2) the
effect of a manufacturer’s vertical integration on others choice of integration strategy; and (3)
manufacturers’ equilibrium integration strategies.
Vertical integration has received significant attention in marketing, economics and strategy
literature. Yet, previous studies consider only manufacturer-retailer integration (forward inte-
gration). We contribute to this line of research in two dimensions. First, by considering both
forward and backward integrations, we capture more options available in practice and are able
to examine a firm’s trade-off between them. Second, we endogenize firms’ investment in quality
improvement and investigate the effect of vertical integration on product quality.
We build a stylized model with two competing supply chains, each with a supplier, a manu-
facturer and a retailer. The supplier can attempt to improve the quality of material it supplies
to the manufacturer. The manufacturer makes a product and sells it exclusively through the
retailer. The manufacturer considers three strategies: (1) forward integration, (2) backward
integration, and (3) no integration. We analyze firms’ equilibrium decisions and profitability
under various supply chain structures.
Interestingly, we find that backward integration benefits a manufacturer while forward inte-
gration can be harmful. A manufacturer is more inclined toward forward integration when its
competitor integrates vertically. For manufacturers’ competitive choice of integration strategy,
we find that manufacturers encounter a prisoner’s dilemma: in equilibrium, every manufacturer
chooses to integrate vertically, and their performance will be worse off than if none of them
integrates vertically. Finally, vertical integration can result in a better quality product sold at
a lower price.
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1.2.3 Are Strategic Customers Bad for a Supply Chain?
Customers today are trained to wait for sales. They anticipate deep discounts on, for example,
the day after Thanksgiving, and therefore, intentionally delay their purchase. This behavior
limits retailers’ demand at full price and increases their challenges during sales seasons. Cus-
tomers’ strategic delay of purchase has gained growing attention to operations management,
and many remedies have been proposed to counteract customers’ strategic behavior. While
it is expected that customers’ strategic behavior would have an adverse effect on firm profits,
the impact of that behavior on the performance of the entire supply chain has not been stud-
ied. Therefore, our goal is to understand the impact of customers’ strategic behavior on the
performance of the firms and that of the entire supply chain, as a whole.
To that end, we build a model with a single supplier serving a single retailer who sells a
product over two periods. The supplier sets the unit wholesale price it charges to the retailer;
the retailer determines its order quantity and the retail price in each period. To understand
the impact of customers’ strategic behavior, we compare firm profit and the total supply chain
profit between two scenarios: (1) when customers are myopic, and (2) when they are strategic.
Myopic customers make their purchase decisions based solely on the current retail price without
considering future change in price. In contrast, strategic customers consider future change in
price and time their purchase; they may postpone their purchase in anticipation of future
discount.
Our results show that firm profits can be higher when customers are strategic. By holding
less inventory, a retailer eliminates customers’ incentive to delay their purchase, increasing their
willingness to buy at full price. As a result, this benefits a supplier with increased revenue.
Moreover, when the product is sufficiently, but not overly, fashionable, a supplier charges a
lower wholesale price to encourage its sales, and this benefits a retailer with lower costs.
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CHAPTER 2
Quick Response under Competition
2.1 Introduction
Quick response (QR) is an operational lever that aims to provide better response to variations
in demand. One of its benefits is to enable in-season replenishment through lead time reduction.
The success of QR has received much attention (Hammond and Kelly 1990), and its benefits
have been studied extensively in literature (e.g., Fisher and Raman 1996; Iyer and Bergen 1997).
Naturally, more and more firms have adopted QR to gain a competitive edge. For example,
a burgeoning British apparel retailer, Primark, uses QR for faster product turnover, and it
fetched 10.1% market share, while the market leader Marks & Spencer garnered 11.4% market
share in the U.K. in 2008 (Vickers 2008). Nevertheless, the growing popularity of QR has also
intensified competition, which can potentially diminish the value of QR. For instance, after its
domestic success with quick response, the Japanese retailer, Uniqlo invaded the U.S. market
in 2006 (Alexander 2009), and a similar move is taken by the British retailer Topshop whose
New York flagship opened in 2009 (Resto 2010). The effect of competition on QR, however,
has received less attention and not been fully understood, and it is our main area of focus in
this paper.
Despite the extensive studies on the benefits of QR for retailers (e.g., Caro and Mart´ınez-
de-Albe´niz 2010; Cachon and Swinney 2009), there has been less focus on the value of QR
to a manufacturer. When should a manufacturer offer QR? What is its optimal supply chain
structure? Should a manufacturer serving competing retailers offer QR? Indeed, it is not
uncommon to see a manufacturer serving competing customers. For example, Hot Kiss, a
California based manufacturer serves junior fashion retailers Hot Topic and deLia’s as well as
upscale department stores like Dilliard’s and Nordstrom (Bhatnagar 2006). Hot Kiss achieves
quick response by taking advantage of local production in California. Similarly, Makalot, a
leading Taiwanese apparel manufacturer serves Kohl’s, Target, JC Penny and Gap. In addition
to regular deliveries, Makalot also provides faster in-season deliveries to its clients, and achieves
quick response by flexible capacity allocation and improved information sharing with its clients.1
In the footwear industry, Yue Yuen, a major sportswear manufacture that provides a shorter
lead time than its competitors, supplies brand names like Nike, Puma and Adidas (Taylor 2008).
In this paper, we model a supply chain with a single manufacturer supplying homogeneous
products to two competing retailers. The retailers sell their products in a consumer market with
a single selling season. Prior to the selling season, the manufacturer sets the QR price for QR
replenishment, and then each retailer places a regular (initial) order at an exogenous wholesale
price. We allow the manufacturer to determine this price in Section 2.6.1. After observing the
actual demand, each retailer with QR ability places a second order at the QR price. Finally,
the selling season starts and the retailers compete in the consumer market, following Cournot
quantity competition. Quantity based competition is appropriate for industries with long supply
lead time (e.g., apparel and footwear); in these industries, price competition is less likely because
1Chou, L., Personal interview with the president of Makalot. February 2009.
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it requires instant adjustment of production quantity (Feng and Lu 2010).2 We consider three
scenarios, with zero, one, and both retailers having QR ability, respectively. We derive the
equilibrium for each of these scenarios and their comparison leads to a number of interesting
results.
As a result of interplay between demand variability and retail competition, we find that the
manufacturer may find it optimal to offer QR to only one of the ex-ante symmetric retailers,
rather than both of them. When a retailer attains QR ability, the tendency is to reduce the
initial order quantity and use the QR order to fulfill any additional demand. The manufacturer’s
value of QR therefore, depends on the trade-off between the initial order loss and additional
QR profit gain. As demand variability decreases, the expected size of QR orders and therefore
the manufacturer’s QR profit decreases as well. Furthermore, due to intensifying effect on
retail competition, the manufacturer’s QR profit from offering QR to the second retailer is
less than that of the first. Thus, when demand variability is sufficiently small, although the
manufacturer’s QR profit from the first retailer outweighs the profit loss in its regular orders,
its QR profit from the second retailer is insufficient to compensate the profit loss in its regular
order. Thus, it is more advantageous for the manufacturer to offer QR exclusively to one of the
retailers. When demand variability is sufficiently large, the manufacturer offers QR to both of
the retailers. Moreover, the total channel profit can also be maximized with only one retailer
with QR option instead of both, as retail competition hinders the value of having a second
retailer with QR option.
When retail competition is ignored, QR always benefits a retailer. Surprisingly, however, we
find that in the presence of retail competition having QR ability can be detrimental to a retailer
2Furthermore, quantity based competition keeps the problem tractable, thus, it is commonly used in com-
petitive models in the operations literature (e.g., Ha et al. 2008; Anand and Girotra 2007; Goyal and Netessine
2007; Mendelson and Tunca 2007).
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when demand variability is sufficiently small. When competing against a competitor without
QR ability, the competitor increases its order quantity to compensate for its lack of QR ability
by ordering a high amount, threatening to deflate the price. This in turn forces the retailer with
QR option to reduce its initial order. When demand variability is small, the benefit of using
QR to match additional demand is insignificant. Consequently, gaining QR ability hurts the
retailer due to potential loss from the initial order. In contrast, when the demand variability
is sufficiently large, QR benefits the retailer. Similarly, when competing against a competitor
who already has QR ability, not having QR ability enables a retailer to force its competitor to
reduce its initial order quantity. When demand variability is small, commiting to such a threat
as a result of not having QR ability dominates the benefit of reducing mismatch between supply
and demand using QR ability.
We demonstrate our results can continue to hold for a number of extensions by: (i) Allowing
the manufacturer to set the wholesale price endogenously; (ii) Considering alternative sequence
of events such as allowing the QR price to be set after retailers place their regular orders or
after demand uncertainty is resolved; (iii) Considering normally distributed demand through
numerical studies; and, (iv) Studying the outcomes when the manufacturer has limited capacity
for fulfilling QR orders. Overall, our results demonstrate how retail competition changes the
value of QR, and provide managerial insights to a manufacturer’s QR offering decision as well
as a retailer’s QR adoption decision.
These extensions also yield some additional results. Specifically, when the QR price is
determined after the retailers place their initial orders, the manufacturer may find it optimal
not to offer QR to any of the retailers. In addition, when there is limited QR capacity, the
manufacturer may always find it optimal to offer QR to only one of the retailers due to capacity
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limit even when demand variability is sufficiently high.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present our literature
review. Section 2.3 describes our model. Section 2.4 derives the equilibrium. Section 2.5
discusses the value of QR both from the manufacturer’s and retailers’ perspective. Section 2.6
presents several extensions to the base model. Section 3.7 offers our concluding remarks. We
present the monopoly retailer benchmark in Section 6.1.1, and all proofs appear in Section
6.1.7.
2.2 Literature Review
Understanding the value of QR has attracted growing attention in academic circles since the
early 1990s. Here, we first summarize papers that consider QR in the monopoly setting. In
their seminal paper, Fisher and Raman (1996) show how early sales information can be used
to improve demand forecasts and better manage production decisions. Iyer and Bergen (1997)
evaluate the effect of lead time reduction enabled by QR in a two-level supply chain, and find
that QR benefits the retailer while it may be detrimental to the manufacturer. Eppen and Iyer
(1997) examine the value of backup agreements. Under this agreement, a retailer can place an
additional order using QR up to a certain percentage of its initial order at the original cost,
but any additional order in excess of that fraction is charged a higher cost. They show that
backup agreements can benefit both the retailer and the manufacturer. Cachon and Swinney
(2009) identify the sufficient conditions under which QR benefits a retailer when it faces strategic
consumers. Fisher et al. (2001) propose a heuristic that determines both ordering quantities and
in-season replenishment time for a catalog retailer, finding this procedure offers the potential
to double that retailer’s profit. These papers do not consider the effect of competition, and
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they treat the price for QR replenishment as exogenously determined. By contrast, we study
the effect of competition on the value of QR, allowing the manufacturer to set endogenously
the price for QR replenishment.
While the above studies are restricted to monopoly, recently, Caro and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz
(2010), Li and Ha (2008) and Krishnan et al. (2010) have examined the competitive value of QR.
Caro and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz (2010) and Li and Ha (2008) focus on retailer competition like
our paper whereas Krishnan et al. (2010) focus on manufacturer competition. Specifically, Caro
and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz (2010) and Li and Ha (2008) consider duopoly retailers competing for
spill-over demand where consumers seek the other retailer only when their first choice retailer
runs out of stock. In contrast, we adopt Cournot competition, in which inventory competition
has a direct impact on the retail price. In addition, both Caro and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz (2010)
and Li and Ha (2008) treat the retailers’ cost for QR replenishment as exogenous, whereas
we allow the manufacturer to set that price. This allows us to study vertical interactions
between the manufacturer and the retailers in addition to horizontal retail competition. Such
variances in modeling approaches also leads to different results. Assuming identical prices for
all replenishment opportunities, Caro and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz (2010) demonstrate that QR
always benefits a retailer. Similarly, Li and Ha (2008) find a firm always benefits from having
reactive capacity that enables replenishments after better demand information is observed. In
contrast, we find QR may hurt a retailer when demand variability is too small.
Krishnan et al. (2010) consider a manufacturer selling its product through a retailer who
also carries a competing product from another manufacturer. The retailer can exert sales effort
to switch demand from one product to another. Therefore, their model studies the competition
between two manufacturers’ products sold by a single retailer. In contrast, we consider the
11
competition between two retailers selling products supplied by a single manufacturer. Krishnan
et al. (2010) find that QR can hurt the manufacturer’s sales because it reduces the retailer’s
commitment to promote the product.
QR enables additional order placement after better demand information becomes available,
and there exists a rich literature studying how firms can make use of updated demand infor-
mation in their procurement decisions. Gurnani and Tang (1999) analyze a situation in which
a retailer can place a second order when it receives better demand information. But at the
time of the first order, the price for the second order is uncertain. Weng (2004) considers a
single-buyer single-manufacturer channel in which the manufacturer is able to dictate its price
for the buyer’s second order. He presents a quantity discount scheme that coordinates the
channel. Milner and Kouvelis (2005) study the effect of demand characteristics on the value of
supply chain flexibility, which is characterized by the timing or quantity flexibility for the sec-
ond ordering opportunity. Donohue (2000) shows that a buy-back contract can achieve channel
coordination for a supply chain with one manufacturer supplying a single retailer. Cvsa and
Gilbert (2002) examine a manufacturer’s trade-off between offering early and delayed purchases.
In their model, a retailer places an order either before or after demand uncertainty is realized,
whereas we allow a retailer to place orders both before and after the uncertainty is resolved. In
addition, Cachon (2004), Dong and Zhu (2007), and Erhun et al. (2008a) examine the impact
of push, pull, and advance-purchase discount contracts. Although these models incorporate
the idea of making use of updated demand information in procurement decision, only Milner
and Kouvelis (2005), Erhun et al. (2008a) and Cvsa and Gilbert (2002) study the value of this
ability. Moreover, only Cvsa and Gilbert (2002) consider the effect of competition.
Models with multiple ordering decisions, albeit without demand information updates, are
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also of particular interest to operations management. Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Simchi-Levi
(2007) and Erhun et al. (2008b) examine the effect of multiple procurement opportunities before
an uncertain selling season starts. Both find more frequent procurement decreases double
marginalization while increasing profitability for all supply chain participants. Anand et al.
(2008) present a two-period model with identical deterministic demand curves and endogenous
wholesale prices. They remove classical motivations and highlight strategic implications for
carrying inventory. This model is extended by Keskinocak et al. (2008) to incorporate capacity
limitations. Works that highlight competition with multiple ordering opportunities include Hall
and Porteus (2000), Netessine et al. (2006), and Liu et al. (2007). All of these study products
sold in multiple periods, whereas we are concerned with a short life cycle product that is sold
over a single period. Furthermore, these works do not study the effect of improved demand
information on inventory decisions.
In addition to using quick response, researchers have identified a number of operational
strategies to cope with demand uncertainty. For example, a firm that produces and sells its
product directly to consumers may invest in reactive capacity to allow for additional production
after better demand information is obtained (e.g., Raman and Kim, 2002; Li and Ha, 2008).
Although both QR and reactive capacity enable a second replenishment opportunity, the second
replenishment is limited by the capacity level set beforehand in the case of reactive capacity.
Delayed product differentiation provides firms with another instrument to respond to demand
uncertainty (e.g., Lee and Tang, 1997; Anand and Girotra, 2007). It allows a firm to configure
an intermediate good into different products after demand uncertainty is resolved, whereas QR
considers a firm’s ability to order additional inventory. Finally, spot trading is also another
commonly used strategy and its value is studied by Mendelson and Tunca (2007). While spot
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trading allows retailers to trade among themselves, in our model QR only allows them to buy
additional units from the manufacturer. Mendelson and Tunca (2007) show spot trading can
adversely affect a firm, and similarly we find that QR ability can be harmful in a competitive
environment.
2.3 The Model
First we introduce the demand model, followed by detailed descriptions of the firms’ decisions.
We consider a manufacturer supplying homogeneous products to two competing retailers, in-
dexed by i = 1, 2. All firms are risk neutral and seek to maximize their individual expected
profits. The retailers sell their products in an uncertain consumer market with a linear demand
curve:
p = A−
2∑
i=1
Xi,
where p is the clearing price, Xi is the quantity sold by retailer i, and A is the demand state that
takes values m+v and m−v with equal probabilities, i.e., P (A = m+v) = P (A = m−v) = 0.5,
where m is the mean demand, and v is a measure of demand variability. We also discuss what
happens when A is normally distributed in Section 2.6.4. The distribution of A is public
information. We assume 0 < v < m to avoid non-positive demand state. We refer to A = m+v
as “high market,” and similarly A = m− v as “low market.”
There are two types of retailers: slow (S) and fast (F). They differ in their ordering oppor-
tunities. A slow retailer has only one ordering opportunity: it places its regular order before
the demand uncertainty is resolved. In addition to this initial order, a fast retailer has QR
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ability to place a second order after the demand uncertainty is resolved. Each retailer places its
regular order Qi at a wholesale price cw per unit, and each fast retailer places its QR order qi at
a price cq per unit. We assume the order quantities are public information, which is common in
models of inventory competition (e.g., Li and Ha 2008; Netessine et al. 2006; Olsen and Parker
2008). The products are sold in a single selling season. We assume that the salvage value of the
products is insignificant, and the retailers sell out all of their inventory in the selling season,
that is, Xi = Qi + qi. This is a common assumption in literature (e.g., Goyal and Netessine
2007; Chod and Rudi 2005; Anand et al. 2008). Therefore, a retailer’s profit πi is given as
follows. Note that qi = 0 for a slow retailer i, and it only chooses Qi.
πi = (A−
2∑
j=1
(Qj + qj))(Qi + qi)− cwQi − cqqi, i = 1, 2, (2.1)
As (2.1) shows, retailer i’s profit consists of three parts: the first part represents retailer i’s
revenue; the second, its cost for the initial order; and the last part captures its cost for the QR
order.
The wholesale price cw for regular orders is exogenously determined. However, the manu-
facturer determines its unit price cq for QR orders. This mimics the situation in which many
other manufacturers are able to deliver the products when given sufficiently long lead time,
determining that the wholesale price cw is dictated by competition. By contrast, few other
manufacturers are able to offer quick response as it requires additional capabilities. This makes
it possible to dictate its QR price cq. Note that we also study what happens when the wholesale
price cw is set endogenously in Section 2.6.1.
The manufacturer’s production cost for regular orders is normalized to zero. Because imple-
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FIGURE 2.1: The Sequence of Events
menting QR requires additional costs (e.g., overtime expenses and more costly transportation
methods) however, the manufacturer incurs a cost premium δ > 0 per unit for QR replenish-
ments. We assume δ < v to eliminate trivial cases in which the QR cost δ is so high, QR is never
used. Thus, given the retailers’ order quantities, the manufacturer’s profit πM is calculated as:
πM = cw (
2∑
i=1
Qi) + (cq − δ)(
2∑
i=1
qi). (2.2)
To avoid an additional trivial case, we assume cw < m. When cw ≥ m the product is not
feasible (i.e., no unit will be sold). This can be seen clearly from (2.3).
Figure 2.1 shows the order of events: First, the manufacturer announces the QR price cq.
Retailers then place their regular orders simultaneously for delivery before the beginning of the
selling season. The demand state A is revealed completely to the retailers. Next, each fast
retailer places its QR order, which will also be delivered before the selling season. Finally, the
selling season ensues during which the retailers sell their inventory, and profits are realized.
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2.4 Competition
We consider three competition scenarios, denoted by SS (two competing slow retailers), FS
(one fast retailer versus one slow retailer), and FF (two competing fast retailers). In this
section, we solve for the firms’ subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) strategies in each
scenario. We will compare these scenarios to characterize the value of QR in the next section.
2.4.1 SS Scenario (Two Competing Slow Retailers)
We consider the SS scenario as a benchmark. In this scenario, none of the retailers has QR
ability, i.e., each retailer can place only a single order that must be decided prior to the resolution
of demand uncertainty. Consequently, this problem reduces to a single stage standard Cournot
duopoly model (Tirole 1988). In this scenario, retailer i’s expected profit is given by E[πi],
where E is the expectation with respect to the demand intercept A and πi is given in (2.1) with
q1 = q2 = 0. It is straightforward to show that the unique equilibrium is given by:
Qi =
m− cw
3
, i = 1, 2. (2.3)
2.4.2 FS Scenario (A Fast Retailer versus a Slow Retailer)
We now study competition between a fast (1) and a slow retailer (2): In this scenario, as
described by the sequence of events given in Figure 2.1, QR ability allows the fast retailer to
place an additional order after demand uncertainty is revealed. In the following, we derive the
firms’ equilibrium decisions by applying backward induction.
In the last stage game, the demand state A is revealed to the retailers. The fast retailer
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determines its QR order quantity q1 to maximize its profit π1 that is given by (2.1). It is
straightforward to show that π1 is concave in q1, and, following the first order condition, retailer
1’s optimal QR order quantity is given by:
q1 = (
A− cq −Q2
2
−Q1)+, (2.4)
where, A is the demand state, cq is the unit QR ordering cost, and (x)
+ = max(0, x). As
(2.4) shows, retailer 1 places its QR order following a base-stock policy and the base-stock level
decreases in both the QR price and the competing retailer’s regular order quantity.
In the second stage game, the retailers determine their regular order quantities to maximize
their expected profits E[πi]. The following lemma characterizes the retailers’ equilibrium regular
and QR order decisions.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique equilibrium for the retailers’ regular order quantity game in
the FS scenario. The retailers’ equilibrium actions are described below and the equilibrium
regular order quantities are given in Section 6.1.2 in the Appendices.
(i) For θ¯FS ≤ cq: Q2 = Q1 ≥ 0, and retailer 1 does not place a QR order for any market
outcome.
(ii) For θFS ≤ cq < θ¯FS: Q2 > Q1 ≥ 0, and retailer 1 places a QR order only in a high
market.
(iii) For cq < θ
FS: Q2 > Q1 = 0, and retailer 1 places QR orders in both high and low
market outcomes, where
θ¯FS = cw + v and θ
FS = min(cw,
3
7
m+
4
7
cw − 5
7
v,m− v).
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A higher QR price, cq, reduces the attractiveness of QR ability. As a result, when cq is
sufficiently high, as in case (i) of Lemma 1, QR is never used and thus the retailers’ behavior
is identical to that of the SS scenario. On the other hand, QR is used only in a high market
for θFS ≤ cq < θ¯FS. In this case, the slow retailer places a larger regular order than its fast
competitor to compensate for the lack of QR option. Finally, when cq < θ
FS, the QR price is
extremely low, and the fast retailer relies only on QR for inventory replenishment, it does not
place a regular order.
In the first stage game, the manufacturer sets the QR price, cq, to maximize its expected
profit E[πM ]. We characterize the manufacturer’s optimal cq in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let
βFS =


18m+
√
21(3m−5v+5δ)
36 for v ≤ 35m+ δ
m− 56(v − δ) otherwise
.
(i) When cw < β
FS, the manufacturer sets cq = cw +
v+δ
2 , the retailers order Q1 =
3
10(m −
cw)− 14(v − δ), Q2 = m−cw5 .
(ii) When cw ≥ βFS, the manufacturer sets cq = min(8cw−3m5 +v, 3m+8cw+7(v+δ)14 ), the retailers
order Q1 = 0, Q2 = (
45m−48cw−7(v−δ)
48 )
+.
In both cases, the fast retailer places a QR order only in a high market, and its QR order
quantity is given by (2.4).
When cw ≥ βFS, the wholesale price is extremely high and this results in a trivial case,
where the fast retailer never places a regular order, whereas when cw < β
FS both retailers
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place a regular order. In comparison to the SS scenario, equation (2.3) and Proposition 1 show
the fast retailer chooses a smaller regular order quantity because it has a second replenishment
opportunity.
2.4.3 FF Scenario (Two Competing Fast Retailers)
The FF scenario concerns competition between two fast retailers. Here both retailers can
place a QR order after the market uncertainty is resolved, as shown in Figure 2.1. We derive
the firms’ equilibrium decisions by applying backward induction. In the last stage game, the
retailers determine their QR order quantities. It is straightforward to show that each retailer
i’s profit, as given in (2.1), is concave in its QR order quantity qi. Therefore, retailer i’s best
response QR order quantity, qBRi , can be derived using the first order condition:
qBRi (A,Qi, Qj , qj) = (
A− cq − qj −Qj
2
−Qi)+,
where, i = 1, 2 and j = 3 − i. Without loss of generality, we assume that retailer i places a
larger regular order, i.e., Qi ≥ Qj. Let qFFi be retailer i’s equilibrium QR order quantity in the
FF scenario. By using the fact that the equilibrium should satisfy qBRi (A,Qi, Qj , q
FF
j ) = q
FF
i ,
we obtain the following equilibrium QR order quantity pair:
(qFFi , q
FF
j ) =


(
A−cq
3 −Qi, A−cq3 −Qj), if A− cq ≥ 3Qi
(0, (
A−cq−Qi
2 −Qj)+), otherwise
. (2.5)
Thus, a retailer places a QR order only when its regular order quantity Qi relative to the
demand A is sufficiently small.
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In the second stage game, the retailers determine their regular order quantities simulta-
neously to maximize their expected profits prior to observing the actual demand state. The
following lemma describes the retailers’ equilibrium actions:
Lemma 2 There exists a unique equilibrium for the retailers’ regular order quantity game in
the FF scenario. In equilibrium, Q1 = Q2 and they are given in Section 6.1.2 in the Appendices.
The retailers’ equilibrium actions are given below:
(i) For θ¯FF ≤ cq: the retailers do not place a QR order for any market outcome.
(ii) For θFF ≤ cq < θ¯FF : the retailers place QR orders only in a high market.
(iii) For cq < θ
FF : Q1 = Q2 = 0, and the retailers place QR orders in both high and low
markets, where
θ¯FF = cw + v and θ
FF = min(cw,m− v).
Note that Lemma 2 is structurally similar to Lemma 1. In the FS scenario, Lemma 1 establishes
the slow retailer initially orders more than its fast counterpart due to asymmetric QR ability. In
contrast, Lemma 2 shows the retailers choose equal regular order quantities in the FF scenario
as both of them have symmetric QR ability.
In the first stage game, the manufacturer sets its QR price to maximize its expected profit
E[πM ]. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Let
βFF =


m+
√
v2+2mδ−2vδ
2 for v ≤ (
√
2− 1)(m− δ)
2m+
√
2(m−v+δ)
4 otherwise
.
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(i) When cw < β
FF , the retailers order Q1 = Q2 =
m−cw
3 − 16(v − δ), the manufacturer sets
cq = cw +
v+δ
2 , and the retailers place QR orders only in a high market.
(ii) When cw ≥ βFF , the retailers choose Q1 = Q2 = 0,
a. for v ≤ (√2 − 1)(m − δ), the manufacturer sets cq = m+δ2 , and the retailers place
QR orders in both high and low markets.
b. for v > (
√
2− 1)(m − δ), the manufacturer sets cq = m+v+δ2 , and the retailers place
QR orders only in a high market.
In all cases retailers’ QR order quantities are given by (2.5).
Retailer behavior in the FF scenario is similar to that of the fast retailer in the FS sce-
nario—they place regular orders only when the wholesale price, cw, is not extremely high. In
this case, the retailers place QR orders if the market turns out to be high, but do not place any
QR order if the market turns out to be low. Also, equation (2.3) and Proposition 2 show a fast
retailer in the FF scenario chooses a smaller regular order quantity due to QR, in comparison
to the SS scenario. With a solid understanding of the firms’ equilibrium actions, we proceed
to evaluate the value of QR.
2.5 The Value of QR
Here we study the impact of having QR ability on the profitability of all channel participants.
This allows us to address numerous questions of managerial interest, including: Should the
manufacturer offer QR ability to all, some or none of the retailers? How does retail competition
affect the value of QR? Does QR improve the performance of the supply chain as a whole? What
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is the impact of demand uncertainty? Section 2.5.1 considers the monopoly retailer benchmark.
Sections 2.5.2, 2.5.3, and 2.5.4 consider duopoly competition and explore the value of QR for
the manufacturer, the retailers and the whole channel.
2.5.1 Monopolist Retailer Benchmark
To tease out the effect of competition, we first consider a monopolist retailer. We will contrast
monopoly and duopoly results to understand the effect of retail competition. When the manu-
facturer serves a monopolist retailer, the firms’ pricing and ordering decisions are described in
Section 6.1.1. Let ΠaR and Π
a
M be the expected equilibrium profits for the monopolist retailer
and the manufacturer, respectively, when the retailer is type a, where a = F, S stands for fast
and slow. The following proposition summarizes the effect of QR on the profitability of the
manufacturer, the retailer and the channel:
Proposition 3
(i) ΠFM > Π
S
M .
(ii) ΠFR > Π
S
R.
(iii) ΠFM +Π
F
R > Π
S
M +Π
S
R.
Proposition 3 shows that QR increases the profitability of the manufacturer, the monopolist
retailer and the entire channel. This is intuitive, because both the manufacturer and the retailer
can always match their no-QR profit. The manufacturer can nullify QR options by setting a
sufficiently high QR price cq. Similarly, the monopolist retailer utilizes QR only if it will increase
profitability.
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2.5.2 Impact of QR on the Manufacturer’s Equilibrium Profit
Next we turn our attention back to duopoly retailers. For example, how many retailers should
receive QR offers from the manufacturer? Most strikingly, we find that offering QR ability
to only one of the ex-ante symmetric retailers may be the optimal choice. Let ΠabM show the
manufacturer’s expected equilibrium profit when retailers 1 and 2 are types a and b, where
a, b = F, S. We define thresholds for demand variability parameter v to illustrate our results
in this section, these thresholds are displayed in Table 6.1 in Section 6.1.3.
The following proposition identifies the supply chain configuration that maximizes the man-
ufacturer’s profit:
Proposition 4
(i) For v ≤ vM , ΠFSM ≥ ΠFFM > ΠSSM .
(ii) For v > vM , Π
FF
M > Π
FS
M > Π
SS
M .
Figure 2.2 illustrates the optimal scenario for the manufacturer as Proposition 4 describes for
m = 1 and δ = 0.5. Note that the shape of vM boundary in the figure depends on cw R βFS, βFF
following Propositions 1 and 2.
A retailer with QR option decreases its regular order as seen in Propositions 1 and 2.
Furthermore, the expected size of the QR order decreases as demand variability gets smaller.
The manufacturer exchanges loss from regular orders for gain from QR orders which increases
in demand variability. When demand variability is high, as in case (ii), the manufacturer
prefers offering QR to both retailers. When it is small, however, as in case (i), surprisingly, the
manufacturer is better off by offering QR ability to only one of the retailers as opposed to both
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of them, because the FS scenario generates a larger profit for the manufacturer from regular
orders than the FF scenario. In this case, such profits outweigh the additional QR profit for
the manufacturer in the FF scenario. Due to retail competition, the manufacturer’s QR profit
from the addition of a second fast retailer (FS to FF) is smaller than that of the first (SS to
FS). Thus, even when QR profit from the first fast retailer (SS to FS) outweighs the profit loss
in its regular orders, QR profit from the second (FS to FF) may not be sufficient to compensate
the profit loss in its regular order. Finally, the FS scenario always yields a higher profit than
the SS scenario as the manufacturer sets the QR price endogenously: it can always nullify QR
option through pricing.
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FIGURE 2.2: The Scenarios that Maximize the Manufacturer’s Profit for m = 1, δ = 0.5
In sum, the manufacturer does not always benefit from offering QR to both of the retailers.
This is in contrast to the monopoly benchmark in Section 2.5.1, where the manufacturer always
benefits from offering QR to the monopolist retailer. Our results in Propositions 3 and 4
demonstrate the manufacturer’s optimal policy critically depends on (i) the competition in
retail market (monopoly vs. duopoly), (ii) the demand variability, (iii) its wholesale price for
regular orders (dictated by the level of competition in the supply market), and (iv) the cost
premium for QR replenishments.
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2.5.3 Impact of QR on the Retailers’ Equilibrium Profits
Turning to the impact of QR on retailer equilibrium profits, we now explore the value of QR for
a retailer under competition. Let Πabi be retailer i’s expected equilibrium profit when retailers 1
and 2 are types a and b respectively, where i = 1, 2 and a, b = F, S. The following proposition
describes a retailer’s value of QR as well as the impact of gaining QR ability on the competitor’s
profitability. It shows having QR ability can be detrimental to a retailer while benefiting its
competitor. (All of the threshold values used in this section are provided in Table 6.1 in Section
6.1.3.)
Proposition 5
(i) ΠFS1 < Π
SS
1 if and only if v < v
S
1 , and Π
FF
1 < Π
SF
1 if and only if v < v
F
1 , furthermore
vS1 ≥ vF1 .
(ii) ΠFS2 > Π
SS
2 , and Π
FF
2 > Π
SF
2 if and only if v < v
F
2 .
(iii) ΠFS1 < Π
FS
2 if and only if v < v
FS.
Contrary to basic intuition, Proposition 5.(i) demonstrates having QR ability can hurt a
retailer regardless of its competitor’s type when demand variability is sufficiently small, due to
the impact of QR ability on the competitor’s actions. For intuition, consider a fast retailer,
Retailer A, (who has QR option) competing against a slow retailer, Retailer B (who does not).
Acquiring QR option can be harmful to Retailer A in this case, because the slow competitor,
Retailer B, can credibly threaten to deflate the price by ordering a high amount to compensate
its lack of QR opportunity. Deflation of the price forces Retailer A to reduce its regular order
quantity. When demand variability is low, there is little to be gained from a QR order, and
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thus, Retailer A’s loss due to regular orders dominates, making QR ability harmful.
By the same token, when demand variability is high, mismatch between supply and demand
is also high, and Retailer B benefits from having QR ability even if this means giving up forcing
the fast competitor to reduce its regular order quantity. Note that Proposition 5.(i) also shows
vS1 ≥ vF1 . For QR to be beneficial, a higher level of demand variability is required when
competing against a slow competitor compared to a fast competitor. In other words, a retailer
whose competitor already has QR option is more likely to benefit from having QR opportunity
compared to a retailer whose competitor does not have QR option.
Ignoring competitive factors, our monopoly benchmark and existing work show that QR
always benefits the retailer (for example, Fisher et al., 1997; Iyer and Bergen, 1997). In contrast,
Proposition 5 demonstrates how competition can actually make QR unattractive to a retailer.
In addition, part (ii) of Proposition 5 shows when a retailer gains QR ability, it can actually
benefit its slow competitor. In particular, a slow competitor always fares better as it enjoys
a larger order quantity over the fast retailer. The fast competitor only fares better if demand
variability is small. Likewise, if both firms have QR opportunity, the competition in a high
market is intensified and this makes the fast competitor fare worse when demand variability is
high. In addition, part (iii) of Proposition 5 compares the retailers’ profits in the FS scenario,
showing the slow retailer achieves a higher profit only when the demand variability is sufficiently
low.
Comparing Propositions 4 and 5 also reveals that when a retailer is given QR option, this
can benefit all supply chain members. In particular, all of the firms are strictly better off in the
FS scenario than in the SS scenario when vS1 < v. In the next proposition, we describe what
happens when both of the retailers gain QR ability simultaneously:
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FIGURE 2.3: The Boundaries Given in Proposition 5 for m = 1 and δ = 0.5
Proposition 6 ΠFFi > Π
SS
i for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 6 shows that both retailers reap greater benefits if both gain QR ability si-
multaneously. When they all have QR opportunity, no retailer can threaten to place a higher
regular order quantity.
One might wonder what the equilibrium would be if retailers choose to adopt QR themselves
rather than having it dictated to them by the manufacturer. This is studied in detail in Section
6.1.6 in the Appendices. We find that the equilibrium is always symmetric, either both (FF)
or none (SS) of the retailers choose to adopt QR. Specifically, when demand variability is low,
none of the retailers adopt QR (SS), when demand variability is high, both of them adopt QR
(FF), and when demand variability is moderate both SS and FF scenarios can be equilibria.
2.5.4 Impact of QR on the Channel’s Equilibrium Profit
Next, we analyze which channel configuration, namely the number of fast retailers, is the most
profitable for the entire channel. Let ΠabC be the expected channel profit in equilibrium, i.e.,
the total expected profit achieved by the manufacturer and both of the retailers in equilibrium
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when retailers 1 and 2 are types a and b respectively, a, b = F, S:
ΠabC = Π
ab
M +
2∑
i=1
Πabi .
The following proposition compares the expected channel profits across the three scenarios.
Proposition 7 ΠFFC ≥ max(ΠFSC ,ΠSSC ) for v ≥ vC , and ΠFSC > max(ΠFFC ,ΠSSC ) otherwise.
Propositions 4 and 5 demonstrate QR ability benefits the manufacturer and the retailers
when the demand variability is sufficiently high but can be detrimental when it is low. Proposi-
tion 7 is in agreement. This is intuitive, since the channel profit is the sum of the manufacturer’s
and retailers’ profits. Proposition 7 shows the channel profit is maximized with two fast retail-
ers when demand variability is sufficiently high, otherwise the channel might be better off with
only one fast retailer.
Overall, the expected channel profit can be maximized by granting QR options exclusively
to a single retailer. In contrast to the monopoly benchmark where having a QR retailer always
benefits the entire channel, retail competition extends the optimal channel configuration to a
continuum: the total channel profit may be maximized by having one or two retailers with QR
ability.
2.6 Extensions
We now consider a number of extensions to our base model that suggest our key insights
continue to hold in various settings, and illustrate the robustness of our results.
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2.6.1 Endogenous Wholesale Price
First, we extend the base model given in Section 2.3 by allowing the manufacturer to dictate
the wholesale price at the beginning of the timeline.3 Specifically, now it chooses the wholesale
price cw to maximize its expected profit in equilibrium. In the following, we present the optimal
wholesale price the manufacturer would choose, then discuss the value of QR.
Lemma 3 Suppose the manufacturer can dictate the wholesale price, it chooses cw =
m
2 to
maximize its expected profit in all scenarios (SS, FS and FF ).
Knowing the manufacturer’s choice of the wholesale price, we are able to derive the firms’
equilibrium profits in each scenario. Comparing these profits across scenarios reveals the firms’
value of QR as the following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 8
(i) ΠFSM > Π
FF
M if and only if v < v¯M , and Π
SS
M < max(Π
FS
M ,Π
FF
M ).
(ii. a) ΠFS1 < Π
SS
1 if and only if v < v¯
S
1 , and Π
FF
1 < Π
SF
1 if and only if v < v¯
F
1 , furthermore
v¯S1 > v¯
F
1 .
(ii. b) ΠFS2 > Π
SS
2 ; Π
FF
2 > Π
SF
2 if and only if v < v¯C .
(iii) ΠFSC > Π
FF
C if and only if v < v¯C , and Π
SS
C < max(Π
FS
C ,Π
FF
C ).
The threshold values v¯M , v¯
F
1 , v¯
S
1 and v¯C are provided in Section 6.1.4 of the Appendices.
Proposition 8 shows our results in Section 2.5 continue to hold when the manufacturer is
able to choose the wholesale price in addition to the QR price. Specifically, Proposition 8.(i)
3It does not matter whether the wholesale price is set first or simultaneously with QR price, because both
prices are determined by the manufacturer and there is no other event happening in between these decisions.
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extends Proposition 4, showing the manufacturer’s optimal policy is to offer QR to only one of
the retailers when demand variability is low. Proposition 8.(ii. a) and (ii. b) echo Proposition
5. They demonstrate how QR ability can hurt a retailer when demand variability is sufficiently
low, and gaining QR can actually benefit the competing retailer. Finally, Proposition 8.(iii)
mimics Proposition 7 showing that the total channel profit can be maximized by having only
one QR-enabled retailer when demand variability is small.
2.6.2 Alternative Sequence of Events
In our base model, the QR price is set at the beginning of the timeline before the retailers place
their regular orders. Here, we discuss two alternative models with regard to timing of the QR
price and analyze the value of QR for the manufacturer, the retailers, and the channel as a
whole. Specifically, we consider the following models:
(E1): The QR price is set after the regular orders are placed, but before the realization of
demand uncertainty.
(E2): The QR price is set after the demand uncertainty is resolved. The remaining events are
the same as our base model.
Models E1 and E2 actually yield identical equilibrium outcomes in our setup. This is
because of the binary nature of demand distribution. In particular, in equilibrium, a fast
retailer places a QR order only in a high market. Therefore, the manufacturer always sets the
QR price for a high market, and the timing of the QR price (whether before or after demand
realization) becomes irrelevant.
We impose an additional assumption, cw ≤ δ, in this subsection. If this assumption is vio-
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lated, it demonstrates the manufacturer’s chosen QR price would be smaller than the wholesale
price (i.e., cq < cw).
4 Thus, retailers always place QR orders regardless of the demand outcome,
which is inconsistent with practice. Furthermore, relaxing this assumption creates a region with
no pure-strategy equilibrium in the FS scenario, which would complicate our analysis.
The following proposition summarizes the firms’ equilibrium actions for the models E1 and
E2.
Proposition 9 For the models E1 and E2:
(i) The FS scenario has a unique equilibrium in which Q1 ≤ Q2 and
a. For v ≤ ǫ1, the fast retailer does not place a QR order for any market outcome.
b. For v > ǫ1, the fast retailer places a QR order only in a high market and it does not
place a QR order in a low market.
(ii) The FF scenario has a unique equilibrium only for v ≤ ǫ1 and v ≥ ǫ2, but there does
not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium for ǫ1 < v < ǫ2. When the equilibrium exists, Q1 = Q2
and
a. for v ≤ ǫ1, the retailers do not place a QR order for any market outcome.
b. for v ≥ ǫ2, the retailers place QR orders only in a high market and they do not place
any QR order in a low market.
The threshold values ǫ1 and ǫ2 are given in Section 6.1.4.
Note that the SS scenario in E1 and E2 models is same as our base model—QR is not
offered and thus QR price is not relevant. When the retailers have QR ability, Proposition 9
4The proof of Proposition 9 in Section 6.1 shows how cw > δ implies cq < cw.
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shows QR is only used in a high market as in the base model. Notice however, a pure-strategy
equilibrium in the FF scenario for ǫ1 < v < ǫ2 does not exist, because having the QR price set
after the regular orders are placed results in piecewise concave profit functions for the retailers.
Retailer profit functions may contain multiple maxima, which leads to discontinuity in the
retailers’ best response functions.
Building on Proposition 9, we characterize the value of QR for the manufacturer, retailers
and the entire channel in Section 6.1.5 in the Appendices. These are formally stated in Propo-
sitions 30 to 32 in that section. We find that our results of the base model continue to hold
even when the QR price is determined after retailers place their regular orders. In particular,
the profits of the manufacturer and the entire channel can still be maximized by granting QR
ability to only one of the retailers, rather than both of them (Propositions 30 and 32). Further-
more, having QR ability can still be detrimental to a retailer while benefitting the opponent
(Proposition 31).
We also find additional results. In models E1 and E2, the manufacturer may find it optimal
not to offer QR at all when the demand variability is too low (Proposition 30). In contrast, in
our base model, the QR price is set at the beginning of the timeline and the manufacturer enjoys
the first mover advantage, consistently offering QR to at least one of the retailers (Proposition
4). When the QR price is set after retailers place regular orders, the manufacturer loses the
first mover advantage, and this reduces the value it can extract from the retailers due to QR.
Similarly, the total channel profit can also be maximized with no QR-enabled retailer at all
(Proposition 32). Finally, we compare retailers’ profitability in our base and E1 and E2 models
in Proposition 33 in Section 6.1.5 in the Appendices. We find that demand variability is the
key factor; competing fast retailers are better off in models E1 and E2 if and only if demand
33
variability is sufficiently small.
2.6.3 Limited QR Capacity
In this section, we study what occurs when the manufacturer has limited QR capacity to grant.
Specifically, we assume the manufacturer can fulfill at most k units using QR.When the retailers’
total QR order quantity exceeds the manufacturer’s QR capacity, the manufacturer allocates
its capacity evenly among the retailers. Any unused capacity by one retailer can be reallocated
to the other retailer. In addition to the assumptions for the base model, we further restrict our
analysis to k < (m − δ)/6 to ensure the QR capacity is indeed limited and binds in both FS
and FF scenarios. Moreover, given any QR capacity level k, we focus only on cw < m− 5k/3
to eliminate the unrealistic scenario in which retailers do not place a regular order due to a
high wholesale price. We derive SPNE for FF and FS scenarios and subsequently examine the
value of QR. The following proposition summarizes the effect of limited capacity on the value
of QR.
Proposition 10 When the manufacturer has a total capacity k for QR replenishment:
(i) Manufacturer:
a. ΠFFM > max(Π
FS
M ,Π
SS
M ) for cw < w˜M and v > v˜M .
b. ΠFSM > max(Π
FF
M ,Π
SS
M ) otherwise.
(ii) Retailers:
a. ΠFS1 > Π
SS
1 if and only if cw > w˜
S
1 and v > v˜
S
1 ; Π
FF
1 > Π
SF
1 if and only if cw > w˜
F
1
and v > v˜F1 .
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b. The imposition of QR capacity limit increases (weakly) the regular order size of a fast
retailer.
(iii) Channel:
a. ΠFSC > max(Π
FF
C ,Π
SS
C ) for cw > w˜C .
b. ΠFFC > max(Π
FS
C ,Π
SS
C ) otherwise.
Note that all of the threshold values are summarized in Section 6.1.4 in the Appendices.
Imposing QR capacity limit induces a fast retailer to increase (weakly) the size of its regular
order. We find our key insights continue to hold for this extension. This extension also yields
an additional insight. In our main model without the capacity limitation, the manufacturer
prefers having two fast retailers when demand variability is sufficiently high (Proposition 4).
With limited QR capacity, Proposition 10.(i) implies having only one fast retailer maximizes
the manufacturer’s profit when the wholesale price is sufficiently high (i.e., cw ≥ w˜M ). This
result shows the QR capacity limit can be also another reason for not offering QR option to
both of the retailers. Intuitively, given a high wholesale price, a fast retailer with QR option
decreases its initial order and relies more heavily on its QR order. In this case, however, the
manufacturer does not have sufficient capacity to satisfy QR orders of two fast retailers. Thus,
the manufacturer is better off by offering QR option to only one of the retailers which alleviates
the reduction in their initial order quantities.
2.6.4 Numerical Study: Normally Distributed Demand
In this section, we use computational studies to explore an alternative demand distribution.
Specifically, we allow the demand intercept A to follow a truncated normal distribution with
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mean 1 and standard deviation σ. We consider all combinations of the following parameters:
cw ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5},
δ ∈ {0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08},
σ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
For each parameter combination (cw, δ, σ), we numerically search for the firms’ equilibrium
decisions in the SS, FS and FF scenarios, i.e., when there are zero, one and two fast retailers
respectively, and this generates a total of 300 instances for our study.
We define the value of QR (VQR) for a retailer as the percentage increase in its profit after
adopting QR. Specifically, it is given by
ΠFb1 −ΠSb1
ΠSb1
× 100%, b = F, S, (2.6)
where ΠFb1 is retailer 1’s equilibrium profit when the competitor’s type is b. Similarly, we define
the value of QR for the manufacturer and the entire channel as the percentage increase in their
profits compared to the SS scenario, which is given by
ΠFbi −ΠSSi
ΠSSi
× 100%, b = F, S and i =M, C, (2.7)
where ΠFbi and Π
SS
i are the equilibrium profits of the manufacturer (M) or the channel (C)
in the scenarios Fb and SS respectively.
We find our key results continue to hold in our numerical studies. Table 2.1 reports our find-
ings for cw = 0.2, 0.3 and δ = 0.02, which is representative, and other parameter combinations
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TABLE 2.1: Value of QR for cw = 0.2, 0.3 and δ = 0.2
(a) Manufacturer and Channel VQR (%) in 2.7
Manufacturer Channel
cw = 0.2 cw = 0.3 cw = 0.2 cw = 0.3
σ FS FF FS FF σ FS FF FS FF
0.1 10.71 0.23 9.43 0.33 0.1 3.56 0.23 2.12 0.12
0.2 11.52 3.22 10.83 3.28 0.2 4.68 2.30 4.32 1.45
0.3 14.88 9.02 13.31 6.52 0.3 7.85 5.51 7.28 3.23
0.4 16.30 16.10 15.31 19.74 0.4 16.48 13.97 14.33 13.31
0.5 23.74 26.87 22.54 25.53 0.5 22.80 23.87 22.43 25.79
(b) Retailer VQR (\%) in 2.6
Competitor Type
cw = 0.2 cw = 0.3
σ FS FF FS FF
0.1 -30.92 -10.33 -31.12 -11.32
0.2 -9.75 -4.37 -9.54 -6.75
0.3 5.24 2.56 11.12 -2.83
0.4 11.40 4.81 22.29 5.42
0.5 28.84 13.46 30.42 15.74
considered in our studies also yield similar results. As expected, Table 2.1 shows the value of
QR for the retailers and the manufacturer increases in the demand standard deviation σ. For
cw = 0.3, the manufacturer prefers having only one fast retailer (FS) when σ ≤ 0.3, and two
fast retailers (FF ) otherwise. In other words, the manufacturer’s optimal policy is to offer QR
to only one of the retailers when the demand variability is not sufficiently high. Similarly, Table
2.1.(a) also demonstrates the total channel profit can be maximized with only one QR-enabled
retailer when demand variability is not sufficiently high (σ ≤ 0.4 for cw = 0.3). Furthermore,
Table 2.1.(a) shows the manufacturer and entire channel are always better off offering QR to
at least one of the retailers. Moreover, Table 2.1.(b) confirms having QR ability can hurt a
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retailer if the demand variability is not sufficiently high: Adopting QR hurts a retailer when
σ ≤ 0.2.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the value of QR under retail competition. For this purpose, we
consider a market served by two competing retailers and compare the equilibrium profits for
the manufacturer, the retailers and the entire supply chain as a whole, when QR is available to
one, both, or none of the retailers. We allow the manufacturer to set the prices for regular and
QR replenishments. We also consider a higher cost for implementing QR, thereby quantifying
the tradeoff between benefits and additional costs of QR.
We demonstrate offering QR ability to a retailer may harm the manufacturer when the
demand variability is not sufficiently high. In particular, we find a manufacturer may find it
attractive to offer QR to only one of the ex-ante symmetric retailers. This happens because a
retailer reduces its regular (initial) order quantity when it can place a QR order. Furthermore,
when the demand is not sufficiently volatile, offering QR can generate insufficient QR profit
to balance the loss that results from a retailer’s reduction in its regular order. Moreover, the
manufacturer’s additional QR profit gain from offering QR to the second retailer is less than
that from the first retailer, as a consequence of retail competition. Therefore, the manufacturer
does not necessarily benefit from having two retailers with QR ability. The total channel profit
can also be maximized with only one retailer with QR ability, instead of two, when demand
variability is not sufficiently high.
We also highlight the potential strategic peril of QR ability for a retailer in the presence of
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retail competition. As expected, QR ability benefits a monopolist retailer with better response
to variation in demand. However, retail competition undermines the value of QR, and obtaining
QR ability can actually harm a retailer when the demand variability is low and we explicitly
characterize when this happens.
We recognize our model has several limitations. We assume retailers who aim to maximize
their expected profits are risk neutral. Unlike a regular order, a QR order faces no demand
risk, thus it has a lower risk than a regular order. A risk-averse retailer will be more inclined to
use QR to decrease its demand risk. We expect a risk-averse retailer to increase its allocation
of QR order (and hence decrease its allocation of regular order), making QR more valuable
than our model predicts. Quantifying the impact of risk-aversion on the value of QR could be
a fruitful avenue for future work. Furthermore, our model assumes QR lead time is relatively
short compared to the selling season. However, this lead time can be significant and also later
arriving units may suffer from drops in sales price over the selling season. These factors will
degrade the attractiveness of QR and firms will shift their allocations from QR to regular orders.
Thus, when such factors are accounted, we expect the outcome to fall between our fast (QR)
and slow (no QR) firm scenarios. Nonetheless, our model cannot fully address these extensions,
and it would be worthwhile to generalize our setting to a multi-period model to allow for long
QR lead time and declining prices and study their impact.
We study a single supplier serving two retailers. While this is not uncommon in practice
(introduction provides some examples), we recognize other supply chain scenarios are possible,
e.g., a retailer having multiple suppliers, or each retailer having a distinct supplier and so
on, and some of our results may not apply to these scenarios. Thus, future work can study
the impact of supply chain configuration on the value of QR considering various scenarios.
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Furthermore, our numerical study in Section 2.6.4 suggests our results can continue to hold for
other more general demand distribution functions, however, showing this extension analytically
would be worthwhile for future work. We also note that, in practice, retailers may not observe
each other’s order quantities. In this case, the manufacturer’s pricing would provide a signal
about order quantities and retailers would choose their best actions accordingly. Additionally,
our model assumes the manufacturer incurs an identical unit QR cost δ for each retailer, making
it indifferent between them. In practice, however, due to geographic dispersion, one retailer
may actually result in a higher expediting cost, and thus the manufacturer may prefer offering
QR to the less costly retailer. Finally, generalizing our duopoly model to oligopoly retailers is
another possible extension. We expect with many competitors, reactions to a retailer’s gaining
of QR ability may not be as strong, thus, a retailer may be more likely to benefit from QR in
an oligopoly.
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CHAPTER 3
Competitive Vertical Integration Strategies
in the Fashion Industry
3.1 Introduction
Vertical integration, a 100-year-old strategy, is regaining a place in the spotlight amid recent
economic turmoil. This revival of vertical integration does not portend the formation of vertical
conglomerates, who exercise full control over material supply, manufacturing and distribution,
like Ford and Carnegie did in the early 20th century (Worthen et al. 2009). Instead, manu-
facturers present diversity in their directions of vertical integration: some choose to forward
integrate distribution operations, while others opt to backward integrate supply activities. In
this paper, we study a manufacturer’s choice of vertical integration strategy under competition
and look at its implications on profitability, product quality and price.
Forward integration extends a manufacturer’s operational reach to product distribution,
tightening its grip on the demand side. For instance, Pepsi purchased its bottlers for better
control over the distribution of its growing product offerings (Collier 2009). This control over
product distribution allows for better response to change in demand, making forward integra-
tion common in the fashion industry. For example, European fashion giant Zara, and American
Apparel, a Los Angeles based apparel retailer, manufacture products and sell them through
their own retail channels. Tainan Enterprise, a Taiwan based manufacturer, established its own
brand, Tony Wear, in China in the late 1990’s (Ho 2002). Conversely, backward integration
stretches a manufacturer’s operations toward the source of raw materials, seizing a stronger
control over quality on the supply side, one of the top reasons that motivate backward inte-
gration. For instance, steelmaker ArcelorMittal is moving deeper into the mining business to
ensure stable material supply (Worthen et al. 2009); likewise, the Chinese apparel manufacturer
Esquel, backward integrates supply functions such as cotton farming to improve the quality of
its raw material (Peleg-Gillai 2007).
Forward and backward integrations benefit firms in different ways, and a firm’s choice
between them is unclear. In the apparel industry, we observe both types of integration strategies.
We are interested in the reasons behind firms’ selection of one direction or the other. This
is complicated by the competition among supply chains, which affects the value of vertical
integration. Furthermore, it is unclear how one firm’s integration affects the choices of others
in selecting forward and backward integration.
In this paper, we consider two competing supply chains, each consisting of a supplier, a
manufacturer and a retailer. The supplier can exert effort to improve the quality of material it
supplies to the manufacturer. The manufacturer then makes a product and sells it through the
retailer exclusively. The product is sold in two periods and its popularity, thereby the market
potential, decreases in time.
Each manufacturer chooses one of the following strategies: (1) forward integration, (2) back-
ward integration, and (3) no integration. We examine the effect of vertical integration on firm
decisions and study the equilibrium choice of vertical integration strategy for a manufacturer.
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There is a great body of research on the choice of distribution channels (e.g., Jeuland and
Shugan 1983; McGuire and Staelin 1983; Gupta and Loulou 1998). Yet, the current research
considers only forward integration (manufacturer-retailer integration) and the effect of product
quality is absent. We contribute new findings to this line of research twofold. First, by consid-
ering both forward and backward integrations, we capture more options that occur in practice.
Second, we endogenize firm investment on quality improvement.
Our model addresses the following questions:
• When does vertical integration benefit a manufacturer? Can it hurt a manufacturer’s
profitability?
• How does a manufacturer’s selection of forward integration, backward integration or no
integration at all depend on its product fashionability, quality cost and competitor’s
supply chain structure?
• What is the resulting equilibrium supply chain structure when firms can (1) only forward
integrate, or (2) only backward integrate, or (3) choose to either forward or backward
integrate? What is the effect of vertical integration on product quality and retail price?
Our study shows that backward integration always benefits a manufacturer. However, for-
ward integration can hurt a manufacturer because it intensifies retail competition, dropping
the retail price, which in turn hurts the manufacturer’s margin. Such a drop is less severe
when the competing supply chain has fewer intermediaries. Therefore, when a competitor ver-
tically integrates, a manufacturer is more inclined to favor forward integration over backward.
In addition, this effect is more pronounced when the product is highly fashionable, i.e., when
product popularity decreases more significantly over time. This reflects the control over product
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distribution dominates the control over quality for highly fashionable products.
We also study competitive choice of integration strategies by manufacturers, finding disin-
tegration in both supply chains can never be an equilibrium. This is contrary to the celebrated
result in prior studies that disintegration can be an equilibrium when only manufacturer-retailer
(forward) integration is considered (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 1983; Gupta and Loulou 1998).
The inclusion of backward integration drives our departure from prior results. Additionally,
manufacturers can fall into prisoner’s dilemma: in equilibrium, all manufacturers vertically
integrate while achieving lower profits.
Interestingly, we find that vertical integration results in a higher quality product sold at a
lower retail price. Vertical integration lowers the retail price of a product because it reduces
the number of intermediaries profiting from it. This benefit alleviates double-marginalization
and encourages more investment in quality improvement.
We also analyze what happens when forward integration results in pricing advantage by
reducing consumer price sensitivity. This advantage increases the attractiveness of forward in-
tegration. When the competitor is already forward integrated, the potential benefit of backward
integration can be nullified by the competitor’s pricing advantage. Consequently, despite the
gain of control over quality, backward integration can actually decrease profitability and it can
lower product quality and sales.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present our literature
review. Section 3.3 describes our model and Section 3.4 derives firm quality and price decisions.
Section 3.5 discusses firm profitability and manufacturer equilibrium integration strategies while
Section 3.6 presents extensions to the base model. Finally, Section 3.7 offers our concluding
remarks.
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3.2 Related Literature
Our work is most relevant to the literature on the competitive choice of distribution channels.
This stream of literature begins with the seminal work of McGuire and Staelin (1983). In
that paper, the authors consider duopoly channels, each with a manufacturer distributing its
product through an exclusive retailer. It is well recognized that the profit of a manufacturer and
the entire channel is maximized when the manufacturer vertically integrates, thereby achieving
centralized decision making, in the absence of competition. Interestingly, however, McGuire
and Staelin (1983) find that in the presence of channel competition, manufacturers may choose
not to vertically integrate, and this may actually yield the highest profit for the manufacturers
and the entire channel. Moorthy (1988) further investigates the driver for this result, owing it
to the rise in manufacturer demand caused by the strategic interaction between channels.
A number of following works have extended the model of McGuire and Staelin (1983),
confirming vertical integration is not the profit-maximizing strategy for a manufacturer under
various extensions. For example, Coughlan (1985) extends the model of McGuire and Staelin
(1983) by adopting a general demand function, and Trivedi (1998) considers retailers carrying
products of multiple manufacturers. Gupta and Loulou (1998) allow a manufacturer to invest in
research and development to reduce unit production cost, and Gupta (2008) further extends this
work by incorporating involuntary knowledge spillovers. Wu et al. (2007) investigate the effect
of demand uncertainty on the equilibrium distribution structure and identify cases in which
demand variability affects, and does not affect, equilibrium design. In addition to intensifying
price competition, Wu et al. (2007) find that disintegration can also intensify other dimension
of competition, such as advertising.
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Similarly, Corbett and Karmarkar (2001) investigate the effect of vertical integration, find-
ing that it lowers the total channel profit. They focus on the impact of variable and fixed
costs on serial multi-tier supply chains. Our work is similar in spirit to Corbett and Karmarkar
(2001), however, we also consider the effect of vertical integration on product quality in addition
to prices. Furthermore, we study competing firms’ choice of vertical integration strategy while
they do not. Boyaci and Gallego (2004) consider two supply chains, each with a wholesaler and
a retailer, and the supply chains compete strictly on service levels. They identify prisoner’s
dilemma in the choice of vertical control: coordinated decision making in each supply chains is
the dominant strategy even though it results in lower overall supply chain performance. While
the above studies consider only manufacturer-retailer integration, we also consider supplier-
manufacturer integration, allowing for either forward or backward integration. In addition,
Savaskan et al. (2004) and Savaskan and Wassnhove (2006) examine channel designs in the con-
text of closed-loop supply chains. They analyze the performance of various channel structures
with products that can be recycled and remanufactured, whereas we consider products that
cannot.
There exists a rich literature on supply chain contracting and coordination. This stream
of research focuses on the design of contractual agreements among supply chain members to
maximize supply chain efficiency. Cachon (2003) and Lariviere (1999) provide excellent reviews
of this literature. Instead of using contracts to coordinate decisions of individual entities,
vertical integration achieves centralized decisions by extending a firm’s operational capability.
In addition, in our model, a manufacturer chooses its direction to vertically integrate (i.e.,
backward or forward). This differs from the current literature on supply chain contracts where
firms do not choose their contract partners.
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In addition to vertical integration, a great variety of operational strategies are also studied
under supply chain competition. For example, Caro and Martinez-de-Albeniz (2010) and Lin
and Parlaktu¨rk (2010) study the value of quick response, and Li and Ha (2008) examine the
impact of inventory cost and reactive capacity on firm competitiveness. Ha and Tong (2008)
and Ha et al. (2008) investigate the value of vertical information sharing in the presence of
supply chain competition. Anand and Girotra (2007) analyze the value of delayed product
differentiation, finding delayed product differentiation can be detrimental in a competitive en-
vironment. The strategies studied by those works focus on operations performed within a firm,
whereas we consider using vertical integration to extend the operational capability of a firm. We
identify circumstances under which this extension of operational capability is actually harmful
to a firm. Finally, our work is also relevant to quality management in the realm of supply chain
(e.g., Baiman et al. 2000; Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005; Zhu et al. 2007). However,
none of these papers consider quality improvement in the presence of supply chain competition,
which is the focus of our research.
3.3 Model
We consider two supply chains (i = 1, 2) selling fashionable products competitively to a con-
sumer market. These products are sold over two periods (t = 1, 2), and their consumer pop-
ularity decreases over time. In the following, we introduce the model of consumer choice, firm
decisions and manufacturer vertical integration strategies.
Following Salop’s (1979) spatial differentiation model, we assume consumers are utility
maximizers and they are uniformly distributed along a circle at 12 units of density in each
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TABLE 3.1: Parameters and Decision Variables
Symbol Definition
t Time period
k Consumer population in the second period
m Consumer reservation value
α Consumer quality sensitivity
d Consumer disutility per unit deviation from the ideal product
ψi,t Distance between product i and a consumer’s ideal product in period t
θi Quality of product i
ri Raw material price charged by supplier i
wi Wholesale price charged by manufacturer i
pi,t Retail price of product i in period t
Qi,t Sales for product i in period t
c Cost coefficient for quality improvement
N, F, B No integraton, forward integration and backward integration respectively
Si Manufacturer i’s vertical integration strategy
period.1 Each consumer is identified by a point on the circle which represents his or her
ideal product. The size of the market in period 1 is normalized to 1, whereas the size of the
market shrinks to k < 1 in period 2. Thus, in t = 2, there are fewer consumers and they are
distributed on a smaller circle as seen in Figure 3.1 (a). Here, k measures the product degree of
fashion: a smaller k indicates faster decrease in product popularity over time, thereby a more
fashionable product. The two competing products are located at the two ends of the diameter.2
Each consumer has a unitary demand and buys a product only when the purchase generates a
positive utility. Specifically, a consumer derives utility
U(θi, pi,t, ψi,t) = m+ αθi − pi,t − dψi,t (3.1)
from purchasing product i (i.e., the product of supply chain i) in period t, where m is a
consumer’s reservation value, θi represents the quality of product i, and pi,t is the retail price
1Changing the density affects equilibrium decisions but it does not alter our insights.
2It is well known in equilibrium, symmetric duopoly firms locate at each end of the diameter of a circular
market (c.f., Salop 1979). Thus, our circular market is identical to using Hotelling’s (1929) model of spatial
product differentiation with duopolists located on each side of the Hotelling line.
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of product i in period t. Here, α captures consumer sensitivity to product quality. We fix the
consumer price sensitivity, i.e., the coefficient to pi,t in (3.1), to 1. This base model makes
key results clear and easy to understand. However, we relax this assumption and present
additional insights in Section 3.6. Finally, ψi,t is the shortest distance between product i and
the consumer’s ideal product as Figure 3.1 (b) illustrates, and a consumer incurs disutility d > 0
per unit of distance due to mismatch of her preference. Table 3.1 summarizes the parameters
and decision variables of our model.
FIGURE 3.1: Circular Model of Competition and Arc Distances
Each supply chain i consists of a supplier (Li), a manufacturer (Mi) and a retailer (Ri),
and all firms are risk neutral profit maximizers. A supplier provides raw materials to its
downstream manufacturer. Supplier i invests in material quality which in turn determines the
product quality θi, and it supplies manufacturer i at a unit material price ri. This mimics
the situation in which product quality directly depends on material quality. For instance, the
quality of a T-shirt is determined by its fabric quality: an all-cotton shirt provides better sweat
absorption and a greater feeling of airiness (Levinson 2000). Manufacturer i produces each
product i with a unit of raw material and sells it to retailer i at a unit wholesale price wi.
Finally, retailer i determines the retail price pi,t for product i, in each period t, and sells it
in the consumer market. The material price ri and wholesale price wi do not change across
periods because firms often sign relatively long term contracts with their suppliers. On the
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other hand, we allow the retail price pi to be adjusted from period to period, reflecting the fact
that a retailer has more flexibility in pricing.
To focus on the effect of competition, we assume firms do not incur variable costs for pro-
duction and retailing. Nevertheless, supplier i incurs a fixed cost c θ2i for achieving quality
level θi, where c determines how expensive it is to improve quality. We note that some lit-
erature (like this paper) regards quality improvement as a one-time investment that does not
affect marginal cost of production (e.g., Bonanno 1986; Demirhan et al. 2007; Bhaskaran and
Krishnan 2009; Kaya and O¨zer 2009). At the same time, some others argue quality improve-
ment accompanies an increase in marginal production cost (e.g., Mussa and Rosen 1978; Desai
2001; Heese and Swaminathan 2006; Netessine and Taylor 2007). It is not uncommon to see
quality improvement as a one-time investment in the apparel industry. For example, Esquel,
a major Chinese apparel manufacturer, provides its supplying cotton farmers with training in
process improvement techniques, such as seed selection and impurities elimination, to ensure
their quality for high-end cotton (Peleg-Gillai 2007). In addition, advances in spinning and
knitting technologies improve the production process, allowing yarns to produce fabric with
superior quality (Bainbridge 2009). Following these observations, we focus on the cases where
quality improvement is achieved through a one-time process improvement, characterized by a
fixed cost investment. We also make the common assumption that firm decisions are common
knowledge (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 1983; Trivedi 1998; Tsay and Agrawal 2000), and firms
have sufficient capacity to fulfill any demand.
FIGURE 3.2: A Manufacturer’s Vertical Integration Strategies
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As Figure 3.2 indicates, we envision three integration strategies for each manufacturer: no
integration (N), forward integration (F ) and backward integration (B). When a manufacturer
does not integrate, its material supply and product retail are accomplished through other
independent firms. In that case, the manufacturer has control only over the wholesale price it
charges to the retailer.
When a manufacturer forward integrates, it sells the product through its own company
stores, and therefore the manufacturer controls the retail price of its product. For instance,
Tainan Enterprise, a leading Taiwanese manufacturer, established its own brand, Tony Wear,
one of the most popular menswear brands in China (Ho 2002). Alternatively, a manufacturer
can backward integrate by performing supply operations in-house, thereby allowing the man-
ufacturer to dictate the quality θi in addition to its wholesale price wi. For example, Esquel
gradually expands its operational scope by developing yarn spinning, cotton ginning and farm-
ing abilities traditionally provided by other suppliers (Peleg-Gillai 2007).
We use Si ∈ {N,F,B} to denote manufacturer i’s integration strategy, and S1S2 to denote
different scenarios of supply chain structures in the industry. We restrict our analysis to c > 2α
2
27d
to ensure the concavity of supplier profit; otherwise, quality improvement is too cheap, firms
invest overly on quality and they do not make any profit when both manufacturers vertically
integrate. In addition, we assume d < 2m3(5+9k) to avoid trivial cases where the firms form local
monopolies and do not compete. Finally, we restrict our analysis to k > 111 ; otherwise, in the
FN scenario, the market size in the second period is too small and all consumers buy product
1 while product 2 does not survive in that period. Under these assumptions, products compete
and the market is covered in each period.
Let Qi,t be the sales quantity for product i in period t. Then the profit functions for a
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retailer πNRi , manufacturer π
N
Mi
and supplier πNLi in a disintegrated supply chain i are given by:
πNRi =
2∑
t=1
(pi,t − wi)Qi,t, (3.2)
πNMi = (wi − ri)
2∑
t=1
Qi,t, (3.3)
πNLi = ri
2∑
t=1
Qi,t − c θ2i . (3.4)
When manufacturer i forward integrates, it sets the retail price itself. In this case, the profit
function for manufacturer i becomes:
πFMi =
2∑
t=1
(pi,t − ri)Qi,t. (3.5)
On the other hand, backward integration allows manufacturer i to dictate its quality level. This
yields the following profit function for manufacturer i:
πBMi = wi
2∑
t=1
Qi,t − c θ2i . (3.6)
For any given channel arrangement S1S2 of the industry, decisions are made as follows.
First, firms who control material supply (a supplier or a backward integrated manufacturer)
competitively determine their quality levels. Contingent on the quality levels, these firms set
the unit price they charge to their downstream customers. Thereafter, a manufacturer sets its
wholesale price if it does not vertically integrate. Finally, the selling season begins, and firms
that sell products to consumers (a retailer or a forward integrated manufacturer) set their retail
prices for each period and demand is realized. Following this sequence of events, we will solve
for a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) by applying backward induction.
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3.4 Quality and Price Decisions
In this section, we examine the effect of vertical integration on price and quality decisions and
sales. To begin, we analyze firms’ decisions under any given supply chain structures S1S2.
Subsequently, we contrast these decisions across different scenarios of supply chain structures
to reveal the impact of vertical integration.
3.4.1 Characterization of Equilibrium Quality, Prices and Sales
Contingent on the price and quality specifications offered by upstream firms, each firm considers
the response of rival firms in determining the best approach to maximizing its own profit. Let
θ, r, w and p be the vectors for product qualities, material prices, wholesale prices and retail
prices respectively. Based on the decision sequence described in Section 3.3, a SPNE when none
of the manufacturers vertically integrates (NN) satisfies the followings for i = 1, 2 and t = 1,
2:
θ∗i = argmax
θi
r∗i
2∑
t=1
Qi,t(θ, p
∗(r∗, θ))− cθ2i , (3.7)
r∗i = argmaxri
ri
2∑
t=1
Qi,t(θ, p
∗(r, θ)) − cθ2i , (3.8)
w∗i = argmaxwi
(wi − ri)
2∑
t=1
Qi,t(θ, p
∗(w)), (3.9)
p∗i = arg maxpi,1,pi,2
2∑
t=1
(pi,t − wi)Qi,t(θ, p). (3.10)
Equations (3.7) to (3.10) formulate the optimization problems for the suppliers, manufactur-
ers and retailers. Essentially, problems (3.7) and (3.8) state a supplier chooses the quality and
material price to maximize its profit. Problem (3.9) shows a manufacturer sets the wholesale
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price to maximize its profit. (3.10) states a retailer maximizes its profit by setting the retail
price.
When manufacturer i vertically integrates, it no longer solves problem (3.9) and a new
problem arises: When manufacturer i forward integrates, it sets retail prices and solves problem
(3.10) with wi replaced by ri. Alternatively, when manufacturer i backward integrates, it
determines its quality θi, solving problems (3.7) and (3.8) with ri replaced by wi. We derive
the equilibrium decisions by applying backward induction, essentially solving problems (3.7) to
(3.10) in reverse order. This procedure leads to the equilibrium product qualities, retail prices
and sales as follows:
Proposition 11 The unique SPNE product quality θi, retail price pi,t and total sales Qi for
each scenario S1S2, Si ∈ {N, F, B}, are as follows:
(i) When none of the manufacturers vertically integrates, NN :
θ1 = θ2 =
(1+k)α
6c , p1,1 = p2,1 = d(7 + 6k), p1,2 = p2,2 = d(6 + 7k), Q1 = Q2 =
1+k
2 .
(ii) When only manufacturer 1 vertically integrates, FN or BN :
θ1 =
(1+k)α(63cd−2α2)
6c(54cd−2α2) , p1,1 =
d(9cd(55+43k)−4(4+3k)α2)
4(27cd+α2)
, p1,2 =
d(9cd(43+55k)−4(3+4k)α2)
4(27cd+α2)
, Q1 =
(1+k)(63cd−2α2)
108cd−4α2 ;
θ2 =
(1+k)α(45cd−2α2)
6c(54cd−2α2) , p2,1 =
d(18cd(14+11k)−(11+9k)α2)
2(27cd+α2)
, p2,2 =
d(18cd(11+14k)−(9+11k)α2)
2(27cd+α2)
, Q2 =
(1+k)(45cd−2α2)
108cd−4α2 .
(iii) When both manufacturers vertically integrate, FF, BF , FB or BB:
θ1 = θ2 =
(1+k)α
6c , p1,1 = p2,1 =
d(5+3k)
2 , p1,2 = p2,2 =
d(3+5k)
2 , Q1 = Q2 =
1+k
2 .
Amanufacturer can choose to forward integrate (F ), backward integrate (B) or not integrate
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at all (N). When only manufacturer 1 is vertically integrated, Proposition 11.(ii) states that
FN and BN scenarios share the same equilibrium quality, price and sales outcomes. This is
because the sequence of events and decisions are identical in these scenarios. Manufacturer 1,
however, achieves different profits: in the BN scenario, it collects the profit of a supplier in a
two-tier supply chain, whereas it collects the profit of a retailer in the FN scenario. Proposition
13 compares these profits. Likewise, when both manufacturers are vertically integrated as in
Proposition 11.(iii), FF , BF , FB and BB scenarios have the same equilibrium quality, price
and sales outcomes. Knowing firms’ decisions in each scenario, we next compare the decisions
across scenarios to examine the effect of vertical integration on product quality, retail price and
sales.
3.4.2 The Effect of Integration on Product Quality, Sales and Retail Price
It is a well-established notion that decisions made by self-profit-maximizing firms generate sub-
optimal profit for the entire channel, producing the effect of double-marginalization. Therefore
double-marginalization is viewed as a frictional cost within a channel due to disintegration in-
efficiency. Vertical integration centralizes decisions and alleviates double-marginalization. The
gain of this benefit for a supply chain is reflected on the change of quality, price and sales as
the following proposition describes. In the following, we drop the subscript t in pi,t for ease of
notation and remind that the superscript S1S2 denotes the structure of supply chains.
Proposition 12 For S1 ∈ {F,B} and
(i) any S2, Q
S1S2
1 > Q
NS2
1 , θ
S1S2
1 > θ
NS2
1 and p
S1S2
1 < p
NS2
1 .
(ii) any S2, Q
S1S2
2 < Q
NS2
2 , θ
S1S2
2 < θ
NS2
2 and p
S1S2
2 < p
NS2
2 .
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(iii) S2 ∈ {N, B}, wS1S22 < wNS22 .
(iv) S2 ∈ {N, F}, rS1S22 < rNS22 .
Interestingly, Proposition 12.(i) shows manufacturer 1’s vertical integration (either forward
or backward) results in the sale of a better quality product 1 at a lower retail price. Vertical
integration alleviates double-marginalization, reducing the frictional cost within supply chain 1,
and thus, it encourages more quality investment for product 1. The improved product quality
elevates consumers’ valuation of product 1, encouraging an increase on the retail price. On
the other hand, vertical integration removes intermediaries who add their margins to the retail
price, leading to an opposite force which lowers the retail price. As a result, the latter force
dominates, and the quality of product 1 increases while its retail price drops.
On the other hand, reduced double-marginalization in supply chain 1 hurts the competitive-
ness of supply chain 2, resulting in less investment on the quality of product 2 as in Proposition
12.(ii). In addition, when manufacturer 1 vertically integrates, the reduced p1 forces the com-
peting product to lower its retail price p2 to remain competitiveness. As a result, the competing
manufacturer reduces its wholesale price and the competing supplier lowers its material price
as in cases (iii) and (iv).3
3.5 Profitability and Equilibrium Integration Strategies
Having characterized equilibrium decisions in each scenario, we now turn our focus to the effect
of vertical integration on profitability. Here, we provide answers to the following questions:
3Part (iii) is irrelevant for S2 = F because a forward integrated manufacturer does not set the wholesale price.
Similarly, Part (iv) is irrelevant for S2 = B because there is no material price when a manufacturer backward
integrates.
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Does vertical integration always benefit a manufacturer? How does vertical integration affect
the total profit of the entire supply chain? What is the equilibrium structure if manufacturers
determine their integration strategies competitively?
3.5.1 Manufacturer’s Value of Vertical Integration
This section analyzes the effect of vertical integration on a manufacturer’s profitability. For-
ward integration gives a manufacturer better control over demand while backward integration
improves its control over quality. When channel competition is absent, it can be shown that
vertical integration always benefits a manufacturer and the entire channel. In the presence of
channel competition, we now examine how the competitor’s reaction affects the value of vertical
integration for a manufacturer. Let ΠS1S2M1 be the equilibrium profit of manufacturer 1 when
manufacturer i, i = 1, 2, chooses strategy Si. Then the following proposition summarizes the
value of forward and backward integrations for a manufacturer.
Proposition 13
(i.a) ΠFNM1 < Π
NN
M1
.
(i.b) ΠFS2M1 > Π
NS2
M1
for S2 ∈ {F, B} if and only if k < 4(27γ−1)
√
8−324γ+3159γ2−3(45γ−2)2
4−108γ+243γ2
where γ = cd
α2
.
(ii) ΠBS2M1 > Π
NS2
M1
for S2 ∈ {F, N, B}.
Vertical integration reduces the effect of double-marginalization in a channel, and one may
expect it also improves a manufacturer’s profitability. In contrast, although backward integra-
tion always benefits the manufacturer as case (ii) illustrates, forward integration can go either
way: It is always detrimental when the competitor is not vertically integrated as in case (i.a),
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but it can be beneficial when facing a vertically integrated competitor as case (i.b) shows.
Forward integration can hurt manufacturer 1 because it overly reduces the retail price p1
for product 1. Specifically, there are two causes to the drop of p1: (1) alleviated double-
marginalization in supply chain 1, and (2) the drop in the competing product’s retail price
p2. When the competing manufacturer 2 is not integrated, the drop in p1 is significant due to
the strong effect of the latter force. As a result, forward integration reduces the profit margin
for manufacturer 1, producing an adverse effect that outweighs the benefit of increased sales.
On the other hand, facing an vertically integrated competitor (S2 ∈ {F, B}), the reduction in
p2 is less pronounced because there are fewer firms in the competing supply chain removing
their margins from p2. Consequently, the reduction in p1 is smaller and forward integration can
be beneficial when k is small. That is, forward integration benefits a manufacturer when the
product is highly fashionable, because the change in demand is drastic, emphasizing the benefit
of flexible pricing ability.
Backward integration always benefits a manufacturer due to alleviation of double-marginalization.
In this case, the competing firms also drop their prices, forcing the manufacturer to reduce its
profit margin as it backward integrates. However, compared to forward integration, the reduc-
tion is less pronounced due to the gain of Stackelberg leadership in setting quality. Therefore,
backward integration always benefits a manufacturer with increased sales.
The previous proposition discusses the change in manufacturer profitability when it moves
from disintegration to vertical integration. In the following proposition, we compare a manu-
facturer’s profit when it forward integrates to its profit when it backward integrates. It shows
forward integration is more likely to be favorable as the competitor vertically integrates.
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Proposition 14
(i) ΠBNM1 > Π
FN
M1
.
(ii) ΠFS2M1 > Π
BS2
M1
for S2 ∈ {F, B} if and only if k < δ.
(iii) ΠFS2M1 −Π
BS2
M1
> ΠFNM1 −ΠBNM1 for S2 ∈ {F, B},
where δ =
(27γ−1)+6
√
γ(18γ−1)
9γ−1 and γ =
cd
α2 .
Forward integration provides a manufacturer flexibility of setting its retail price for each
period.4 On the other hand, backward integration grants a manufacturer Stackelberg leader-
ship in controlling product quality. Proposition 14 demonstrates that a manufacturer’s choice
between these benefits is contingent on the structure of its competing supply chain. When the
competing channel is not integrated as in Proposition 14.(i), backward integration is always
more favorable. This happens because vertical integration leads to severe drop in retail price,
hurting a manufacturer’s profit margin. However, this adverse effect is less severe when the
manufacturer backward integrates due to its Stackelberg leadership.
When the competing manufacturer is already vertically integrated as in case (ii), forward
integration can be more favorable. In this case, the pressure of dropping the retail price is
reduced because there are fewer firms in the competing channel, resulting in smaller drop in
the competing retail price and increasing the attractiveness of forward integration. As a result,
forward integration is more favorable when the product is highly fashionable: The product
popularity drops significantly in time, making flexible pricing ability more valuable as case (ii)
shows. Following the same token, a manufacturer is more likely to favor forward over backward
integration when its competitor moves from disintegration to vertical integration as in case (iii).
4Recall that the retail price is set independently for each period while the wholesale and material prices
remain the same across periods.
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Previous results describe a manufacturer’s best response integration strategy given the chan-
nel structure of its competitor. We are also interested in the equilibrium S∗1S
∗
2 when manu-
facturers choose their integration strategies competitively. We describe the equilibrium in the
following proposition.
Proposition 15
(i) When manufacturers consider no integration (N) and only backward integration (B),
S∗1S
∗
2 = BB.
(ii) When manufacturers consider no integration (N) and only forward integration (F ),
S∗1S
∗
2 = NN .
(iii) When manufacturers consider no integration (N), and both forward (F ) and backward
(B) integration, then
S∗1S
∗
2 =


FF for k < δ,
BB for k > δ,
where δ is given in Proposition 14.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 15 describe the equilibrium when a disintegrated manufac-
turer considers only backward or only forward integration. When only backward integration
is considered, both manufacturers choose to vertically integrate, but they stay rather disinte-
grated when only forward integration is considered.5 Such discrepancy occurs because forward
integration overly reduces manufacturer profit margins. This negative effect is less pronounced
5In this case, there may exist multiple equilibria. Specifically, FF can be another equilibrium. However, we
focus on NN because it is Pareto optimal as Proposition 16 shows.
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with backward integration because manufacturers gain leadership in setting quality. When a
manufacturer can choose to either forward or backward integrate, Proposition 15.(iii) demon-
strates that both of the manufacturers choose to forward integrate when the product is highly
fashionable (k < δ), because the value of flexible pricing ability is significant in that case. On
the other hand, both manufacturers choose to backward integrate if product fashionability is
low. For k = δ boundary, each manufacturer is indifferent between forward and backward
integration, and all possible integration scenarios BB, FB, BF and FF are equilibria.
Previous literature on distribution channels has focused only on manufacturer-retailer (for-
ward) integration (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 1983; Gupta and Loulou 1998; Trivedi 1998),
finding disintegration in all channels can be an equilibrium. We contribute to this stream of
literature by considering backward integration and highlight its strategic implication: while
NN can be equilibrium when firms consider only forward integration, it cannot be equilibrium
when backward integration is also considered. This happens because, when a manufacturer
does not vertically integrate, its competitor is always better off by integrating backward for
channel leadership.
McGuire and Staelin (1983) and Gupta and Loulou (1998) argue that manufacturers may
prefer disintegration because the insertion of an independent retailer mitigates competition
faced by a manufacturer. This buffering effect is also present in our model. In particular, it
can be shown that a manufacturer’s derived consumer sensitivity to quality and price is weakly
higher (lower) as it forward (backward) integrates. In other words, the further a manufacturer
is away from the market, the smaller the competition intensity it faces.
Having characterized manufacturer equilibrium strategies, the following proposition com-
pares a manufacturer profit before and after integration.
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Proposition 16 ΠNNM1 > Π
FF
M1
and ΠNNM1 > Π
BB
M1
.
Contrary to common belief, Proposition 16 shows manufacturers achieve lower profits when
both of them vertically integrate. In this case, a manufacturer’s benefit of vertical integration is
outweighed by the same benefit gained by the competitor. Recall that when only manufacturer
1 vertically integrates, the drop in p2 (retail price of product 2) is one of the causes driving down
p1. When both manufacturers 1 and 2 vertically integrate, reduced double-marginalization of
supply chain 2 constitutes another force driving down p2, further intensifying retail competition
and hurting the profit margin of manufacturer 1. Proposition 15 together with Proposition 16
suggest the presence of prisoners’ dilemma: each manufacturer attempts to benefit from vertical
integration, but that benefit is actually nullified by the competitor’s gain from also integrating.
3.5.2 Effect of Vertical Integration on Channel Profitability
The previous section shows how vertical integration can hurt a manufacturer. It is unclear
whether this indicates another channel participant retains potential benefit from integration.
To see if this is the case, we examine the effect of vertical integration on the total channel
profitability. Let ΠS1S2C1 be the total equilibrium profit achieved by supply chain 1 when man-
ufacturer i, i = 1, 2, chooses strategy Si, and let Π
S1S2
j1
be the equilibrium profit for firm j
in supply chain 1, where j = L (Supplier) , M (Manufacturer) and R (Retailer). The next
proposition shows vertical integration is detrimental to the profitability of the entire supply
chain.
Proposition 17
(i) ΠFS2M1 < Π
NS2
M1
+ΠNS2R1 and Π
BS2
M1
< ΠNS2M1 +Π
NS2
L1
for any S2.
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(ii) ΠFS2C1 < Π
NS2
C1
and ΠBS2C1 < Π
NS2
C1
for any S2.
(iii) Π
S∗1S
∗
2
C1
≤ ΠNNC1 .
One would expect vertical integration to improve the profitability of the entire supply chain.
Rather, Proposition 17 states that vertical integration always lowers the total supply chain profit
due to channel competition. When manufacturer 1 vertically integrates, again, the drop in the
retail price of product 2 leads to a significant drop in the retail price of product 1, hurting
the profit margin for the entire channel. Thus, Proposition 17.(i) shows that an integrated
manufacturer makes less than the total profit achieved by two individual firms combined.6 While
the manufacturer profit can be improved, vertical integration is detrimental to the total supply
chain profit as demonstrated by Proposition 17.(ii). Consequently, Proposition 17.(iii) states in
equilibrium, each supply chain achieves a lower profit than it does if none of the manufacturers
consider vertical integration. Note the equality for case (iii) holds only when manufacturers
consider either forward integration or no integration at all. In that case, S∗1S
∗
2 = NN as in case
(ii) of Proposition 15.
3.6 Forward Integration and Price Sensitivity
So far we have assumed vertical integration does not affect consumer price sensitivity, and con-
sumers have identical price sensitivity for each product. In this section, we relax this assumption
and consider what happens when forward integration reduces consumer price sensitivity. Intu-
itively, direct contact with consumers can improve a manufacturer’s pricing advantage because
company stores provide better brand perception which increases consumer willingness to pay.
6When supply chain competition is absent, it can be shown an integrated manufacturer always achieves a
higher profit than two separated firms, i.e., ΠFM1 > Π
N
M1
+ ΠNR1 and Π
B
M1
> ΠNM1 + Π
N
S1
, due to alleviation of
double-marginalization.
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Indeed, it is not uncommon to see higher retail prices in company stores than in general retailers,
and some examples are provided in Table 3.2.7
3.6.1 Forward Integration: Symmetric Reduction to Price Sensitivity
Now we investigate what happens if manufacturers enjoy identical reduction in consumer price
sensitivity when they forward integrate. Specifically, let βSi be the consumer price sensitivity
to product i when manufacturer i chooses strategy Si, Si ∈ {F, N, B}. Then the base model
described in Section 3.3 entails βFi = β
B
i = β
N
i = 1 as (3.1) shows. In this section, we relax that
assumption, allowing βF1 = β
F
2 = β
F ≤ 1 while keeping the assumption βBi = βNi = 1. That
is, forward integration reduces consumer price sensitivity while backward integration does not.
We need to revise our parametric assumption that ensures the concavity of supplier profit in
FB scenario, specifically, in accordance with βF ≤ 1, we now require c > 2α2
27dβF
. In addition,
we further restrict our analysis to d > α
2(1−βF+k(3+βF ))
54ckβF
to eliminate the trivial case where
product 1 covers all demand while product 2 does not survive in the second period under FB
scenario. We present the resulting equilibrium quality, prices and sales for all possible supply
chain configurations in Table 6.3 in Section 6.2.1.
While our discussion in the following will focus on additional findings due to relaxing βF = 1,
we want to point that most of the key results of the base model continue to hold. Specifically,
Proposition 18 shows vertical integration can still improve product quality and sales while it
reduces the retail price as in Proposition 12. Proposition 19 shows vertical integration can be
detrimental to a manufacturer, which is consistent with Proposition 13. Proposition 19 also
characterizes the conditions that make forward integration more attractive than backward inte-
7The prices are collected on February 11, 2010 from both physical and online stores.
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gration similar to Proposition 14. However, allowing βF < 1 complicates the analysis, making
characterization of manufacturers’ equilibrium vertical integration strategies as in Proposition
15 intractable. This difficulty arises because firm profit expressions involve high order polynomi-
als, and characterizing equilibrium regions requires comparing multiple high order polynomials.
Even though, we cannot fully characterize equilibrium integration strategies, Proposition 20
confirms that no integration cannot still be an equilibrium integration strategy when βF < 1
too.
TABLE 3.2: Examples of Difference in Retail Prices
Company Store Private Retailer
Product Price Retailer Price
Columbia Steep Slop Parka Mens’s Ski Jacket $181.9 REI $139.93
North Face Denali Thermal Women’s Jacket $199 Dick’s Sporting Goods $178.99
Nike Dri-Fit UV Men’s Stripe Golf Polo $70 Dick’s Sporting Goods $65
Apple iPod Nano 5th Gen 8GB $149 Walmart $133.99
Sony DSC-T90 Digital Camera $279 Walmart $248
We first examine the effect of vertical integration on product quality and sales. When
forward integration reduces consumer price sensitivity, the next proposition demonstrates that
vertical integration does not necessarily improve quality and sales.
Proposition 18 Let S1, S2 ∈ {F, N, B}:
(i.a) For (S1, S2) = (B,F ): θ
S1S2
1 < θ
NS2
1 , Q
S1S2
1 < Q
NS2
1 , θ
S1S2
2 > θ
NS2
2 , Q
S1S2
2 > Q
NS2
2 if
and only if βF < 42+27γ .
(i.b) For (S1, S2) 6= (B,F ): θS1S21 ≥ θNS21 , QS1S21 ≥ QNS21 , θS1S22 ≤ θNS22 , QS1S22 ≤ QNS22 .
(ii.a) pFS21 > p
NS2
1 if and only if β
F < σS2 .
(ii.b) pBS21 < p
NS2
1 ; p
S1S2
2 ≤ pNS22 for S1 6= B.
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The threshold σS2 is stated in the proof in Section 6.2.2 and the equalities in (i.b) and (ii.b)
holds only for S1 = N .
When manufacturer 1 backward integrates, Proposition 18.(i.a) shows a new result: man-
ufacturer 1’s anticipation of quality improvement can be nullified by the competitor’s pricing
advantage. Specifically, as manufacturer 1 moves from disintegration to backward integration,
the quality of product 1 gets lower if the competitor is already forward integrated. In this
case, consumers are less price sensitive to the competing product 2 (βB1 = 1 and β
F
2 = β
F < 1).
When βF is small, the competitor uses this advantage and improves its quality to offset product
1’s competitive gain from backward integration. Additionally, contrary to the previous result
where vertical integration always lowers retail price, case (ii.a) shows forward integration can
increase the retail price of product 1, when βF is small, because consumers become very price
insensitive in that case.
Proposition 18 (i.b) and (ii.a) imply a new insight: forward integration increases both
product quality and retail price if it significantly improves a manufacturer’s pricing advantage,
i.e., βF < σS2 . For example, a forward integrated firm can frequently redesign it storefronts to
keep the store at the pinnacle of world fashion. This promotes consumer willingness to pay and
increases the sale of premium products.
The previous proposition identifies new results for product quality, price and sales. In
the next proposition, we present new findings regarding the value of vertical integration to a
manufacturer.
Proposition 19
(i) ΠFS2M1 > Π
NS2
M1
if and only if βF < τS21 for S2 ∈ {F, N, B}.
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(ii) ΠBFM1 < Π
NF
M1
if and only if βF < τ2; Π
BS2
M1
> ΠNS2M1 for S2 ∈ {N, B}.
(iii) ΠFS2M > Π
BS2
M if and only if β
F < τS23 for S2 ∈ {F, N, B}.
(iv) ΠBFM1 −ΠFFM1 > ΠBNM1 −ΠFNM1 if and only if βF < τ4; ΠFBM1 −ΠBBM1 > ΠFNM1 −ΠBNM1 .
The thresholds τS21 , τ2 and τ3 are characterized in the proof in Section 6.2.2.
When forward integration improves a manufacturer’s pricing advantage, manufacturers are
more likely to adopt this strategy. Consequently, regardless of the competitor’s integration
strategy, forward integration can be beneficial and it can be favored over backward integration
when the pricing advantage is great enough as in Proposition 19.(i) and (iii). In contrast, when
the effect of vertical integration on pricing advantage is ignored, Propositions 13 and 14 state
that forward integration benefits manufacturer 1 only when manufacturer 2 is already vertically
integrated (i.e., S2 ∈ {F, B}).
Interestingly, Proposition 19.(ii) demonstrates an additional insight: the potential benefit
of backward integration can be nullified by the competitor’s superior pricing advantage. This
is in contrast to our base model where backward integration is always beneficial. Specifically,
moving from disintegration to backward integration harms manufacturer 1’s profitability if the
competing manufacturer is already forward integrated (S2 = F ) and β
F is small. In that
case, the competitor uses its lower consumer price sensitivity advantage (βF2 < β
B
1 ), improving
its product quality to undermine product 1’s potential quality advantage due to backward
integration.
Finally, Proposition 19.(iv) finds an opposite result to Proposition 13: a manufacturer
can be more likely to be better off by being backward integrated rather than being forward
integrated as the competitor moves from disintegration to forward integration. In other words,
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the manufacturer can be more likely to favor backward over forward integration as its competitor
moves from disintegration to forward integration. The competitor gains the pricing advantage
as it forward integrates which intensifies the competition on the retail level. When βF is low,
this effect is strong, making a manufacturer favor backward integration which helps avoiding
the intensified competition on the retail level.
Next, we summarize the equilibrium when manufacturers competitively determine their
vertical integration strategies.
Proposition 20 When βF ≤ 1 and manufacturers consider either no integration (N), forward
(F ), or backward (B) integration, then NN cannot be an equilibrium.
Proposition 20 confirms when both forward and backward integrations are available to a
manufacturer, disintegration in every supply chain cannot be an equilibrium outcome. This
is because backward integration does not affect consumer price sensitivity. When a manu-
facturer chooses to stay disintegrated (N), its competitor always has incentive to move from
disintegration to backward integration as Proposition 13 shows, i.e., ΠBNM1 > Π
NN
M1
.
3.6.2 Forward Integration: Asymmetric Reduction to Price Sensitivity
In the previous section, we have assumed manufacturers have identical price sensitivity when
they forward integrate, i.e., βF1 = β
F
2 . Now, we relax this assumption, allowing for β
F
1 6= βF2
where 0 < βFi < 1, i = 1, 2, while maintaining the assumption β
B
i = β
N
i = 1. This mimics the
situation in which manufacturers gain different pricing advantage when they forward integrate.
The resulting equilibrium quality, prices and sales for each scenario are summarized in Table 6.3
in Section 6.2.1. Because the model discussed in Section 3.6.1 is a special case with βF1 = β
F
2 ≤ 1,
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all of the results continue to hold for βF1 6= βF2 . As in section 3.6.1, however, characterizing
manufacturers’ equilibrium integration strategy is intractable for βF1 6= βF2 because firm profit
expressions are high order polynomials, making comparisons across scenarios difficult.
FIGURE 3.3: Qualities and Sales in Scenarios NF and FF
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In the following proposition, we summarize the impact on sales and quality when manu-
facturer 1 moves from disintegration to forward integration while manufacturer 2 is already
forward integrated (i.e., NF to FF ). We focus on the move from NF to FF because, as
we will explain later, other cases (i.e., manufacturer 1 moves from disintegration to backward
integration, or manufacturer 2 is already backward integrated) are its special cases.
Proposition 21 There exists ξθi and ξ
Q
i , i = 1, 2, such that:
(i) For βF1 ≤ βF2 , QNF1 < QFF1 , θNF1 < θFF1 , QNF2 > QFF2 , and θNF2 > θFF2 .
(ii) For βF1 > β
F
2 ,
(a) QNF1 > Q
FF
1 if and only if c < ξ
Q
1 , and θ
NF
1 > θ
FF
1 if and only if c < ξ
θ
1.
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(b) QNF2 < Q
FF
2 if and only if if c < ξ
Q
2 , and θ
NF
2 < θ
FF
2 if and only if c < ξ
θ
2.
(iii) ξθi and ξ
Q
i increase in β
F
1 − βF2 ,
where ξθi and ξ
Q
i are given in the proof in Section 6.2.2.
When forward integration gives manufacturer 1 a superior pricing advantage (βF1 ≤ βF2 ),
it improves both its quality and sales quantity while reducing those of the competitor. Figure
3.3 depicts the product quality and sales quantity for each firm in NF and FF scenarios. The
solid curves represent product 1 while the dashed ones represent product 2. In Figure 3.3(a),
βF1 < β
F
2 and in this case quality and sales quantity increase for product 1 when the market
moves from NF to FF scenario.
Interestingly, if forward integration leads to inferior pricing advantage for manufacturer 1
(βF1 > β
F
2 ), forward integration hurts both quality and sales quantity for product 1 when the
quality cost c is low, as shown in Figure 3.3(b). In that case, superior pricing advantage allows
supply chain 2 to improve its product quality, discouraging supply chain 1 from improving its
quality. Nevertheless, if c is high, this suppression is too costly and vertical integration improves
quality and sales quantity for product 1.
FIGURE 3.4: The Effect on Quality when Changing from NN to FN
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The results in Proposition 21.(i) and (ii) can be understood as follows: Whether manufac-
turer 1’s move from disintegration to forward integration increases the quality for product 1 is
determined by (i) manufacturer 1’s benefit from forward integration or (ii) the effect of pricing
advantage. As Figure 3.4 illustrates, when the quality cost c is high, as in the high region of
Figure 3.4, manufacturer 1’s benefit from forward integration dominates, so forward integration
increases its product quality. On the other hand, when c is low, as in the low region of Figure
3.4, pricing advantage dominates: product 1 quality is improved only when manufacturer 1 has
superior pricing advantage (i.e., βF1 < β
F
2 ).
Moreover, part (iii) of proposition 21 shows that ξθi and ξ
Q
i increase in product 2’s pricing
advantage βF1 −βF2 . In other words, the greater pricing advantage the competitor has, the more
likely it reacts to manufacturer 1’s forward integration by improving its product quality.
While Proposition 21 is concerned with the effect of moving supply chain structures from
NF to FF , it can also explain the effect of manufacturer 1’s vertical integration when its
competitor is already vertically integrated (i.e., NB to FB, NB to BB, or NF to BF ), as
these are just special cases for Proposition 21 with βS11 = 1 or β
S2
2 = 1.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examine vertical integration strategies under channel competition. To this
end, we analyze two competing three-tier supply chains, each with a supplier, a manufacturer
and a retailer. The retailers sell vertically differentiated products in a consumer market. Each
manufacturer considers three vertical integration strategies: forward, backward and no integra-
tion. Forward integration enables a manufacturer to control its retail price, whereas backward
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integration allows it to control product quality.
We show backward integration is always beneficial to a manufacturer due to its quality
leadership advantage. Forward integration, however, can be detrimental because intensified
supply chain competition drops the retail price, leading to a lower profit margin. This negative
effect is alleviated when the competing channel is shorter (i.e., already integrated), and thus a
manufacturer is more likely to forward integrate when its competitor moves from disintegration
to vertical integration.
Regarding manufacturers’ competitive choice of integration strategies, we highlight the im-
plication of having the option of backward integration. When manufacturers consider solely
moving from disintegration to forward integration, no integration in every channel can be an
equilibrium outcome, consistent with McGuire and Staelin (1983), Gupta and Loulou (1998)
and Trivedi (1998). This is no longer an equilibrium, however, when backward introduction is
also considered. Finally, we encounter prisoner’s dilemma: in equilibrium, all manufacturers
choose to vertically integrate, and this lowers their as well as the entire channel’s profitability.
Finally, we find a manufacturer’s vertical integration can result in a higher quality product
sold at a lower price. This occurs because vertical integration encourages quality improvement
and it results in fewer firms adding their margins to the retail price. On the other hand, the
competitor always responds to a manufacturer’s vertical integration by lowering both its retail
price and product quality.
We identify additional results when forward integration reduces consumer price sensitivity.
First, we show backward integration can be detrimental if the competitor is already forward
integrated. When a manufacturer backward integrates, the potential benefit is nullified by the
competitor’s reaction of increased quality. As a result, the manufacturer lowers its quality and
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suffers from having a smaller sales quantity. In addition, forward integration can both increase
retail price and product quality.
Our model has several limitations. We assume products are sold through exclusive retailers
and therefore ignore product line pricing. While it is common for company stores to sell products
exclusively for a manufacturer, general retailers usually carry products of multiple brands.
In that case, an individual retailer conducts product line pricing, further intensifying retail
competition, and we expect forward integration to be less valuable than our model predicts.
It is recognized that consumers may strategically delay their shopping in anticipation of price
drop. Nonetheless, our model considers long term strategic decisions and thus, it does not
take the short term strategic actions of consumers into account. Finally, we ignore the effect
of demand uncertainty to focus on the choice between control over quality from backward
integration versus control over retail price from forward integration.
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CHAPTER 4
Are Strategic Customers Bad for a Supply
Chain?
4.1 Introduction
Retailers frequently use discounts as a means for increasing sales. Customers also learn to act
strategically, and many holiday shoppers plan to wait for the year-end sales. Moreover, fierce
competition during holiday seasons drags retailers into price wars, forcing them to offer deeper
and deeper discount (Bynes and Zellner 2004). Thinner profit margins and great demand uncer-
tainty challenge retailers’ ability to provide adequate service level and, therefore, profitability.
Thus, it is commonly believed that customers’ strategic behavior may posture an adverse effect
on retailers’ profitability. However, is this really the case? If so, does it also have a negative
impact on the performance of a supplier and the entire supply chain as a whole? These are the
questions we try to answer.
Recognizing the importance of strategic customer behavior, there is a growing body of
research studying its implication in operations management, and many remedies have been
proposed to mitigate the adverse effect of strategic customers. Examples of those remedies
include: using price or quantity commitment to reduce markdown (Su and Zhang 2008; Aviv
and Pazgal 2008; Su and Zhang 2009); satisfying only a fraction of the demand at a lower price to
increase willingness to pay (Zhang and Cooper 2008); creation of scarcity to eliminate strategic
behavior with low inventory (Liu and van Ryzin 2008; Su and Zhang 2008) or adjusting display
format (Yin and Tang 2006); using posterior price match (Lai et al. 2010); better alignment
of supply and demand with quick response (Cachon and Swinney 2009). There are also works
centering on a firm’s optimal pricing decision in the presence of strategic customers (Levin
et al. 2009; W. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2008; Levin et al. 2010) or on customers’ learning
process to anticipate future sales (Popescu and Wu 2007). Despite the growing attention on
strategic customers, none of the literature actually examines its effect on firm profitability.
As such, we propose the following research questions and attempt to answer them in this
chapter:
• Does customers’ strategic behavior deteriorate the profitability of every firm in a supply
chain?
• How does it affect the profitability of the entire supply chain as a whole?
• How does the strategic behavior impact firms’ pricing and ordering decisions? Does the
presence of strategic behavior encourage a retailer to restrict product availability?
4.2 The Model and Assumptions
We consider a supply chain with a supplier serving a retailer. The retailer sells a product
over two periods, t = 1, 2. Every firm is risk neutral and aims to maximize its profit over
two periods. Before the selling season starts, the supplier first sets a unit wholesale price w
it charges to the retailer, and then the retailer determines its order quantity Q which will be
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FIGURE 4.1: Sequence of Events
delivered before the selling seasons start. At the beginning of each selling season t, the retailer
sets the retail price pt, and then customers make their purchase decisions. The sequence of
events is depicted in Figure 4.1 and we assume all prices (w and pt) are public information.
Any inventory leftover at the end of period 1 will be carried over to period 2 at no inventory
holding cost. Inventory has zero salvage value at the end of period 2. We assume firms do not
incur variable production cost for ease of exposition. The retailer and the supplier know the
order quantity Q, but customers do not observe that quantity and they form a common belief
Qˆ about it for decision making, i.e., they do not know a retailer’s inventory level.
We assume there is a unit mass of customers, each of whom has a unitary demand. Every
customer has an individual valuation V known only to himself, and V is publicly known to
distribute uniformly on (0, 1). However, a customer’s interest in the product decreases over
time and its valuation in t = 2 is decreased by 1 − δ where 0 < δ < 1. Thus, a customer’s
surplus from a purchase in period t, t = 1, 2, is given by
Ut = δ
t−1V − pt. (4.1)
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Customers have two types: Myopic (M) and strategic (S). Amyopic customer buys a product
in the first period if and only if U1 > 0. Otherwise he waits until the second period and buys
the product if and only if U2 > 0. On the other hand, a strategic customer times his purchase
to maximize his surplus. Specifically, based on his belief, a strategic customer conjectures the
retail price p2(Qˆ) in the second period. Then he buys a product in the first period if and only
if
U1(p1) > Max[0, U2(p2(Qˆ))]. (4.2)
Thus, a strategic customer looks forward into future, whereas a myopic customer makes his
purchase decision solely based on the current retail price.
We solve for the firms’ and customers’ subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) pricing
and purchasing decisions. When customers are strategic, they anticipate future price based
on their belief Qˆ. In that case, we look for rational expectations equilibrium which assumes
customers’ belief turns out to be correct. This is a common assumption in the strategic customer
literature (e.g., Su and Zhang 2008; Cachon and Swinney 2009; Su and Zhang 2009). Let θ be
the valuation of the marginal customer who is indifferent between purchasing in period 1 and
period 2. Then a SPNE satisfies the following:
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p∗2(θ,Q) = argmaxp2
p2min[(θ − p2/δ), Q¯(θ,Q)] (4.3)
Q¯(θ,Q) = max[Q− (1− θ), 0] (4.4)
θ∗ = inf{θ : θ − p1 > V¯ }, (4.5)
V¯ =


0 formyopic customers,
δθ − p∗2(θ, Qˆ) for strategic customers,
(4.6)
(p∗1, Q
∗) = arg max
(p1,Q)
p1min[1− θ∗, Q] + p∗2(θ∗ − p∗2/δ) − wQ, (4.7)
Qˆ = Q∗, (4.8)
w∗ = argmax
w
wQ∗. (4.9)
Basically, (4.3) states the retailer sets p2 to maximize its revenue in the second period.
Q¯(θ,Q) is defined in (4.4) and it denotes the inventory carried over from period 1 to period
2. The minimum operator in (4.3) indicates the retailer cannot sell more than what it has.
(4.5) defines the marginal customer who is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing
in period 1. Next, (4.5) and (4.6) show for myopic customers, the marginal customer generates
zero utility from purchasing in period 1 and a customer buys the product in period 1 if V > θ∗.
On the other hand, when customers are strategic, the marginal customer is indifferent between
purchasing the product in period 1 and 2. A strategic customer conjectures the retail price in
period 2 and waits for period 2 if his utility is lower than the marginal value θ∗. (4.7) states the
retailer chooses its order quantity Q and the retail price p1 in the first period to maximize its
profit. Furthermore, we consider the rational equilibrium which requires the belief to be correct
as (4.8) shows. Finally, (4.9) states the supplier selects the wholesale price w to maximize its
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profit.
4.3 Equilibrium Decisions
In this section, we derive firms’ equilibrium decisions for each customer type and contrast these
decisions between strategic and myopic customers. As Figure 4.2 shows, the supplier first
determines the wholesale price w. Then the retailer places an order Q, and then it sets the
retail price pt at the beginning of each period t. We derive the equilibrium decisions by solving
equations (4.3-4.9) in three stage games using backward induction. First, we characterize the
retailer’s decision on the retail price for the second period p2. Next, we derive its order size
Q and the retail price p1 for the first period. Finally, we analyze the supplier’s choice of the
wholesale price w.
Following backward induction, first we examine the retailer’s pricing decision for the second
period, which leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let [0, θ) be the segment of customers remains in the market at the beginning of
t = 2 and Q¯ be the retailer’s remaining inventory at that time. Then
(i) For Q¯ ≤ θ2 , p2 = δ(1 −Q) and the retailer sell Q¯ in t = 2.
(ii) For Q¯ > θ2 , p2 =
δθ
2 and the retailer does not sell all of Q¯ in t = 2.
The retailer sells the product in period 1, and it carries remaining inventory, if any, to
period 2. Since inventory is not replenished in period 2, Lemma 4 shows the retailer sells all of
the remaining inventory if the inventory level is not too high. Otherwise, the retailer sells only
some of its inventory in period 2.
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In the second stage game, the retailer determines its order quantity Q and the retail price
p1 for the first period. When customers are myopic, the marginal customer is θ = p1. However,
when they are strategic, the marginal customer is indifferent between purchasing in the first or
second period, i.e., θ−p1 = δθ−p2(Qˆ), where p2(Qˆ) is given by Lemma 4. Note that customers
do not observe the true inventory level, and they conjecture the retail price p2 in the second
period based on their belief Qˆ. Having the marginal customer characterized for both customer
types, the retailer’s profit is given by
πR = p1(1− θ) + p2(Q− (1− θ))− wQ, (4.10)
where p2 is a function of Qˆ given by Lemma 4. The retailer then chooses its order quantity
Q and retailer price p1 for period one to maximize its profit. Specifically, first we derive the
optimal retail price for any given Q (and Qˆ if customers are strategic). Then we characterize
the optimal order quantity for the retailer. When customers are strategic, the equilibrium order
quantity satisfies ∂πR∂Q = 0 and Qˆ = Q. This process leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 5 When customers are strategic, the retailer’s equilibrium order quantity and retail
price are:
(i) For w < δ2 , Q =
3δ−2w
4δ and p1 =
2+2w−δ
4 . The product is sold in t = 1, 2.
(ii) For δ2 ≤ w < δ2−δ , Q = 1−w2−δ and p1 = 1+w−δ2−δ . The product is sold only in t = 1.
(iii) For δ2−δ ≤ w, Q = 1−w2 and p1 = 1+w2 . The product is sold only in t = 1.
When customers are myopic, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and retail price are:
(iv) For w < δ2−δ , Q =
(3−δ)δ−2w
(4−δ)δ and p1 =
2+w
4−δ . The product is sold in t = 1, 2.
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(v) For δ2−δ ≤ w, Q = 1−w2 and p1 = 1+w2 . The product is sold only in t = 1.
Cases (i) to (iii) of Lemma 5 describe the retailer’s decisions when customers are strategic.
In this case, the retailer orders more and the product is sold in both periods when the wholesale
price w is low. But when w is sufficiently high, as in cases (ii) and (iii), the retailer orders less
and it sells the product only in the first period. In this case, strategic customers recognize that
the product will not be available in t = 2, which increases their willingness to buy in t = 1.
Consequently, this encourages the retailer to order more when w is not overly high as in case
(ii) (i.e., 1−w2−δ >
1−w
2 ). On the other hand, when the wholesale price w is too high, as in case
(iii), the increased willingness to pay does not encourage the retailer’s order size. In contrast,
when customers are myopic as in cases (iv) and (v), the retailer is not encouraged to order more
as in case (ii) because customers do not take future product availability into account.
Next we characterize the supplier’s choice of wholesale price w. The supplier sets w to
maximize its profit:
πS = wQ. (4.11)
We summarize the supplier’s choice of w as well as the retailer’s decisions in the following
proposition.
Proposition 22 When customers are strategic, the retailer sells the product only in t = 1
in equilibrium. When customers are myopic, the retailer sells the product in both periods for
δ > 2 − √2 and it sells the product only in t = 1 otherwise. The firms’ equilibrium decisions
are summarized in Table 4.1.
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Customer Type Strategic Myopic
Range δ ≤ 0.4247 0.4247 < δ ≤ 2
3
2
3
< δ δ ≤ 2−
√
2 2−
√
2 < δ
w 12
δ
2−δ
1
2
1
2
δ(3−δ)
4
Q 14
2(1−δ)
(2−δ)2
1
2(2−δ)
1
4
3−δ
2(4−δ)
p1
3
4
2−2δ+δ2
(2−δ)2
3−2δ
2(2−δ)
3
4
δ+3δ−δ2
4(4−δ)
p2 n/a n/a n/a n/a
(5−δ)δ
2(4−δ)
TABLE 4.1: Firms’ Equilibrium Decisions
Consistent with prior study (e.g., Xu and Zhang 2008), Proposition 22 states that the
product is only sold in the first period when customers are strategic. To unveil the impact
of having strategic customers, we compare firms’ equilibrium decisions across customer types,
which leads to the following corollary. Note the superscript S denotes strategic customers and
M refers to myopic ones.
Corollary 1
(i) pS1 ≤ pM1 .
(ii) QS ≥ QM .
(iii) wS < wM if and only if 0.4247 < δ < 2−√2.
As expected, Corollary 1 (i) shows the retail price is lower when customers are strategic.
However, the total sales are higher when customers are strategic. This is due to a lower retail
price and the customers’ recognition that the product will not be available in the second period.
Interestingly, case (iii) states the wholesale price w is lower with strategic customers when δ
is sufficiently, but not overly, high. The reason is as follows. When δ is low, the product’s
value in the second period is negligible. In this case, customer type does not affect decisions
and the product is sold only in the first period. But when δ is sufficiently, but not overly,
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high, the product becomes sufficiently attractive to customers in the second period. As such,
the shortage in that period increases strategic customers’ willingness to buy in the first period,
motivating the supplier to lower the wholesale price for a higher sales. But when δ is very high,
the wholesale price is lower with myopic customers, because w is dropped in that case so the
product is sold in both periods, benefiting the supplier from a higher sales.
4.4 Impact of Customer Type and Channel structure on Prof-
itability
We have shown how firm decisions depend on customer type. Now we shift our focus to prof-
itability. First we examine the impact of customer type on a firm’s profitability. Next, we
discuss how the total channel profitability depends on its structure (centralized versus decen-
tralized channel) and customer type.
4.4.1 Impact of Customer Type on Firm Profit
In this section, we examine how customer type affects firm profit? Does having strategic
customers decrease profitability? To this end, we use the decisions characterized in Proposition
22 to derive firm profits described by equations (4.10) and (4.11). Let ΠS and ΠR be the
supplier’s and the retailer’s equilibrium profits respectively. We use superscripts SD and MD
to denote the scenarios with strategic customers and myopic customers, respectively. The next
proposition summarizes the impact of having strategic customers on firm profits:
Proposition 23
(i) ΠSDS > Π
MD
S for δ > 0.4247, and Π
SD
S = Π
MD
S otherwise.
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(ii) ΠSDR > Π
MD
R if and only if 0.4247 < δ < 2−
√
2.
Customers’ product valuation increases in δ, and so does strategic customers’ tendency to
wait. When δ ≤ 0.4247, the product value is too low in the second period. The product is only
sold in the first period and the customer type does not affect profitability. Interestingly, when
δ is sufficiently high, Proposition 23 (i) shows that the supplier benefits from having strategic
customers. In this case, the product is only sold in the first period, and the supplier benefits
from a higher sales because the shortage in the second period increases strategic customers’
willingness to buy.
Surprisingly, Proposition 23 (ii) states the retailer can be strictly better off when customers
are strategic. The benefit is driven by a lower wholesale price. Specifically, for 0.4247 < δ <
2 − √2, the supplier charges a lower wholesale price than it would with myopic customers to
encourage order quantity (Corollary 1). As a result, the retailer benefits from a lower cost.
Combining cases (i) and (ii) suggests that both firms are strictly better off when customers
become strategic for 0.4247 < δ < 2 − √2. That is, firms can actually take advantage of
customers’ strategic behavior by selling a product only in the first period to increase customers’
willingness to purchase at a higher price. When the product is sufficiently, but not overly,
fashionable, both firms lower their prices and reap a greater profit from increased sales.
4.4.2 Supply Chain Performance
The last section demonstrates that customers’ strategic behavior can actually benefit a firm.
Does it also benefit the total profit achieved by the entire supply chain? Does the entire supply
chain perform better in a centralized system? We provide answers to these questions in this
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section. Let ΠT = ΠS +ΠR be the total profit achieved by a supply chain. Our base model is a
decentralized system where each firm chooses decisions in its own favor, and we use superscripts
SD and MD to denote scenarios with strategic and myopic customers, respectively. Here,
we also define superscripts SC and MC similarly for a centralized system where decisions are
made by a central planner who aims to maximize the total channel profit. We describe the
equilibrium decisions for SC and MC scenarios in Appendix 6.3.
First, we discuss the effect of having strategic customers on channel profitability. The
following proposition shows a decentralized supply chain reaps a higher profit when customers
are strategic. Note the subscript T denotes the total profit achieved by the entire channel.
Proposition 24
(i) ΠSCT < Π
MC
T .
(ii) ΠSDT ≥ ΠMDT .
Strategic customers takes future price and inventory availability into account and time their
purchase. Compared to myopic customers, intuitively this should adversely affect channel prof-
itability, and Proposition 24 (i) confirms this belief in a centralized supply chain. Interestingly,
Proposition 24 (ii) illustrates a decentralized supply chain is more profitable when customers
are strategic. This is due to a higher sales when customers are strategic as Corollary 1 shows:
the shortage of product in the second period encourages the sales in the first period, outweigh-
ing the disadvantage of a lower retail price with strategic customers. In other words, making
a product available only when it is “hot” benefits the entire channel when customers become
strategic.
Next, we examine the effect of channel structure, i.e., centralized or decentralized supply
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chain, on channel profitability. The following proposition shows a decentralized supply chain
can outperform a centralized one when customers are strategic.
Proposition 25
(i) ΠMDT < Π
MC
T .
(ii) ΠSDT > Π
SC
T if and only if δ > 0.4247.
(iii) QSD < QSC and pSD1 > p
SC
1 .
It is generally believed that a centralized supply chain achieves a higher profit than a
decentralized one, and Proposition 25 (i) confirms this belief when customers are myopic. In
contrast, case (ii) states that having strategic customers benefits a decentralized channel when δ
is sufficiently high. To see why, first observe from case (iii) that a decentralized system achieves
smaller sales but a higher retail price. When δ is small, the impact of having two selling periods
is insignificant as the product value is low in the second period, making a centralized channel
outperform a decentralized one.
Nevertheless, when δ is large enough, a decentralized channel performs better: customers’
strategic behavior is significant and a decentralized channel benefits from reducing inventory
level in exchange for a higher margin. Note that a centralized channel cannot credibly reduce
its sales for a higher margin, because customers do not believe the retailer would order a small
amount in the absence of a wholesale price.
Common intuition suggests that both decentralization and strategic customers deteriorate
channel profitability. Drawing from the previous two propositions, the following corollary ac-
tually finds the channel does not necessarily perform the worst in the SD scenario.
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Corollary 2
(i) ΠMCT > Max(Π
MD
T ,Π
SC
T ,Π
SD
T ).
(ii) ΠSDT > Max(Π
MD
T ,Π
SC
T ) if and only if δ > 0.4247.
Essentially, Corollary 2 compares channel profit across four possible scenarios from the two
dimensions we discussed: myopic versus strategic customers and centralized versus decentralized
systems. First note that a centralized system with myopic customer achieves the highest profit
as one would expect. However, case (ii) finds that a decentralized system with strategic customer
(SD) outperforms other two possible supply chain setups (MD and SC). That is, the scenario
with both seemingly adverse effects, strategic customers and decentralized system, can achieve a
higher total channel profit than scenarios where only one of them takes place. Decentralization
lowers the inventory level of a channel, and strategic behavior increases customers’ willingness
to purchase at p1. As a result, the entire channel benefits from higher sales at the regular price
p1.
4.5 Extensions
We have shown that having strategic customers does not necessarily imply lower firm profitabil-
ity. In contrast, having strategic customers can Pareto-improve firm profits. In this section,
we consider several extensions and demonstrate these key results continue to hold in various
situations.
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4.5.1 Capacity Limit
In the base model described in section 4.2, we assume the supplier does not have any capacity
limit and it can meet any demand. Suppose now the supplier does have a production capacity
limit which it determines in advance. Do our results continue to hold? Specifically, we assume
in this section that the supplier sets its production capacity and it incurs a cost c per unit
capacity. The supplier first determines its capacity level k, and it chooses the wholesale price
w. The retailer then places an order subject to the capacity limit k and the rest of events unfold
as Figure 4.2 shows. Thus, the supplier’s profit becomes:
ΠS = wMin(Q, k) − c k. (4.12)
We derive firms’ equilibrium decisions using backward induction which are summarized in
Appendix 6.3. Basically, we find when there is production capacity limit, product sales are
decreased but firm behavior is not changed: the product is sold only in the first period when
customers are strategic, and it can be sold in both periods when customers are myopic. In the
next proposition, we summarize the impact of having strategic customers under capacity limit.
Recall that Πi denotes the equilibrium profit for firm i, which refers to a supplier (S), a retailer
(R) or the entire channel (C).
Proposition 26 When the supplier invests production capacity at unit cost c:
(i) ΠSDS ≥ ΠMDS .
(ii) ΠSDR > Π
MD
R if and only if c¯ < c < c¯
.
(iii) ΠSDC ≥ ΠMDC ,
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where
c¯ =Max(1− 8(1 − δ)
√
1− δ)
(2− δ)2 , 1−
(1− δ)(2 +√(4− δ)δ)
2− δ )), and c¯ =
δ2 − 4(1 − δ)(1 −√2δ)
(2− δ)2 .
Proposition 26 shows that our key results continue to hold. Specifically, a supplier and the
entire supply chain achieve higher profits when customers are strategic. Also, a retailer can
reap a higher profit with strategic customer when the capacity cost c is sufficiently, but not
overly, high.
4.5.2 Exogenous Wholesale Price
In the base model we assume the supplier has dominant bargaining power and acts as the
Stackelburg leader. In practice, however, this may not be the case. In this section, we assume
the wholesale price w is exogenous, and firm decisions are characterized in Lemma 5. One can
interpret w as the bargain outcome of a retailer and its supplier: a smaller w favors the retailer
and it implies stronger bargaining power to the retailer. In the following proposition, we show
the supplier and the entire supply chain can still be better off when customers are strategic.
Proposition 27 When the wholesale price w is exogenously determined:
(i) ΠSDR ≤ ΠMDR .
(ii) ΠSDS > Π
MD
S if and only if w <
δ
2−δ .
(iii) ΠSDC > Π
MD
C if and only if
δ
2 < w <
δ
2−δ .
Proposition 27 contrasts firm profits between having myopic and strategic customers. When
w is exogenously determined, the retailer’s ordering cost does not differ by the customer type.
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Thus, when customers are strategic, the retailer does not benefit from having a lower ordering
cost as in Corollary 1, and customers’ strategic behavior decreases its profitability as case (i)
shows. Interestingly, cases (ii) and (iii) illustrate that profitability of the supplier and the entire
channel can still be higher when customers are strategic. It can be shown that the retail price
pt, t = 1, 2, is lower when customers are strategic, benefiting the supplier from a higher sales in
this case. This benefit is the most significant for medium w, making the entire channel benefit
from having strategic customers.
4.5.3 Quick Response
Suppliers often offer quick response service to provide retail customers with additional replenish-
ment opportunities during a selling season. In our base model, a retailer has only one ordering
opportunity. In this section, we consider what happens if a retailer can place a second order q
at the same wholesale price w after demand in the first period is realized, but before the retail
price p2 of the second period is determined. The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 4.2.
FIGURE 4.2: Sequence of Events with Quick Response
We derive firms’ equilibrium decisions using backward induction, and they are summarized
in the following lemma.
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Lemma 6 Suppose a retailer has a second replenishment opportunity and
(i) customers are myopic, then the equilibrium decisions are given in Table 4.1.
(ii) customers are strategic, then the equilibrium decisions are given in Table 4.2.
δ < 0.5245 0.5245 ≤ δ < 23 23 ≤ δ
w 12
(2−δ)δ
4−3δ
(6−5δ)δ
2(4−3δ)
Q+ q 14
2(1−δ)
4−3δ
(6−5δ)δ
4(4−3δ)
p1
3
4
2−δ
4−3δ
2+δ
4
p2 n/a n/a
(10−7δ)δ
4(4−3δ)
TABLE 4.2: Firm Decisions with Quick Response when Customers are Strategic
Lemma 4.2 (i) states that having quick response ability does not alter the equilibrium
outcome when customers are myopic. This is because the wholesale price is the same for both
ordering opportunities, which nullifies the value of having another ordering opportunity in our
deterministic setting. On the other hand, when customers are strategic as in case (ii), the
retailer does not use the second replenishment when δ < 23 as the product value is too low in
the second selling period. Thus, the product is sold only in the first period in this case. But
when δ ≥ 23 , high product value in the second period justifies a second order, and the product
is sold in both periods. Using the decisions in Lemma 6, we compare firms’ equilibrium profits
and summarize the impact of having strategic customers in the following proposition:
Proposition 28 When the retailer has an additional ordering opportunity:
(i) ΠSDR > Π
MD
R if and only if 0.5245 < δ < 2−
√
2.
(ii) ΠSDS > Π
MD
S if and only if 0.5245 < δ < 0.842.
(iii) ΠSDC > Π
MD
C if and only if 0.5245 < δ < 0.6062.
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Essentially, Proposition 28 shows that firm profits can still be higher when customers are
strategic. For a retailer, it benefits from a lower wholesale price, as in our base model, when δ is
sufficient, but not overly, high. However, Proposition 28 (ii) demonstrates the supplier can be
worse off by having strategic customers when δ is high enough (Recall that, in the base model,
a supplier is better off by having strategic customers). Specifically, quick response allows a
retailer to achieve its ideal sales through the additional ordering opportunity, enabling it to
credibly maintain a low inventory level and benefit from a higher retail price. When δ is high,
customers are more likely to postpone their purchase and, in response, a retailer orders less
to keep a high profit margin, hurting its supplier with reduced sales. As a result, the reduced
supplier profit hurts the total channel profit when δ is sufficiently high.
4.5.4 Price and Quantity Commitments
Prior studies have shown the use of price or quantity commitments can effectively mitigate
the adverse effect of strategic customers (e.g., Su and Zhang 2008; Aviv and Pazgal 2008;
Su and Zhang 2009). However, their impact on the profitability of a supplier and the entire
channel has received less attention. Thus, in this section, we derive equilibrium decisions under
these commitments, and examine their impact on firm profitability. Specifically, when price
commitment is implemented, a retailer announces its retail prices p1 and p2 before any demand
is realized. On the other hand, when quantity commitment is applied, it announces its inventory
level before the retail price p1 is determined. In other words, price and quantity commitments
eliminate customers’ uncertainty about future price and inventory level, respectively. Recall
that the superscript SD refers to a decentralized channel with strategic customers, and let
SDC denote that scenario with price or quantity commitments. In the following proposition,
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we show that price or quantity commitments do not necessarily benefit a firm.
Proposition 29 When a retailer commits on its future retail price or order quantity:
(i) In either case, the supplier sets w = 12 and the retailer orders Q =
1
4 . The retail prices
are p1 =
3
4 and p2 =
3δ
4 , and the product is only sold in t = 1.
(ii) ΠSDCR > Π
SD
R if and only if 0.4247 < δ < 0.6135.
(iii) ΠSDCS ≤ ΠSDS and ΠSDCC ≤ ΠSDC .
When a retailer commits on its future retail price, customers can correctly infer the retailer’s
inventory level. Similarly, quantity commitment enables customers to correctly anticipate fu-
ture price. Thus, both commitments eliminate customers’ uncertainty on price and quantity,
and they lead to the same equilibrium outcome as Proposition 29 (i) shows. Under these com-
mitments, a retailer sets a high p2 so its product is sold only in the first period at a higher
margin. Interestingly, case (ii) finds that the retailer profit can be lower with price or quantity
commitments, because the wholesale price is higher when a commitment is made. Specifically,
the revelation of price or order quantity dampens customers’ uncertainty and thus their mo-
tivation to purchase in the first period. Consequently, the supplier lacks the motivation to
lower its wholesale price when a commitment is made. In addition, we can show that these
commitments lower the retailer’s order size, hurting the supplier’s profit as well as the total
channel profitability as case (iii) shows.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
Strategic customers have attracted a growing attention in operations literature. Many remedies
have been proposed to mitigate its adverse impact on a retailer. However, the impact of having
strategic customers on other channel participants has received less attention. Thus, in this
chapter, we investigate what happens to firm profitability when customers become strategic.
We study a supply chain with a supplier serving a retailer who sells a product over two
periods. The supplier determines the wholesale price it charges to the the retailer, while the
retailer chooses its order quantity and retail price. Customers have heterogeneous product
valuation which decreases over time. There are two types of customers: strategic customers are
those who take future price into account when making their purchase decision, while myopic
customers ignore those factors. We characterize firms’ subgame perfect equilibrium decisions
for each customer type. We contrast the equilibrium decisions and firm profits under each
customer type to understand the impact of having strategic customers.
Our results show that firms can be more profitable when customers are strategic. In that
case, a retailer sells its product only in the first period, i.e., when the product is “hot”. Limiting
product availability increases strategic customers’ willingness to buy, benefiting a supplier and
the entire channel from a higher sales. In addition, due to customers’ increased willingness to
buy, the supplier lowers its wholesale price to encourage sales when the product is sufficiently,
but not overly, perishable. Consequently, this benefits the retailer by a lower purchase cost in
that case. We also extend our model and show firm profits can be higher with strategic cus-
tomers when (1) the wholesale price is exogenously determined, (2) a supplier has a production
capacity limit, and (3) a retailer has an additional ordering opportunity.
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We also examine the impact of channel structure on the performance of the entire supply
chain. Common intuition suggests that decentralized decision making or strategic customers
decrease the total channel profitability. Surprisingly, we show that the total channel profit can
be higher when both of them hold. That is, firms can actually take advantage of these seemingly
disadvantageous factors to improve channel performance: firms can stimulate sales by selling
a product to strategic customers only when it is “hot”, and decentralization lowers inventory
level for higher profit margin. In sum, having strategic customers does not necessarily decrease
firms’ profitability, and a product’s perishability plays a pivotal role on the impact of having
strategic customers.
Our model also has several limitations. For instance, we assume that each customer has
identical discount δ to product value. In practice, this discount may vary by person, and one
may investigate whether our results continue to hold in this situation. Also, in some cases,
customers’ product valuation may increase in the number of total customers who own the
product. This phenomenon is not captured in our model, and reexamining our results in this
situation can be an interesting future avenue. As our model shows, many commonly accepted
results in the literature can be different when customers are strategic. It will be an prospective
avenue to examine whether commonly used contracts (e.g., two-part tariff and revenue sharing
contracts) can still coordinate a supply chain when customers are strategic.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future Research
Retailing is a vital industry in most developed economies, and it is facing fiercer competition and
smarter customers. Many operational strategies have been developed to gain competitive edge.
However, retail competition complicates firms’ decision making, and the value of these strategies
becomes less predictable. Moreover, customers have become smarter and more strategic: they
learn to time their purchase for the best bargain. Understanding the impact of these challenges
is critical to retailers’ survival. To this end, we develop analytical models to study these
challenges in three essays. The first two essays focus on two commonly used strategies, quick
response and vertical integration, and we examine their value under retail competition. Then
in the third essay, we investigate how customers’ strategic behavior affects firms’ decisions and
profitability. In the following, we summarize our findings in each essay and propose avenues for
future research.
The first essay of this dissertation is titled “Quick Response under Competition”, and it
investigates the impact of retail competition on the value of quick response. It is common to
see a supplier serving multiple competing retailers, but the value of quick response has not been
studied in this situation. For example, Hot Kiss, a California based manufacturer serves junior
fashion retailers Hot Topic and deLia’s as well as upscale department stores like Dillard’s and
Nordstrom (Bhatnagar 2009). In this case, should a supplier offer quick response service to
none, some, or all of its retail clients? For a retail client, should it adopt this service? Also,
what is the optimal strategy to maximize the profitability of the entire supply chain?
To answer these questions, we develop a stylized model with a manufacturer serving two
competing retailers. In our model, each retailer places an initial order before a selling season
starts, and quick response allows a retailer to replenish inventory after demand uncertainty
is resolved. The manufacturer determines the unit price it charges to the retailers and each
retailer chooses its order quantity. The products are sold in a selling season and the retailers
are engaged in Cournot competition. We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium when no,
one, or two retailers have quick response ability, and compare firm profitability across these
scenarios. We first show that, in the absence of competition, quick response alleviates the
mismatch between supply and demand, thereby improving the profitability of every channel
participant.
Nevertheless, we find that the value of quick response is undermined by retail competition.
First, under retail competition, the manufacturer’s optimal strategy is to offer quick response
to none, only one, or both of the retailers as demand uncertainty increases. In other words,
the manufacturer does not always benefit from offering quick response to all of its clients. This
result shows that retail competition diminishes the marginal value of offering quick response,
and higher demand uncertainty is needed to justify its value to a manufacturer. Retailers
also may experience a decrease in the value of quick response. We find that QR may prove
detrimental to a retailer when demand uncertainty is low. Similarly, competition may erode
the value of quick response to the entire channel; depending on demand uncertainty, the total
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channel profit can be maximized with zero, one, or two retailers with quick response.
In addition, the above insights continue to hold for the following situations: (1) when the
manufacturer has full control over the price for all ordering opportunities;, (2) alternative timing
of pricing decision;, (3) when the manufacturer has capacity limit for QR replenishment; and
(4) numerical studies of other demand distributions. Overall, the degree of demand uncertainty
and competition are critical determinants for the value of quick response. Thus, managers
should take them into account in their quick response decisions.
The second essay of this dissertation, titled “Competitive Vertical Integration Strategies in
the Fashion Industry”, is motivated by the apparel manufacturing industry. We focus on two
key characteristics of this industry: fashion and quality differentiation. Apparel products are
fashionable: they have short life cycle and their value decreases over time. This characteristic
highlights the importance of timely response to customers’ change in taste. Thus, some apparel
manufacturers choose forward integration to extend their reach toward product distribution
and improve their influence over demand. For example, the Taiwanese manufacturer Tainan
Enterprise forward integrates by launching its own brand and selling products through its
own distribution channel (Ho 2002). Apparel products are also differentiated by quality. For
example, the quality of a T-shirt is determined by its fabric quality: an all-cotton shirt provides
better sweat absorption and a greater feeling of airiness (Levinson 2000). A better quality
product often suggests the need for better raw materials, and some apparel manufacturers
choose backward integration to tighten their grip on material quality. For example, the Chinese
manufacturer Esquel chooses backward integration to improve its cotton quality as well as to
assure material supply (Peleg-Gillai 2007).
It is intriguing that manufacturers, even in the same industry, demonstrate inconsistent
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direction of vertical integration. Moreover, these apparel products compete in the same apparel
market and it is not clear how competition affects manufacturers’ choice of integration strategies.
Thus, we ask the following research questions: (1) When does vertical integration benefit? Can
it hurt a manufacturer’s profitability? (2) How does a manufacturer’s choice between forward
and backward integration depend on its degree of fashion, quality cost and competitor’s supply
chain structure? (3) What is the resulting equilibrium supply chain structure under channel
competition?
To investigate these questions, we build a model with two competing supply chains, each
with a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. Each supplier controls the quality of raw
material, which determines the quality of a product, and retailers sell products competitively
in a market over two periods. Each firm also determines the unit price it charges to the
downstream party. Products are fashionable, and therefore the firms’ potential market size
reduces over time. The manufacturer considers three strategies: (1) forward integration, (2)
backward integration, and (3) no integration. We analyze firms’ equilibrium decisions and
profitability under various supply chain structures.
Among other results, our key findings are as follows: First, we find that backward integra-
tion benefits a manufacturer while forward integration can be harmful. Specifically, vertical
integration leads to a lower retail price, and thereby reduced margins, due to intensified compe-
tition. This erosion on profit margin can outweigh the benefit of reduced double-marginalization
when a manufacturer forward integrates. However, when a manufacturer backward integrates,
its Stackelberg leadership in setting quality alleviates the hurt of a lower profit margin, making
backward integration remain attractive.
We also examine manufacturers’ competitive choice of integration strategies, showing it
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depends greatly on the degree of product fashion. When products are highly fashionable, i.e.,
when their popularity drops significantly over time, every manufacturer chooses to forward inte-
grate in equilibrium; otherwise, all of them choose to backward integrate. In other words, when
a product is highly fashionable, the importance of controlling demand dominates, motivating a
manufacturer to forward integrate. But the benefit of stronger control over quality dominates
when a product is more durable. Thus, the degree of product fashion is a key determinant of
supply chain structures.
We also find that a manufacturer’s choice between forward and backward integration de-
pends on the structure of its competing supply chain. When the competing channel disinte-
grates, backward integration always is more favorable due to the gain of Stackelberg leadership.
But when the competing manufacturer already is vertically integrated, forward integration can
be more favorable. In this case, the pressure of dropping the retail price is lessened due to
fewer firms in the competing channel. In sum, we characterize a manufacturer’s choice between
the benefit of forward and backward integrations. Forward and backward integrations provide
different competitive edges, and managers need to consider the structure of their competing
channels.
In the previous two essays, we examine the impact of competition on quick response and
vertical integration strategies. In addition, customers today are strategic: They anticipate
deep discounts, for example, the day after Thanksgiving and therefore intentionally delay their
purchase. It is a common belief that strategic customers erode a retailer’s profitability. However,
the full impact of strategic customers on the profitability of every supply chain participant is
unclear. Thus, in the third essay, titled “Are Strategic Customers Bad for a Supply Chain?”, we
answer the following research questions: Does it really harm a retailer when customers become
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strategic? If so, is its negative impact passed on to a supplier as well as the performance of the
entire supply chain as a whole?
We study these questions using a model with a single supplier serving a single retailer who
sells a product over two periods. The supplier sets the unit wholesale price it charges to the
retailer; the retailer determines its order quantity and the retail price in each period. We
consider two customer types: Strategic customers take future price into account when making
their purchase decisions, while myopic customers do not consider future price in their decisions.
Comparing firm profitability under these two customer types allows us to understand the impact
of strategic customers.
Surprisingly, our key findings show that firms can be more profitable when customers are
strategic. Firms can exploit customers’ strategic behavior by selling a product only in the first
period, i.e., when customers value it highly. This strategy increases strategic customers’ will-
ingness to pay the full price which in turn benefits a supplier with higher sales. Moreover, when
a product is sufficiently, but not overly, fashionable, the supplier charges a lower wholesale price
to encourage sales, and this benefit a retailer with a lower unit cost. In that case, interestingly,
the profitability of both firms becomes higher when customers are strategic. We extend our
model and find these results continue to hold when (1) the wholesale price is exogenously de-
termined, (2) the supplier has a production capacity limit, and (3) a retailer has an additional
ordering opportunity.
Moreover, it is believed that decentralized decision making and/or strategic customers di-
minish the total channel profitability. Interestingly, we show that the total channel profit can
be higher when both of them hold. In other words, these seemingly disadvantageous factors
actually can work together to improve channel performance. Decentralization lowers the inven-
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tory level of a channel, and strategic behavior increases customers’ willingness to purchase at
the full price. As a result, the entire channel benefits from higher sales at the full price.
This dissertation contributes to operations literature by examining the competitive value of
quick response and vertical integration, and it demonstrates the theoretical benefit of strategic
customers. There are several avenues for future research. For example, horizontal integration
is another commonly used strategy. Horizontal integration extends the potential market size,
providing economies of scale and bargaining power for a retailer. On the other hand, vertical
integration streamlines a supply chain, improving its cost efficiency. Examining a retailer’s
choice between vertical and horizontal integration can be a prospective future direction. Our
models assume that a retailer carries only one product and therefore, we ignore product line
pricing. One may consider extending our model by allowing for product line pricing and inves-
tigate its impact on the value of quick response and vertical integration strategies. In addition,
it would be interesting to examine the value of commonly used contracts, for example, a buy-
back contract or a revenue sharing contract, when customers are strategic. While the value of
these contracts has been studied when customers’ strategic behavior is ignored, investigating
the impact of strategic customers on the value of these contracts may be a worthwhile future
study.
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CHAPTER 6
Appendices
6.1 Appendix I
In this section, we present additional results, threshold values and proofs for Chapter 2.
6.1.1 Monopoly Retailer Benchmark
Here we characterize firms’ decision in the monopoly setting where the supply chain is comprised
of a manufacturer serving a monopoly retailer. Let qH and qL be the QR order quantities for the
monopoly retailer in the high and low markets respectively. The following lemma characterizes
the supply chain participants’ equilibrium strategies:
Lemma 7
(i) When the monopoly retailer does not have QR ability, the unique equilibrium order quantity
for the retailer is Q = m−cw2 .
(ii) When the monopoly retailer can place a QR order, there exists a unique equilibrium as
follows:
(a) For cw ≤ cF : Q = m−v−2cw+cq2 , cq = 2cw+v+δ2 , qH > 0 and qL = 0.
(b) For cw > cF : Q = 0, q
H ≥ 0, qL ≥ 0 and
1. For v ≤ m−δ2 : cq = m+δ2 .
2. For m−δ2 < v: cq = m− v.
6.1.2 Addendum to Lemmas
Lemma 1: This lemma describes the retailers’ equilibrium actions after cq is chosen in
the FS scenario. The following describes their equilibrium regular order quantities:
(i) For θ¯FS ≤ cq: Q1 = Q2 = m−cw3 .
(ii) For θFS ≤ cq < θ¯FS: (Q1, Q2) = (3m−5v−8cw+5cq10 , 2(m−cw)5 ) for cw ≤ α1; (Q1, Q2) =
(0,
3m−v−4cw+cq
6 ) for α1 < cw ≤ α2; (Q1, Q2) = (0, 0) otherwise, where α1 = 3m−5v+5cq8 and
α2 =
3m−v+cq
4 .
(iii) For cq < θ
FS: (Q1, Q2) = (0,
m+cq
2 − cw).
Lemma 2: This lemma describes the retailers’ equilibrium actions after cq is chosen in the
FF scenario. The following describes their equilibrium regular order quantities:
(i) For θ¯FF ≤ cq: Q1 = Q2 = m−cw3 .
(ii) For θFF ≤ cq < θ¯FF : Q1 = Q2 = m−v−2cw+cq3 for cw <
cq+m−v
2 , and Q1 = Q2 = 0
otherwise.
(iii) For cq < θ¯
FF : Q1 = Q2 = 0.
6.1.3 Demand Variability v Threshold Values for the Base Model
The following table describes the threshold values in section 2.5 for cw < min(β
FS , βFF ) and
cw ≥ min(βFS , βFF ), where βFS and βFF are given in Propositions 1 and 2 respectively.
TABLE 6.1: Threshold Values in Section 2.5
Condition Threshold Values
vM =
2
√
cw(m−cw)√
5
+ δ vS1 =
2
√
19
15 (m− cw) + δ
cw < min(β
FS, βFF ) vF2 =
2
5
√
19
5 (m− cw) + δ vF1 = 2
√
2
5 (m− cw) + δ
vC = (
2
√
52cwm−41c2w−11m2
5
√
5
+ δ)+ vFS = 2
√
3
5 (m− cw) + δ
vM = min(x1, x2) v
S
1 = v
F
1 = v
FS = min(βFS , βFF )
cw ≥ min(βFS, βFF ) vF2 is irrelevant in this case
vC = min(x3,max(β
FS , βFF ))
x1 = δ − 5m+ 8
√
2
7 (m
2 + 3cwm− 3c2w)
x2 =
1
3m+
4
3
√
7
(2cw −m) + δ
x3 =
194m+7(18(δ−v)+
√
6(57m2−326m(v−δ)+561(v−δ)2 ))
416
6.1.4 Demand Variability v Threshold Values for the Extensions
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Endogenous Wholesale Price
v¯M =
m√
5
+ δ v¯S1 =
√
19m
15 + δ v¯
F
1 =
√
2m
5 + δ v¯C =
√
19m
5
√
5
+ δ
Alternative Sequence of Events
ǫ1 = δ − cw vˆF2 = 134472cw+7(220
√
9161−26621)m
51875−1540
√
9161
+ δ
ǫ2 =
13m−168cw+155δ
155 vˆ
a
C =
m−24cw
47 +
8
√
−c2w+55mcw−8m2
47
√
5
+ δ
vˆ1M =
7
√
3cw(1027cw−352m)
528 − 71cw176 + δ vˆbC =
588m−5688cw+77
√
3496c2w−2072mcw+601m2
8565 + δ
vˆ2M =
112
√
y1
25135 − 49m457 − 904cw5027 vˆcC =
−40915m−28920cw+1848√y2
365515 + δ
vˆS1 =
2132cw+7(553−33
√
365)m
231
√
365−6003) + δ y1 = 363m
2 − 41844mcw − 16607c2w
vˆS2 =
(161−33
√
14)m−305cw
3(48+11
√
14)
+ δ y2 = 5(−2263m2 + 11970mcw − 4587c2w)
(vˆ1C , vˆ
2
C) =
{
(vˆaC , vˆ
a
C), for cw ≤ wˆC
(vˆbC , vˆ
c
C), otherwise
, where wˆC is given by the solution to vˆ
b
C = vˆ
c
C
Limited QR Capacity
v˜M =


2
√
cw(m−cw)√
5
+ δ for cw ≤ 2m−
√
4m2−45k2
4 ,
2k +
√
k2 − 4cw(m−cw)15 + δ for 2m−
√
4m2−45k2
4 < cw ≤ w˜M ,
irrelevant for w˜M < cw.
w˜M =
m−
√
m2−15k2
2 w˜
S
1 = m− 15k√19 w˜F1 = m−
15k
4
√
2
v˜S1 =
2
√
19
15 (m− cw) + δ v˜F1 = 2
√
2
5 (m− cw) + δ
w˜C =


52m−5
√
36m2−205(v−δ)2
82 for δ < v ≤ 3k2 + δ,
52m−15
√
4m2+164k2−328k(v−δ)+123(v−δ)2
82 for
3k
2 + δ < cw ≤ 2k + δ,
11m
41 for 2k + δ < v.
6.1.5 Value of QR in Models E1 and E2
Here, we discuss the value of QR to the manufacturer, retailers and the entire channel for the
extended models E1 and E2 described in Section 2.6.2. Since a pure-strategy equilibrium may
not exist in FS scenario of these extended models (see Proposition 9), in this section we only
compare FS to FF scenarios for v ≤ ǫ1 and v ≥ ǫ2 in which a pure-strategy equilibrium exists
in both scenarios.
The following proposition characterizes the value of QR for the manufacturer.
Proposition 30 For the models E1 and E2:
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(i) ΠSSM > max(Π
FS
M ,Π
FF
M ) for v < vˆ
1
M .
(ii) ΠFSM ≥ max(ΠSSM ,ΠFFM ) for vˆ1M ≤ v < vˆ2M .
(iii) ΠFFM ≥ max(ΠSSM ,ΠFSM ) for If vˆ2M ≤ v.
The threshold values vˆ1M and vˆ
2
M are given in Appendix 6.1.4.
The next proposition characterizes retailers’ value of QR. It indicates having QR ability can
still be detrimental to a retailer and it can benefit its rival.
Proposition 31 For the models E1 and E2:
(i) ΠFS1 < Π
SS
1 if and only if v < vˆ
S
1 , and Π
FF
1 > Π
SF
1 .
(ii) ΠFS2 > Π
SS
2 if and only if v < vˆ
S
2 , and Π
FF
2 > Π
SF
2 if and only if v < vˆ
F
2 .
The threshold values vˆS1 and vˆ
S
2 are given in Appendix 6.1.4.
In the base model, we show that QR ability can hurt a retailer regardless of its competitor’s
type (fast or slow). In contrast, when the regular orders are placed at the beginning of the
timeline, retailers become the first mover, increasing the value extractable from QR. As a result,
Proposition 31 indicates that gaining QR ability is now always beneficial to a retailer when its
competitor already has QR ability. Nevertheless, QR ability can still be harmful to a retailer
against a competitor who does not have QR option. In addition, gaining QR ability can still
benefit a competing retailer.
The third proposition addresses the effect of QR on the channel profitability for the models
E1 and E2. It shows the channel profit can still be maximized with only one fast retailer and
the demand variability is the key determinant.
Proposition 32 For the models E1 and E2:
(i) ΠFFC > max(Π
FS
C ,Π
SS
C ) for vˆ
1
C < v.
(ii) ΠFSC ≥ max(ΠFFC ,ΠSSC ) for vˆ2C < v ≤ vˆ1C .
(iii) ΠSSC ≥ max(ΠFFC ,ΠFSC ) for v ≤ vˆ2C .
The threshold values vˆ1C , vˆ
2
C are given in Appendix 6.1.4.
Different from our base model, Proposition 32 shows the total channel profit can also be max-
imized with no QR-enabled retailer at all. This result reflects the effect of the retailers’ gain
of first mover advantage: placing regular orders before the QR price is set. The first mover
advantage encourages the excess use of QR. When demand variability is sufficiently low, there
is little value to QR and it does not justify the cost for the entire channel.
Finally, we compare the retailers’ profits in our base model and alternative E1 and E2
models. Let Πabi,B show retailer i’s equilibrium profit in the base model when retailers 1 and 2
are types a and b, where a, b = F, S and i = 1, 2. Similarly, let Πabi,E be retailer i’s equilibrium
profit in the alternative models. Recall that E1 and E2 models result in the same outcome.
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Proposition 33
(i) ΠFFi,B < Π
FF
i,E if and only if v <
24cw−5m
13 +
4
√
2(788c2w−376cwm+63m2)
65 for i = 1, 2.
(ii) ΠFS1,B < Π
FS
1,E and Π
FS
2,B > Π
FS
2,E.
Note that since QR option is not used in SS scenario, our base and E1 and E2 models do not
differ.
In models E1 and E2, the QR price is set after initial orders are placed. Therefore, when
choosing their initial order quantity, retailers take into account the impact on the QR price
whereby a larger initial order quantity results in a lower QR price. When the demand variability
v is high, the QR option is more valuable, thus a retailer indeed orders larger initial order
quantities to receive a lower QR price. However, in the FF scenario increased order quantities
of both retailers results in more intense competition making the retailers worse off. In contrast,
when the demand variability v is low, the QR option is less valuable, retailers do not have a
strong incentive to order a large quantity initially, and they enjoy the first mover advantage,
which makes them better off compared to the base scenario.
In the FS scenario, the fast retailer enjoys a higher profit in E1 and E2 models due to its
first mover advantage. Thus, not surprisingly, the slow retailer is worse off in in E1 and E2
models.
6.1.6 When the Retailers Can Decide Whether to Adopt QR
Here we describe what happens when the retailers can simultaneously determine whether to
adopt QR. Let a and b be retailer 1 and 2’s QR decision, a, b = F, S. Then there are three
possible scenarios for equilibrium outcome: FF , FS and SS. A scenario is an equilibrium if
none of the retailers is better off by deviating to anther decision (changing its decision from F
to S or S to F ). Using the SPNE derived in section 4, we compare the retailers’ profits across
scenarios, and obtain the following result:
Proposition 34 When the retailers choose whether to adopt QR simultaneously, the equilib-
rium choices (a, b) is
(a, b) =


(S, S) for v ≤ vF1
(S, S) or (F,F ) for vF1 < v ≤ vS1
(F,F ) for vS1 < v
.
vS1 > v
F
1 , and they are given in Table 6.1.
Figure 6.1 describes the equilibrium region given in Proposition 34. As the figure shows,
both of the retailers choose not to have QR ability when demand variability is too low, and both
adopt QR when demand variability is too high. Nevertheless, both the SS and FF scenarios
can be equilibria when the demand variability is moderate.
107
FIGURE 6.1: Retailers’ Equilibrium QR Adoption Decisions
6.1.7 Proofs for Chapter 2
In this section we provide proofs of lemmas and propositions in Chapter 2.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The retailers’ expected profits are
π1 = E[(A−Q1 − q1 −Q2)(Q1 + q1)− cqq1]− cwQ1,
π2 = E[(A−Q1 − q1 −Q2)Q2]− cwQ2,
where q1 is given by (2.4). It can be shown
∂2πi
∂Q2i
< 0. Let qH and qL denote the fast retailer’s QR
order quantities in a high and low market, respectively. Then solving the first order conditions
∂πi
∂Qi
= 0, for i = 1, 2, yields the following initial order quantities:
a. For θ¯FS ≤ cq: Q1 = Q2 = m−cw3 , and qH = qL = 0.
b. For θFS ≤ cq < θ¯FS:
(Q1, Q2) =


(
3m−5v−8cw+5cq
10 ,
2(m−cw)
5 ) , for cw ≤ α1
(0,
3m−v−4cw+cq
6 ) , for α1 < cw ≤ α2
(0, 0) , for α2 < cw
, and qH > 0 while qL = 0
c. For cq < θ
FS:
(Q1, Q2) = (0,
m+ cq
2
− cw), qH ≥ 0 and qL ≥ 0.
α1 =
3m−5v+5cq
8 and α2 =
3m−v+cq
4 correspond to the thresholds such that Q1 = 0 and
Q2 = 0 for θ
FS ≤ cq < θ¯FS, while θ¯FS and θFS correspond to the thresholds such that q1 = 0
in a high market and q1 = 0 in a low market.
Proof of Proposition 1.
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The manufacturer solves the following problem to maximize its profit:
max
cq
E[πM ] = E[(cq − δ)q1] + cw(Q1 +Q2),
where q1 is given by (2.4) and Qi, i = 1, 2, is characterized in Lemma 1. It can be shown
that E[πM ] is a piecewise concave function: it is continuous and concave in cq for cq > θ
FS
and cq < θ
FS respectively, but is discontinuous at cq = θ
FS, because in equilibrium Q1 = 0 for
cq ≤ θFS and Q1 > 0 otherwise. In other words, the discontinuity is due to the fast retailer’s
change in behavior: it places an initial order only when the QR price is sufficiently high, but
it does not place any initial order when the QR price is too low. Since E[πM ] is concave in cq
for cq > θ
FS , we obtain the optimal QR price by applying the first order conditions, and the
threshold βFS is given by the solution to Q1 = 0 in this case. Furthermore, following Lemma
1, this optimal price is feasible only for cq < θ¯
FS which translates to δ < v. Otherwise, demand
uncertainty is too low and QR is never used. Similarly, for cq ≤ θFS we derive the optimal
QR price for this case by applying the first order conditions. Comparing the manufacturer’s
profit for cq > θ
FS and cq ≤ θFS with the optimal QR price for each of these cases reveals
the manufacturer is always better off by using the optimal cq for cq > θ
FS . That is, the
manufacturer induces the fast retailer to place a QR order only in a high market.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Retailer i maximizes its expected profit
πi = E[(A−Qi − qi −Qj − qj)(Qi + qi)− cwQi − cqqi],
where qi and qj are given by (2.5). It can be shown
∂2πi
∂Q2i
< 0. Let qHi and q
L
i be retailer i’s QR
order quantities in a high and low market respectively. Then the equilibrium order quantities
can be obtained by solving ∂πi∂Qi = 0, for i = 1, 2, leading to the following results:
(i) For θ¯FF ≤ cq: Q1 = Q2 = m−cw3 and qHi = qLi = 0.
(ii) For θFF ≤ cq < θ¯FF :
Q1 = Q2 =
{
m−v−2cw+cq
3 , for cw <
cq+m−v
2
0 , otherwise
, and qHi > 0 while q
L
i = 0.
(iii) For cq < θ¯
FF : Q1 = Q2 = 0, q
H
i > 0 and q
L
i > 0.
The threshold θ¯FF is derived from the condition qH = 0 for the cases (i) and (ii), and θFF
is derived from the condition qL = 0 for the cases (ii) and (iii).
Proof of Proposition 2.
The procedure of this proof essentially follows that of Proposition 1. The manufacturer
solves the following problem to maximize its profit:
max
cq
E[πM ] = E[(cq − δ)(q1 + q2) + cw(Q1 +Q2)],
where q1 is given by (2.5) and Qi, i = 1, 2, is characterized in Lemma 2. It can be shown that
E[πM ] is piecewise concave in cq but discontinuous at cq = θ
FF because the wholesale price is
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sufficiently small and the retailers do not place any QR order for cq ≤ θFF . Since E[πM ] is
concave in cq for cq > θ
FF , we solve maxcq>θFFE[πM ] by applying the first order conditions,
which leads to the optimal cq in which Q1 = Q2 ≥ 0, qHi ≥ 0 and qLi = 0. Similarly, we obtain
the optimal cq for cq ≤ θFF using the first order conditions, leading to another optimal cq in
which Q1 = Q2 = 0, q
H
i > 0 and q
L
i > 0. Finally, comparing the manufacturer’s profits between
these two cases reveals the boundary βFF .
Proof of Proposition 3.
Parts (i) and (ii) of this proposition are straightforward by showing that ΠFM ≥ ΠSM and
ΠFR ≥ ΠSR. In addition, combining (i) and (ii) leads to (iii) of this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The results are straightforward from comparing the manufacturer’s expected profitΠM
across the scenarios, and vM is derived by solving Π
FS
M = Π
FF
M .
Proofs of Propositions 5 and 6.
The results are derived by comparing each of the retailer’s expected profit across the sce-
narios.
Proof of Proposition 7.
The results are derived by comparing the expected total channel profit across the scenarios.
Proof of Lemma 3.
The optimal wholesale price is given by the solution to the following problem
maxcwE[πM ] (6.1)
for SS, FS and FF scenarios. It can be shown that E[πM ] is concave in cw in each of these
scenarios, and the optimal wholesale price cw =
m
2 can be derived by solving the first order
conditions.
Proof of Proposition 8.
First, we obtain the firms’ expected profits using the wholesale price cw =
m
2 given in
Lemma 3. Then part (i) of the proposition appears straightforward in comparing ΠSSM , Π
FS
M
and ΠFFM . Similarly, parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition are straightforward from comparing
the expected profits of a retailer and the entire channel respectively across the scenarios.
Proof of Proposition 9.
We provide the proof for the model E1. We first consider the FS scenario and next the
FF scenario. In each scenario, following backward induction, we first derive the manufacturer’s
choice of cq which is described by Lemma 8, followed by the retailers’ equilibrium regular order
decisions which are given by Lemma 9. The results for the model E2 can be derived following
the same procedure, which yields the same results as E1.
In the last stage game in the FS scenario for the model E1, the fast retailer determines
its QR order quantity as given in (2.4). Using this QR order quantity, in the second stage
game, the manufacturer determines its QR price to maximize its expected profit E[πM ], which
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is piecewise concave in cq. The manufacturer’s optimization of QR price leads to the following
pricing scheme:
Lemma 8 The optimal QR price for the manufacturer in the FS scenario for model E1 is
given below:
(1) For 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ σ1: cq = m−Q2+δ2 − Q1, and the fast retailer places a QR order for both
high and low market outcomes;
(2) For σ1 < Q1 < σ2: cq =
m−Q2+v+δ
2 − Q1, and the fast retailer places a QR order only
in a high market;
(3) For σ2 ≤ Q1: cq = δ, and the fast retailer does not place a QR order for any market
outcome;
where σ1 =
m−(1+
√
2)v−δ−Q2
2 and σ2 =
m+v−δ−Q2
2 .
Next, in the first stage game, each of the retailers places an initial order to maximize its
expected profit E[πi], which is piecewise concave in Qi as cq is discontinuous on Q1 = σ1.
Observe that the equilibrium initial order quantities must satisfy one of the cases stated in
Lemma 8, and E[πi] is concave in Qi for each of the cases in that lemma. Therefore, we apply
the first order conditions to derive the expressions for equilibrium order quantities (if it exists).
Nevertheless, we need to verify that no retailer has incentive to deviate from these quantities
so that they are equilibrium. This procedure leads to the following results:
Lemma 9 There exists a unique equilibrium for the FS scenario in model E1:
(1) For v ≤ δ− cw, Qi = m−cw3 for i = 1, 2. The fast retailer does not place a QR order for
any market outcome.
(2) For δ − cw < v, Q1 = (7m−8cw−v+δ22 )+ and Q2 = (4(7m−8cw−v+δ)77 )+. The fast retailer
places a QR order only in a high market.
proof: We derive cases (1) and (2) in this lemma as follows. Case (1) concerns an equilibrium
in which q1 = 0 in all market outcomes, corresponding to case (1) of Lemma 8, and solving the
first order conditions yields Qi = (m−cw)/3 for i = 1, 2. Since E[πi] is piecewise concave in Qi,
the first order condition only provides a necessary condition for an equilibrium; we also need
to confirm that no retailer has incentive for unilateral deviation. For the quantities derived in
this case, it suffices to ensure that the fast retailer has no incentive to place a QR order in a
high market even when cq = δ, i.e.,
dπ1
dq1
|Q1=Q2=m−cw3 ,q1=0,A=m+v ≤ 0,
which implies v ≤ δ − cw.
Case (2) concerns an equilibrium in which QR is used only in a high market, corresponding to
case (2) of Lemma 8. Solving the first order condition yields (Q1, Q2)=((
7m−8cw−v+δ
22 )
+, (4(7m−8cw−v+δ)77 )
+).
Moreover, qL1 < 0 implies v > δ − cw.
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Now we have to ensure no retailer has incentive to deviate. For the fast retailer, deviation
such that Q1 ≥ σ2 is unattractive, because E[π1] is concave in Q1 for Q1 ≥ σ2 and
dE[π1]
dQ1
|
Q1=σ2,Q2=
4(7m−8cw−v+δ)
77
≤ 0.
Now consider retailer 1’s deviation so that Q1 ≤ σ1. Since E[π1] is concave in Q1 for Q1 ≤ σ1,
dE[π1]
dQ1
|Q1=σ1≥0,
and deviating to Q1 = σ1 is unattractive, we conclude that retailer 1 has no incentive to deviate
to Q1 ≤ σ1. Applying similar analysis reveals that the slow retailer has no incentive to deviate
either.
Similar analysis can be applied to examine what happens when QR is used in both low and
high markets, i.e., corresponding to case (3) of Lemma 8. This analysis reveals that cq =
2cw+δ
3
in equilibrium, implying that cq < cw for cw > δ. Moreover, q
L
1 > 0 implies cw >
3v
4 + δ, and
therefore assuming cw ≤ δ eliminates an equilibrium in which QR is used in both of the market
outcomes.
Now consider the FF scenario. We apply the same procedure described above to derive
the SPNE for this scenario. In the last stage game, the retailers determine their QR order
quantities as given in (2.5). Next in the second stage game, the manufacturer determines cq
to maximize its expected profit E[πM ]. Using the QR order quantities described in (2.5), the
manufacturer’s expected profit E[πM ] is again piecewise concave in cq, and the manufacturer’s
optimization problem leads to the following result:
Lemma 10 The optimal QR price for the manufacturer in the FF scenario for model E1 is
given below:
(a) For min(σ4, σ5, σ7) ≤ Q1 ≤ min(σ3, σ6): cq = 2m−3(Q1+Q2)+2(v+δ)4 , which yields qH1 > 0,
qH2 > 0, q
L
1 = 0, q
L
2 = 0;
(b) For min(σ3, σ15) ≤ Q1 and m−(1+
√
2)v−δ
3 ≤ Q2 ≤ m+v−δ3 : cq = m−3Q2+v+δ2 , which yields
qH1 = 0, q
H
2 > 0, q
L
1 = 0, q
L
2 = 0;
(c) For σ8 ≤ Q1 ≤ min(σ5, σ10, σ11): cq = 7m−12Q1−9Q2+v+7δ14 , which yields qH1 > 0, qH2 > 0,
qL1 > 0, q
L
2 = 0;
(d) For min(σ9, σ10) ≤ Q1 ≤ min(σ4, σ16): cq = m−2Q1−Q2+v+δ2 , which yields qH1 > 0,
qH2 = 0, q
L
1 = 0, q
L
2 = 0;
(e) For σ11 ≤ Q1 ≤ min(σ7, σ12): cq = 2m−3Q1−3Q2+2δ4 , which yields qH1 > 0, qH2 > 0,
qL1 > 0, q
L
2 > 0;
(f) For Q1 ≤ min(σ8, σ9): cq = m−2Q1−Q2+δ2 , which yields qH1 > 0, qH2 = 0, qL1 > 0, qL2 = 0;
(g) For σ13 ≤ Q1 and Q2 ≤ m−(1+
√
2)v−δ
3 : cq =
m−3Q2+δ
2 , which yields q
H
1 = 0, q
H
2 > 0,
qL1 = 0, q
L
2 > 0;
(h) For min(σ6, σ12) ≤ Q1 ≤ min(σ13, σ15): cq = 3m−3Q1−6Q2+v+3δ6 , which yields qH1 > 0,
qH2 > 0, q
L
1 = 0, q
L
2 > 0;
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(i) For σ16 ≤ Q1 and Q2 ≥ m+v−δ3 : cq = δ, which yields qH1 = 0, qH2 = 0, qL1 = 0, qL2 = 0;
where σ3 to σ16 are given in Table 6.2.
σ3 = (2m− 3Q2 + 2v −
√
2(m− 3Q2 + v − δ)− 2δ)/3
σ4 = Q2 − (m− 3Q2 + v − δ)/
√
3
σ5 = (14m − 15Q2 − 10v −
√
7(m− 3Q2 + 7v − δ) − 14δ)/27
σ6 = Q2 + (4v +
√
6(−m+ 3Q2 + v + δ))/3
σ7 = (2m− 3Q2 − 2(v +
√
2v + δ))/3
σ8 = Q2 − v/2−
√
7/6(m− 3Q2 + v − δ)/2
σ9 = (m−Q2 − v −
√
2v − δ)/2
σ10 = (21m− 33Q2 − 15v −
√
21(−m+ 3Q2 + 5v + δ) − 21δ)/30
σ11 = Q2 + (4v +
√
14(−m+ 3Q2 + v + δ))/6
σ12 = (3m− 3Q2 − v −
√
3(m− 3Q2 + v − δ)− 3δ)/6
σ13 = (3m− 6Q2 + v +
√
6(−m+ 3Q2 + δ)− 3δ)/3
σ14 = (m− (1 +
√
2)v − δ)/3
σ15 = m+ (−6Q2 + v −
√
3(m− 3Q2 + v − δ)− 3δ)/3
σ16 = (m−Q2 + v − δ)/2
TABLE 6.2: Threshold Values for cq in the FF scenario of the model E1
Q1
Q2
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
FIGURE 6.2: Regions Characterized in Lemma 10 (m = 1, v = 0.7, cw = 0.5, δ = 0.5)
Note: Some regions may not exist, depending on m, v, cw and δ.
Figure 6.2 depicts the regions described in Lemma 10 for m = 1, v = 0.7, cw = 0.5, δ = 0.5.
In the first stage game, the retailers determine their initial order quantities to maximize their
expected profits. Similar to the FS scenario, the manufacturer’s chosen cq described in Lemma
10 is discontinuous on some of the boundaries due to piecewise concavity of E[πM ]. As a result,
a retailer’s expected profit E[πi] is piecewise concave in Qi, and discontinuity occurs on some
of the boundaries given in Table 6.2. Nevertheless, E[πi] is concave in each of the cases (a) to
(i) described in Lemma 10. Since an equilibrium must satisfy one of these cases, we can apply
the first order conditions to derive the order quantities for an equilibrium. Then we check
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for retailers’ incentive for deviation to characterize an equilibrium. This process leads to the
following symmetric result, i.e., Q1 = Q2:
Lemma 11 There exists a unique equilibrium for the FF scenario in model E1 only for v ≤
ǫ1 and v ≥ ǫ2, and there does not exist a pure-strategy equilibrium otherwise. The unique
equilibrium is given below:
(1) For v ≤ ǫ1, Qi = m−cw3 for i = 1, 2. The retailers do not place a QR order for any
market outcome.
(2) For v ≥ ǫ2, Qi = (19m−24cw−5v+5δ60 )+ for i = 1, 2. Each retailer places a QR order only
in a high market,
where ǫ1 = δ − cw and ǫ2 = 13m−168cw+155δ155 .
proof: We derive cases (1) and (2) in this Lemma as follows. Case (1) concerns an equilibrium
in which qi = 0 in all market outcomes, corresponding to case (i) of Lemma 10. Solving the
first order conditions yields Qi =
m−cw
3 for i = 1, 2. This quantity is an equilibrium only if
qHi ≤ 0, which implies v ≤ δ − cw.
Case (2) concerns an equilibrium in which QR is used only in a high market, corresponding
to case (a) of Lemma 10. Solving the first order condition yields Qi = (
19m−24cw−5v+5δ
60 )
+.
This is an equilibrium only if no retailer has incentive to deviate, and it can be shown that
deviation is attractive for v < 13m−168cw+155δ155 . In that case, a retailer has incentive to deviate
by purchasing more initially but not using QR at all.
Finally, applying the analysis described above reveals that there does not exist an equilib-
rium (asymmetric) corresponding to the other cases described in Lemma 10. Therefore cases
(1) and (2) characterize the unique equilibrium for v ≤ δ − cw and v ≥ 13m−168cw+155δ155 , and
there is no pure-strategy equilibrium otherwise.
Note that there does not exist an equilibrium for the FF scenario for δ − cw < v <
13m−168cw+155δ
155 . This happens because the retailers’ profit functions are piecewise concave
in their regular order quantities, leading to multiple local maxima and hence the discontinuity
of their best response functions. Finally, Proposition 9 for the model E1 proceeds by combining
Lemmas 9 and 11.
Proof of Proposition 10.
The proof of this proposition involves two parts: (1) obtaining the SPNE of each scenario,
and (2) comparing profits across scenarios. We illustrate the derivation and the results of the
first part; the latter part is straightforward after the first part is obtained.
Basically, the derivation of SPNE follows the steps shown in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. The key
difference is driven by the introduction of the QR capacity limit k, which results in additional
cases to be analyzed in each stage game.
For the FS scenario, using the first order conditions we derive the fast retailer’s QR order
quantity:
q1 = min((
A− cq − 2Q1 −Q2
2
)+, k).
Next we proceed to solve for the retailers’ equilibrium regular order quantities with this QR
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ordering policy. This yields a result similar to Lemma 1 with one additional case: For v ≥ k
and min(cw+k−v, 2cw+k+2m−4v4 ) < cq ≤ min(cw−k+v, 2cw−7k+2m+4v4 ), the fast retailer orders
qH1 = k and q
L
1 = 0. That is, when the demand variability is large enough and cq is not overly
high, the QR capacity is fully used in a high market. It can also be shown that in equilibrium
Q2 > Q1, and Q1 > 0 implies cw > m − 5k3 . Next we derive the manufacturer’s optimal QR
price for Q1 > 0, which yields
cq =


cw + v for v ≤ δ, and qH1 = qL1 = 0,
2cw+v+δ
2 for δ < v < 2k + δ, and 0 < q
H
1 < k, q
L
1 = 0,
cw + v − k for 2k + δ ≥ v, and qH1 = k, qL1 = 0.
For the FF scenario, first we solve for the retailers’ equilibrium QR order quantities. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that Q1 ≥ Q2. Recall that we assume that when the retailers’
total QR order quantity exceeds the manufacturer’s QR capacity, the manufacturer allocates
its capacity evenly between the retailers. This complicates the analysis and the equilibrium
is characterized in seven regions. Using this result, next we derive the retailers’ equilibrium
regular order quantities. This yields a result similar to Lemma 2 with one additional case: For
min(cw +
3k
2 − v,m− v) < cq ≤ min(cw + 3k2 + v,m+ v − 3k), the retailers order qHi = k and
qLi = 0. This case is relevant only for v ≥ 3k2 , and Qi > 0 implies cw < m − 3k2 . Recall that
Q1 > 0 in the FS scenario requires that cw < m− 5k3 , and therefore Qi > 0 for both of the FS
and FF scenarios requires that cw < m − 5k3 . Knowing the retailers’ ordering policies, finally
we study the manufacturer’s QR pricing decision for cw < m− 5k3 , which yields:
cq =


cw + v for v ≤ δ, and qHi = qLi = 0,
2cw+v+δ
2 for δ < v <
3
2k + δ, and 0 < q
H
i < k, q
L
i = 0,
cw + v − 32k for 32k + δ ≤ v, and qHi = k, qLi = 0.
The above results implies that the QR capacity is fully utilized in both FF and FS scenarios
only for v ≥ max(2k+δ, 3k2 +δ). Also note we assume v < m, and hencem > max(2k+δ, 3k2 +δ)
is the necessary condition for QR to be fully used, which implies k < m−δ6 . Finally, we obtain
the firms’ equilibrium profits with the above results, and comparing these profits across the
scenarios yields the results described in this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 30.
The results are derived by comparing the manufacturer’s expected profit across the scenarios.
Proof of Propositions 31.
The results are derived by comparing each of the retailer’s expected profit across the sce-
narios.
Proof of Proposition 32.
The results are derived by comparing the channel’s total expected profit across the scenarios.
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Proof of Lemma 7. In this case, the retailer’s profit is given by
πR = (A−Q− q)(Q+ q)− cqq − cwQ,
where Q and q are the initial and QR order quantities respectively. It is straightforward that
πR is concave in q, and the retailer’s optimal QR order quantity is given by
q = (
A− cq − 2Q
2
)+.
Given the QR ordering policy, the retailer determines its initial orderQ to maximize its expected
profit E[πR]. Simple algebra reveals that
∂E[πR]
∂Q ≤ 0, and applying the first order condition yields
the retailer’s optimal initial order quantity as follows:
Q =


m−cw
2 for cw + v < cq, and q
H = qL = 0,
m−v−2cw+cq
2 for cw < cq ≤ cw + v, and qH > 0 qL = 0,
0 form− v < cq ≤ cw, and qH ≥ 0 qL ≥ 0,
m−v−cq
2 for cq ≤ min(m− v, cw), and qH ≥ 0 qL ≥ 0.
Anticipating the retailer’s initial and QR order quantities as described above, the manufac-
turer chooses its QR price, cq, to maximize its expected profit
E[πM ] = E[(cq − δ)q] + cwQ.
It can also be confirmed that E[πM ] is piecewise concave in cq, and solving
∂E[πM ]
∂cq
= 0 leads to
the results given in the proposition with
cF =


m+
√
(2m−δ)δ
2 for v ≤ min(δ, m−δ2 ),
m+
√
m2−4mv+4v(v+δ)
2 for
m−δ
2 < v ≤ δ,
m+
√
m2−4mv+5v2+2vδ+δ2
2 formax(δ,
m−δ
2 ) < v,
m+
√
v2+2mv−2vδ
2 for δ < v ≤ m−δ2 .
Proof of Proposition 33.
The result is straightforward by comparing retailer profit across different sequence of events.
Proof of Proposition 34.
The result is established by showing that no retailer has incentive to deviate from these decisions.
6.2 Appendix II
In this section, we first present the equilibrium decisions in sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 and then
we provide the proofs for Chapter 3.
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6.2.1 Equilibrium Decisions in Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2
In these sections, we consider βFi < 1 when manufacturer i forward integrates. Following the
procedure described in the proof of Proposition 11, we derive the following equilibrium decisions.
TABLE 6.3: Equilibrium Quality, Retail Price and Sales in Section 3.6.1
Scenarios Quality Period 1 Retail Price Period 2 Retail Price Total Sales
S1 = N, S2 = N θ1 = θ2 =
(1+k)α
6c p1 = p2 = d(7 + 6k) p1 = p2 = d(6 + 7k) Q1 = Q2 =
1+k
2
S1 = F, S2 = N θ1 = (63γ − 2)A p1 = B1 p1 = B1 − d(1−k)β1 Q1 = (63γ − 2)C
θ2 = (45γ − 2)A p2 = B2 p2 = B2 − d(1 − k) Q2 = (45γ − 2)C
S1 = B, S2 = N θ1 = (63γ − 2)D p1 = E1 p1 = E1 − d(1 − k) Q1 = (63γ − 2)F
θ2 = (45γ − 2)D p2 = E1 + E2 p2 = E1 + E2 − d(1 − k) Q2 = (45γ − 2)F
S1, S2 ∈ {F, B} θ1 = (27γβ2 − 2)G p1 = H1 p1 = H1 − d(1−k)β1 Q1 = β1(27γβ2 − 2)I
θ2 = (27γβ1 − 2)G p2 = H2 p1 = H2 − d(1−k)β2 Q2 = β2(27γβ1 − 2)I
A = (1+k)α6cJ , B1 =
d(k−1−15β1−13kβ1+γβ1(495+387k))
2β1J
, B2 =
d((504γ−1)β1−21+k(396γβ1+β1−19)−21)
2J ,
C = (1+k)2(54γ−1)β1−2 , D =
(1+k)α
12c(27γ−1) , E1 =
d(495γ+3k(129γ−4)−16)
4(27γ−1) , E2 =
3d(1+k)(3γ−2)
4(27γ−1) , F =
(1+k)
4(27γ−1) ,
G = α(1+k)6c(27γβ1β2−β1−β2) , Hi =
d(β1β2γ(135+81k)−(9+7k)βi+(k−1)β3−i)
2βi(27γβ1β2−β1−β2) , I =
(1+k)
2(27γβ1β2−β1−β2) , J =
(54γ − 1)β1 − 1, γ = cdα2 ,
βi =
{
1 if Si = B
βFi < 1 if Si = F
6.2.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 11.
We present the proof for NN scenario; the equilibrium for other scenarios can be derived
following the same procedure. Following backward induction, first we derive the retailers’
equilibrium retail prices for each period. Retailers i’s sales Qi,t can be obtained by solving
U(θi, pi,t, Qi,t) = U(θj, pj,t, ρt −Qi,t) for j = 3− i, which yields
Qi,t =
α(θi − θj)− pi,t + pj,t + dρt
2d
, (6.2)
where ρ1 = 1 and ρ2 = k are the market sizes in each period. Using the sales given by (6.2),
retailers determine their retail price pi,t, t = 1, 2, competitively to maximize their profits. It is
straightforward to show retailer profit in the NN scenario πNNRi is concave in pi,1 and pi,2. Since
inventory is not carried over to the second period, we can solve the retailer pricing problem
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separately for each period using the first order conditions, and obtain the equilibrium prices
and sales:
p∗i,t = dρt +
α(θi − θj) + 2wi + wj
3
,
Q∗i,t =
ρt
2
+
α(θi − θj) + (wj − wi)
6d
.
Having known the retail sales, each manufacturer sets the wholesale price wi to maximize its
profit πNNMi given in (3.3). It is straightforward to show π
NN
Mi
is concave in wi, and the equilibrium
for the wholesale price game can be derived by solving ∂ πNNMi /∂ wi = 0 simultaneously for
i = 1, 2, which yields:
w∗i =
3d(1 + k)
2
+
(2ri + rj) + α(θi − θj)
3
.
Given the manufacturer response for wholesale prices, the suppliers then determine their ma-
terial prices. Each supplier sets its material price ri to maximize its profit π
NN
Si
given in (3.4).
Again, it is straightforward that the profit function is concave in ri. Therefore the equilibrium
satisfies ∂ πNNSi /∂ ri = 0 for i = 1, 2, which yields:
r∗i =
27d(1 + k) + 2α(θi − θj)
6
.
Finally, we consider the supplier quality game. Each supplier determines its quality θi to
maximize profit πNNSi . It can be shown that
∂2 πNNSi
∂ θ2i
< 0 ⇔ c > α281d . Thus, we need c > α
2
81d
to ensure the concavity of πNNSi with respect to θi. Otherwise, quality improvement is too
cheap and competition drives both suppliers to overly invest on quality, making no profit.
Assuming c > α
2
81d , we solve for the suppliers’ equilibrium quality decision following the first
order conditions and obtain:
θ∗i =
(1 + k)α
6c
.
Finally, the equilibrium prices and sales in Proposition 11 follow using this equilibrium quality.
Note the above SPNE is derived for the case where the retailers compete in each market, and
we need to find the parametric conditions for this case. One can find that retailer i’s best
response retail price is given as follows:
pBRi,t =


m+wi+αθi
2 , for Max(σ1, σ2) ≤ pj,t. Local monopoly;
2m− dk − pj,t + α(θi + θj) , for Min(σ2, σ3) ≤ pj,t < Max(σ1, σ2). Local monopoly;
dk+pj,t+wi+α(θi−θj)
2 , for pj,t < Min(σ2, σ3). Retailers compete, market is cleared;
where σ1 =
1
2(3m− 2dk − wi + α(θi + 2θj)),
σ2 = (
√
2m− dk + (1−√2)(wi − αθi) + αθj),
σ3 =
1
3(4m− 3dk − wi + α(θi + 3θj)).
To ensure that the retailers always engage in competition, for each stage game analyzed above,
we check for conditions under which manufacturer and supplier decisions always result in p∗j,t <
Min(σ2, σ3) in equilibrium for the retail pricing game, and this procedure leads to the condition
d < α
2(5+9k)
54m . In sum, we need two parametric assumptions for the NN scenario: (1) c >
α2
81d for
concavity of suppliers’ profit functions, and (2) d < α
2(5+9k)
54m to ensure retail competition in each
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period. In addition, under these assumptions, plugging the equilibrium prices into consumers
utility function reveals that every consumer earns positive utility from their purchase.
We apply the same approach to derive the equilibrium for other scenarios. Likewise, each
scenario generates two conditions: one for concavity of profit functions and the other for ensur-
ing retail competition. Comparing these conditions across scenarios, we find the FF , BF and
FB scenarios generate the highest lower bound c > 2α
2
27d to ensure concavity of profit functions,
and the NN scenario gives the smallest upper bound d < α
2(5+9k)
54m to ensure retail competition.
Finally, in the FN scenario, it can be shown Q2,2 =
9cd(11k−1)−4kα2
216cd−8α2 , and 216cd−8α2 > 0 in the
parameter space we consider. Thus, we also need k > 111 so that product 2 survives in t = 2.
Proof of Proposition 12.
The proof proceeds by comparing the equilibrium qualities and sales given in Proposition
11 across scenarios in the parameter space we consider. For example, θFN1 − θNN1 = 3d(1+k)α108cd−4α2
and QFN1 −QNN1 = 9d(1+k)α108cd−4α2 . We assume c > 2α
2
27d which implies 108cd− 4α2 > 0, and thereby
θFN1 > θ
NN
1 and Q
FN
1 > Q
NN
1 . Other results in this proposition can be derived following the
same procedure.
Proof of Proposition 13.
The proof proceeds by comparing manufacturer profit across scenarios using the equilibrium
quality and prices given in Proposition 11. For part (i.a), we have ΠNNM1 − ΠFNM1 = ǫ1d16(27γ−1)2
where ǫ1 = 4 − 180γ + 1863γ2 + k2(4 − 180γ + 1863γ2) + 6k(4 − 204γ + 2565γ2) and γ = cdα2 .
Note the assumption c > 2α
2
27d implies γ >
2
27 , for which it can be shown ǫ1 > 0, and thereby
ΠNNM1 > Π
FN
M1
. The proof for (i.b) is straightforward by solving ΠFS2M1 − Π
NS2
M1
= 0. Part (ii)
proceeds following the same procedure as in part (i.a).
Proof of Proposition 14.
Part (i) proceeds by Proposition 13 (i.a) and (ii): ΠBNM1 > Π
NN
M1
> ΠFNM1 . Part (ii) compares
ΠBS2M1 and Π
FS2
M1
. It can be shown ΠBS2M1 − Π
FS2
M1
= α
2ǫ2
36c , where ǫ2 = 9(1 + k + k
2)γ − (1 + k)2.
Solving ΠBS2M1 − Π
FS2
M1
= 0 is equivalent to solving ǫ2 = 0, which yields two roots with δ being
the larger one. δ is the only relevant root because ∂
2ǫ2
∂k2 = 18γ − 2 > 0 and the smaller root
is negative. Part (iii) proceeds by the fact (ΠFS2M1 − Π
BS2
M1
) − (ΠFNM1 − ΠBNM1 ) =
γ(1+k)2ǫ3α2
16c(27γ−1)2 > 0
where ǫ3 = 16 − 945γ + 14013γ2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 15.
Parts (i) and (ii) follow from ΠBS2M1 > Π
NS2
M1
and ΠFNM1 < Π
NN
M1
by Proposition 13. In
particular, when a manufacturer can only choose to forward integrate or not integrate at all,
it can be shown that FF is another equilibrium for k <
540γ−6075γ2−12+(27γ−1)
√
8−324γ+3159γ2
4−108γ+243γ2 .
However, Proposition 16 shows ΠFFM1 < Π
NN
M1
, and therefore NN is Pareto optimal.
The proof for part (iii) proceeds by showing no firm has incentive to deviate. First we show
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BB is an equilibrium for k > δ. This result is established by two facts: (1) Proposition 13 (ii)
shows deviation from BB to NB is unattractive, and (2) Proposition 14 states manufacturer
1 does not deviate from BB to FB for k > δ. Note that manufacturer 1 is indifferent between
BB and FB for k = δ. Now we show FF is an equilibrium for k < δ. This result is established
by the following two facts. First, Proposition 14 shows manufacturer 1 does not deviate from
FF to BF for k < δ. Second, let ǫ4 =
4(27γ−1)
√
8−324γ+3159γ2−3(45γ−2)2
4−108γ+243γ2 , the threshold given in
Proposition 13. Then it can be shown that δ < ǫ4 for the parameter space we consider, i.e.,
1
11 < k < 1, making deviation from FF to NF unattractive for k < δ.
Now we consider asymmetric equilibrium. First, FB cannot be an equilibrium for k 6= δ,
because deviation to BB is attractive to manufacturer 1 for k > δ, and deviation to FF is
attractive to manufacturer 2 for k < δ. Finally, FN and BN cannot be equilibrium because
manufacturer 2 is better off by choosing backward integration by Proposition 13 (ii). By sym-
metry, NF and NB also cannot be equilibrium and BF is an equilibrium only for k = δ.
Proof of Proposition 16.
The proof is straightforward because ΠNNM1 − ΠFFM1 =
d(1+6k+k2)
4 > 0 and Π
NN
M1
− ΠBBM1 =
(1+k)2α2
36c > 0.
Proof of Proposition 17.
First consider part (i) of this proposition. For S2 ∈ {B, F}, the proof is straightforward
because ΠNS2M1 +Π
NS2
R1
−ΠFS2M1 =
3d(1+k)2ǫ5
16(27γ−1)2 where ǫ5 = 4− 156γ + 1377γ2 > 0. Other cases for
part (i) can be shown following the same procedure.
Now consider part (ii) of this proposition. For S2 ∈ {B, F}, we have ΠNS2C1 −Π
FS2
C1
= ΠNS2C1 −
ΠBS2C1 =
(1+k)2(18γ−1)αγ(477γ−20)
16c(27γ−1)2 > 0. For S2 = N , we have Π
NS2
C1
− ΠFS2C1 = Π
NS2
C1
− ΠBS2C1 =
(1+k)2α2γ(20−927γ+10125γ2 )
16c(27γ−1)2 > 0.
For part (iii), first note Proposition 15 states that S∗1S
∗
2 = NN, FF or BB depending on
the strategies that are considered. Then part (iii) follows because ΠNNC1 −ΠFFC1 = ΠNNC1 −ΠBBC1 =
9
4d(1 + k)
2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 18.
We use β to denote βF in this proof for ease of notation. The proof proceeds by comparing
the equilibrium quality, price decisions and sales given in Table 6.3. For part (ii.a), solving
pFS21,t − pNS21,t = 0 reveals that pFS21,t > pNS21,t if and only if β < σS2 , where σS2 is the larger root
to χS2 = 0, where S2 ∈ {F, N, B}, and
χF =
{
α2(k − 1− β − kβ + 14β2 + 12kβ2)− 9cdβ(84β − 55 + k(72β − 43)), for t = 1
α2(1− β + 12β2 + k(14β2 − 1− β))− 9cdβ(72β − 43 + k(84β − 55)), for t = 2
χN =
{
18cdβ(28β − 15 + k(22β − 9)) + α2(5− 16β − β2 + k(3− 16β + β2)), for t = 1
18cdβ(22β − 9 + k(28β − 15)) + α2(3− 16β + β2 + k(5− 16β − β2)), for t = 2
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χB =


α4(1− k − 2β − 2kβ − 11β2 − 9kβ2) + 243c2d2β(15 − 28β + k(9− 22β))
−9cdα2(3 + 14β − 61β2 − k(3− 8β + 49β2)), for t = 1
α4(k(1− 2β − 11β2)− 1− 2β − 9β2)− 243c2d2β(22β − 9 + k(28β − 15))
+9cdα2(3− 8β + 49β2 − k(3 + 14β − 61β2)), for t = 2
Proof of Proposition 19.
The proof proceeds by comparing manufacturer profit across scenarios using the equilib-
rium quality and prices given in Table 6.3. In the following, we characterize the existence and
derivation for τN1 . The derivation for τ
F
1 , τ
B
1 , τ2, τ
S2
3 and τ4 can be obtained following the same
procedure. In addition, we use β to denote βF in this proof for ease of notation. It can be shown
that ΠFNM1 − ΠNNM1 = d4υ3 (υ2 − υ1υ3), where υ1 = 3(1 + k)2, υ2 = 81c2d2(85 + 26k + 85k2)β2 −
36cdα2β(3+10β+k(8β−6)+k2(3+10β))+α4(1+2β+5β2+k2(1+2β+5β2)−k(2+4β−6β2),
υ3 = β(54cdβ − α2(1 + β))2. Since υ3 > 0, solving ΠFNM1 − ΠNNM1 = 0 is equivalent to solving
ǫ5 = υ2− υ1υ3 = 0. It can be shown that ǫ5 = 0 has only one real root for 0 < β < 1. Then τN1
is given by this root because of the following facts: (1) ǫ5 > 0 for β = 1, (2) ǫ5 < 0 for β = 0,
and (3) ∂
3ǫ5
∂β3
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 20.
NN cannot be an equilibrium, because proposition 13 (ii) states ΠBNM1 > Π
NN
M1
, showing
manufacturer 1 has incentive to deviate by choosing backward integration.
Proof of Proposition 21.
We use βi to denote β
F
i in this proof for ease of notation. First, we obtain firm equilibrium
decisions given in Appendix 6.2.1 following the procedure described in the proof of Proposition
11. Then the results in this proposition proceeds by comparing equilibrium quality and sales
across scenarios, which leads to the following threshold values
ξθ1 =
α2(15 − 11β1 − 2β2 +
√
81− 66β1 + β21 − 60β2 + 44β1β2 + 4β22
54d(6 − 5β1)β2 ,
ξθ2 =
α2d(β1(4 + 3β2)− 5β2 +
√
25β22 − 2β1β2(15β2 + 8) + β21(16 + 9β22 )
54d2β1β2
,
ξQ1 = ξ
Q
2 = ξ
θ
2 .
Part (iii) of this proposition follows by replacing βF2 = β
F
1 −∆ and show dξ
θ
i
d∆ > 0 and
dξQi
d∆ > 0.
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6.3 Appendix III
6.3.1 Equilibrium Decisions for Extensions
In the following lemma, we describe the equilibrium decisions for a centralized supply chain for
both customer types.
Lemma 12 In a centralized supply chain, the product is sold in both periods. When customers
are strategic, the equilibrium order quantity is Q = 6−5δ8−6δ , the retail prices are p1 =
(2−δ)2
8−6δ and
p2 =
(2−δ)δ
8−6δ . When customers are myopic, the equilibrium order quantity is Q =
3−δ
4−δ , the retail
prices are p1 =
2
4−δ and p2 =
δ
4−δ .
The next lemma summarizes the equilibrium decisions when the supplier has a capacity
limit.
Lemma 13 When there is capacity limit and customers are strategic, the product is sold only
in t = 1 in equilibrium. The supplier’s optimal capacity level and wholesale price are:
(1) For c < 3δ−22−δ : k =
1−c
2−δ and w =
1+c
2 .
(2) For 3δ−22−δ ≤ c < 4−4δ−δ
2+4
√
2δ(δ−1)
(2−δ)2 : k =
2(1−δ)
(2−δ)2 and w =
δ
2−δ .
(3) For 4−4δ−δ
2+4
√
2δ(δ−1)
(2−δ)2 ≤ c: k = 1−c4 and w = 1+c2 .
When there is capacity limit and customers are myopic, the product is sold only in t = 1 in
equilibrium. The supplier’s optimal capacity level and wholesale price are:
(1) For c <
δ−(1−δ)
√
(4−δ)δ
2−δ : k =
(3−δ)δ−2c
2(4−δ)δ and w =
(3−δ)δ−2c
4 .
(2) Otherwise: k = 1−c4 and w =
1+c
2 .
6.3.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. The retailer solves
max
p2
πR = p2(θ − p2
δ
)
s.t. θ − p2
δ
≤ Q− (1− θ)
Since πR is concave in p2, KKT conditions are sufficient to characterize the optimal p2,
which leads to cases (i) and (ii) of this lemma. Following the same procedure, we derive the
supplier’s optimal capacity level and wholesale price when customers are myopic.
Proof of Lemma 5. First consider when customers are strategic. There are there possible
cases in equilibrium: Q ≥ (1 − θ/2), (1 − θ) ≤ Q < (1 − θ/2) and Q ≤ (1 − θ). Note the first
case is impossible, because the retailer has leftover inventory at the end of t = 2 in that case
and it can be strictly better off by reducing its order quantity. Next, we discuss the equilibrium
decisions for the other two cases.
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(1) For (1− θ) ≤ Q < (1− θ/2): In this case, θ = p1−δ(1−Qˆ)1−δ . Using this θ, it can be shown
πR given by (4.10) is concave in p1. Thus, by applying the first order condition with respect to
p1, we obtain the optimal price
p1 =Max(
(1 + δ) − (Q+ Qˆ)δ
2
, 1−Q(1− δ)− Qˆδ).
Using this optimal p1, we derive the rational equilibrium order quantity by solving
∂πR
∂Q = 0
and Q = Qˆ, which yields
Q =
{
3δ−2w
4δ for w <
δ
2
1−w
2−δ otherwise
.
(2) For Q ≤ (1 − θ): In this case, customers believe that the retailer does not have any
inventory at the end of t = 1, and thus the marginal customer is θ = p1. With this θ, the
retailer’s profit πR is joint concave in p1 and Q. Thus the first order condition yields the
optimal retail price p1 =
1+w
2 and order size Q =
1−w
2 . It can be shown that πR is higher with
this order quantity for w > δ2 . However, it can be shown that for w <
1−δ
2−δ , the retailer has
incentive to deviate by ordering more and sells the product in t = 2. Thus, Q = 1−w2 is an
equilibrium only for w > 1−δ2−δ . Finally, cases (i) to (iii) of this lemma follow by combining (1)
and (2). When customers are myopic, cases (iv) and (v) can be derived similarly using θ = p1.
Proof of Proposition 22. The supplier maximizes its profit by solving
max
w
πS = wQ
where Q is given by Lemma 5. It can be shown that πS is concave in w and the optimal w can
be characterized by the first order condition, leading to w in Table 4.1. Finally, the equilibrium
Q, p1 and p2 can be obtained through Lemma 5.
Proof of Corollary 1. The results proceed by comparing the decisions given in Table 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 23. First we derive firm profits by applying the equilibrium decisions
in Table 4.1 to profit functions given by equations (4.10) and (4.11). Then the results are
straightforward by comparing firm profits.
Proof of Proposition 24. The results are straightforward by deriving total channel profit
as ΠC = ΠR +ΠS and comparing it across scenarios.
Proof of Proposition 25. The results are straightforward by comparing the total channel
profit and equilibrium decisions across scenarios.
Proof of Corollary 2. The results are straightforward by comparing the total channel profit
across scenarios.
Proof of Proposition 26. The results are straightforward by comparing firm profits using
the equilibrium decisions given in Lemma 13
Proof of Proposition 27. First we derive firm profits by plugging the equilibrium decisions
given in Lemma 5 into the profit functions given by equations (4.10) and (4.11). Then the
results in this proposition proceed by comparing firm profits across scenarios.
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Proof of Lemma 6. We present the proof when customers are strategic. The equilibrium
decisions when customers are myopic can be derived following the same procedure. When the
supplier offers quick response, the retailer profit is
πR = p1(1− θ) + p2(q + Q¯)− w(Q+ q),
where Q¯ = Q− (1− θ) is the inventory carried over from t = 1 to t = 2, and θ is the marginal
customer who is indifferent between buying in t = 1 or t = 2. The supplier profit is given by
πS = w(Q+ q). (6.3)
Following backward induction, first we derive the retailer’s ordering decision in t = 2. In this
case, the retailer solves
max
p2,q
πR = p2Min(q + Q¯, θ − p2
δ
)−w q,
This problem is jointly concave in p2 and q. Therefore the optimal solution can be derived
using KKT conditions, which leads to the following result:
(1) For Q¯ < θ−w/δ2 : p2 =
w+δθ
2 and q =
θ−w/δ
2 − Q¯.
(2) For θ−w/δ2 ≤ Q¯ < θ2 : p2 = δ(θ − Q¯) and q = 0.
(3) For θ2 ≤ Q¯: p2 = δθ2 and q = 0.
Next, we derive the retailer’s equilibrium order quantity and retail price p1. When customers
believe Q¯ ≥ 0, the marginal customer satisfies θ− p1 = δθ − p2. Using p2 given in case (1), the
marginal customer is
θ =
p1 − p2
1− δ =
2p1 − w
2− δ . (6.4)
We characterize firm decisions using rational expectation equilibrium, seeking for an equi-
librium satisfying ∂πR∂Q = 0 and Q = Qˆ. This procedure leads to the following result.
Lemma 14 When the supplier offers quick response, the retailer’s equilibrium order quantity
and retail price in t = 1 are
(1) For w < (2−δ)δ4−3δ : Q = {Q : 2(1−δ)4−3δ ≤ Q ≤ 6−5δ2(4−3δ) − w2δ}, q ≥ 0 and p1 = (2−δ)
2+w(4−3δ)
8−6δ .
(2) For (2−δ)δ4−3δ ≤ w < δ2−δ : Q = 1− wδ , q = 0 and p1 = wδ .
(3) For δ2−δ ≤ w: Q = 1−w2 , q = 0 and p1 = 1+w2 .
Next, knowing the retailer’s ordering decision, the supplier chooses w to maximize its profit
given by equation (6.3), which leads to the result of this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 28. The proof proceeds by comparing πR and πS given in equations
(6.3.2) and (6.3) with decisions characterized in Lemma 6.
Proof of Proposition 29. First we consider quantity commitment where customers observe
Q. Following backward induction, first we characterize the retailer’s pricing decision p2 in the
second period and the result of this problem is given by Lemma 4.
124
Next, we derive the retailer’s equilibrium order quantity and retail price for t = 1. In this
case, θ = p1−δ(1−Qˆ)1−δ and Qˆ = Q. The retailer maximizes its profit πR given by (4.10). We first
characterize the optimal retail price for t = 1 for any given Q as follows:
p∗1(Q) =


1−Q forQ < 12 ,
1+δ
2 − δQ for 12 ≤ Q < 4−3δ+
√
4−7δ+3δ2
8−6δ ,
(2−δ)2
8−6δ otherwise.
Given the optimal price p∗1(Q), we maximize πR over Q, leading to the optimal quantity Q =
1−w
2 . Finally, the supplier chooses w to maximize its profit πS = w(
1−w
2 ). It is straightforward
to show the optimal wholesale price is w = 12 and thereby the equilibrium decisions.
Now we consider price commitment where p1 and p2 become common knowledge. Note that
customers do not need to form a belief Qˆ because p2 is common knowledge. In this case, the
marginal customer is characterized by
θ =
p1 − p2
1− δ .
Let Q¯ be the inventory carried from t = 1 to t = 2. For any given p1 and p2, we have the
following cases for customer behavior:
(1) For Q(1− δ)− (1− p1 − δ) < p2 ≤ p1δ: Q¯ = 0 and the product is sold only in t = 1.
(2) For p2 ≤ Min(Q(1 − δ) − (1 − p1 − δ), δ(1 − Q)): Q¯ ≥ 0= and the product is sold in
both periods.
(3) For δ(1−Q) < p2 ≤ p1δ: Q¯ > 0 and the product is sold in both periods with inventory
unsold at the end of t = 2.
The retailer profit is jointly concave in p1 and p2. Thus KKT conditions is sufficient to
characterize the optimal solution which is given as follows:
(p1, p2) =
{
(1−Q, δ(1 −Q)) forQ < 12 ,
(12 ,
δ
2) otherwise.
Using these optimal prices, it can be shown that the retailer’s profit is concave in Q, and
the first order condition yields the optimal order quantity Q = 1−w2 . Next the supplier chooses
w to maximize its profit πS = w
1+w
2 . It is straight forward that the optimal wholesale price is
w = 12 and thereby the equilibrium decisions.
Finally, cases (ii) and (iii) of this proposition proceed by comparing firm profits against
those in the SD scenario using the equilibrium decisions given in case (i) .
Proof of Lemma 13. First consider when customers are strategic. Given any capacity level
k, the supplier in this case solves
max
w
πS = wMin(Q, k) − c k, (6.5)
where the order quantity Q is given by Lemma 5.This problem leads to the following result:
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(1) For δ < 0.4247: The product is sold only in t = 1 and
(1. a) For k ≤ 14 : Q = k, w = 1− 2k.
(1. b) For k > 14 : Q = 1/4, w =
1
2 .
(2) For 0.4247 ≤ δ < 23 : The product is sold only in t = 1 and
(2. a) For k ≤ 14 : Q = k, w = 1− 2k.
(2. b) For 14 < k ≤ 2−δ8δ : Q = 14 , w = 12 .
(2. c) For 2−δ8δ < k ≤ 2(1−δ)(2−δ)2 : Q = k, w = δ2−δ .
(3) For 23 ≤ δ: The product is sold only in t = 1 and
(3. a) For k ≤ 1−δ2−δ : Q = k, w = 1− 2k.
(3. b) For 1−δ2−δ < k ≤ 2(1−δ)(2−δ)2 : Q = k, w = δ2−δ .
(3. c) For 2(1−δ)
(2−δ)2 < k ≤ 14−2δ : Q = k, w = 1− k(2− δ).
(3. d) For 14−2δ < k: Q =
1
4−2δ , w =
1
2 .
Using these results, the supplier then maximize its profit with respect to k:
max
k
πS = wMin(Q, k) − c k, (6.6)
The supplier profit ΠS is piecewise concave in k. The result comes straightforward by solving
for the optimal k for each given δ.
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